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PER CURIAM:
Appellants J. Val Roberts and Verle H. Roberts appeal from a
judgment awarding damages for condemnation of real property.
This appeal is before the court on appellee's motion to dismiss
the appeal or affirm the judgment and motion to strike
appellant's docketing statement and on appellant's motion for
partial summary reversal. Appellant's request for
oral argument
is denied on the basis of our determination that lf[t]he facts and
legal arguments are adequately represented in the [memoranda] and
record and the decisional
process would not be significantly
aided by oral argument.M Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in limiting
the issues at trial to the value of the property taken and
severance damages, if any, based upon the parties' stipulation.
Under the facts of this case, where the stipulation does not
expressly reserve for trial the issue of the necessity of the
taking, and the evidentiary hearing on the issue was vacated and
an order of immediate occupancy issued based on the stipulation,
the trial court did not err in limiting the scope of the issues
for trial to the value of the property taken. See Cornish Town

v. Roller. 817 P.2d 305, 309 (Utah 1991); Redevelopment Agency v.
Tanner. 740 P.2d 1296, 1299-30 (Utah 1987), The trial courts
order of immediate occupancy, in reliance upon the stipulation,
made the required findings as to public purpose and need for the
property. Having made those findings, the trial court did not
err in placing the burden of proof on appellants to show the
value of the property taken. See Utah State Road Comm. v.
Fribercr, 687 P.2d 821, 832 (Utah 1984). Appellants' claim that
appellee lacked authority to use eminent domain proceedings to
obtain property for sidewalk construction is without merit. See
Utah Code Ann. S 27-12-96(9) (1995). Finally, appellants have
failed to demonstrate that the trial court's findings of fact in
support of its judgment on the value of the property taken are
clparly erroneous. .§e^ State v r p$nft, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah
1994).
Appellants seek summary reversal of the trial court's order
requiring appellee "to install fill so the distance from the top
of the retaining wall to the ground level is no greater than 2
feet 6 inches in the area immediately west of the retaining
wall,11 to slope the area three feet to the west, and to install
sod. The trial^court-spacif icailX-£flUiJ44 A<? 9£Y9rance damages
S*#WJLtLS$ Iron the manner *n whipft the wall y&§ CQns£ruct^dT*-^*
Appellant seeks jreversal?of this ruling and a determination by
this court th^t, #ppallae muatL.install ^ pafety^railinjg or pay for
taking an additional three feet of appellants' property.
Although there may be SQlf guestion about whether tfc§ trial courts
had authority to fashion an equitable remedy in this condemnatiop
case,, appellants' request for a safety railing*also assumes that
the court had this authority. Appellants did not preserve the
issue that the remedial measures constituted an additional taking
in the trial court. Under the facts of this case, appellants
have demonstrated no basis for reversal of the ruling. The
remaining issues raised on appeal are without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.

Gregory K-/Orme,fcresiaingJudge

^ 7~

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

950136-CA
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ALAMO LAND & CATTLE CO., INC., Petitioner,
v
STATE OF ARIZONA
424 US 295, 47 L Ed 2d 1, 96 S Ct 910
[No. 74-125]
Argued October 14 and 15, 1975. Decided February 24, 1976.
SUMMARY

In federal condemnation proceedings involving lands which, under the
New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act (36 Stat 557), were held in trust by
Arizona for school purposes under federal grants, and which had been
leased by Arizona to a private party under a 10-year grazing lease as
authorized by the Act, the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona held that the lessee was entitled to share in the compensation
award to the extent of both its leasehold interest at the time of condemnation and its improvements on the lands. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recognized that the lessee was entitled to compensation for the improvements, but held that under the Enabling Act, Arizona
had no power to grant a compensable property right to the lessee (495 F2d
12).
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
In an opinion by BLACKMUN, J., expressing the view of six members of the
court, it was held that (1) nothing in the Enabling Act, apart, possibly, from
the extent it might incorporate Arizona law by reference, prevented the
usual application of Fifth Amendment protection of an outstanding leasehold interest, and thus Arizona could execute a grazing lease in such a
manner that the lessee would be entitled to just compensation for the value
of the unexpired leasehold interest upon federal condemnation, and (2) on
remand, the Court of Appeals should determine various questions, including
whether under state law and the lease provisions, the lessee could not
possess a compensable leasehold interest upon federal condemnation.
WHITE, J., joined by BRENNAN, J., dissented, expressing the view that
Briefs of Counsel, p 839, infra.
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under the Enabling Act, the lessee was entitled to compensation only to the
extent of the improvements
STFVFNS, J , did not participate
HEADNOTES
Classified to U S Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers Edition
Public Lands § 26 — federal granta to Eminent Domain § 108 — federal constate — sale
damnation — Arizona trust land*
la, lb The full value provision of the
— rights of leasee
New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act (36
^ 2 b ' ^ Nothing in the New MexicoStat 557), which provides that no lands A n z o n a Enabling Act (36 Stat 557),
...
. , A
j
r J i apart, possibly, from the extent it may
held in trust by Arizona
under federal
*\
f
.
,
'
,, ,
,
,
,
incorporate Arizona law by reference,
grants shall be sold for less than their p r e v e n t a t h e u g u a l a p p l l c a t l o n of Fifth
appraised value, does not exclude an Amendment protection of an outstandappropnate deferred payment arrange- , n g leasehold interest, and Arizona may
ment
execute a 10-year grazing lease of lands

T O T A L CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY® R E F E R E N C E S
27 A M J U R 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 260, 352-355, 63 A M J U B
2d, Public Lands §§ 23, 107
9 A M J U R P L & P R FORMS (Rev ed), Eminent Domain, Forms
27, 214, 11 A M J U R P L & P R FORMS (Rev ed), Federal
Practice and Procedure, Forms 2001-2011
7 A M J U R LEGAL FORMS 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 97 1 et s e q ,
15 A M J U R LEGAL FORMS 2d, Public Lands §§ 212 16-212 18
4 A M J U R PROOF OF FACTS 649, Eminent Domain
11 A M J U R TRIALS 189, Condemnation of Urban Property
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ANNOTATION REFERENCES
Measure of damages payable on condemnation of real property by federal
government 19 1 Ed 2d 1361
Elements and measure of lessee's compensation for taking leasehold in eminent
domain 94 L Ed 826 3 ALR2d 286
Federal courts federal or state law as applicable in determining what is
property for which compensation must be paid upon its taking by the federal
government 1 ALR Fed 479
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—held in trust for school purposes by
Arizona under federal grants—in such a rental value for the remaining term of
manner that the lessee, upon federal the lease, plus the value of any renewal
right exceeds the capitalized value of
condemnation of the lands, will be enti
tied to just compensation for the value of the rental specified in the lease
the unexpired leasehold interest
Eminent Domain § 108, Public Lands
§ 26 — federal grants to Arizona
Public Lands § 26 — federal grants to
— lease — condemnation
state — disposition of state's in7
Under the New Mexico-Arizona En
terest
3 The New Mexico-Arizona Enabling abhng Act (36 Stat 557), if a lease is
Act (36 Stat 557) requires that when made by Arizona of land held in trust
Arizona disposes of its interest in lands under a federal grant for a rental of
held in trust under federal grants, the substantially less than the land's fair
rental value, the lease is null and void,
trust is to receive, at the time of disposi
tion, the then full value of the particular and the holder of the claimed leasehold
interest
is not entitled to compensation
interest which is being dispensed
upon condemnation of the land by the
Eminent Domain § 108 — just com- United States
pensation — leasehold interest
4 The holder of an unexpired lease- Public Lands § 26 — Arizona trust
lands — grazing lease
hold interest in land is entitled, under
8 Under the provision of the New
the Fifth Amendment, to just compensa
tion for the value of that interest when Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act (36 Stat
it is taken upon condemnation by the 557) that no "mortgage or other encum
United States
brance" of trust lands held by Arizona
under federal grants shall be valid a
Damages §§120, 122; Eminent Domain lease of trust lands for grazing purposes
§ 108; Public Lands § 26 — federal for a term of 10 years or less, as authogrants to Arizona — lease — con- rized by the Act, is not a prohibited
demnation
"mortgage or encumbrance "
5 When a lease is made by Arizona of
land held in trust under federal grants Appeal and Error § 1692 1 — remand
pursuant to the New Mexico-Arizona En
— questions not considered below
abhng Act (36 Stat 557), the trust must
receive from the leasee the then fair
9a, 9b Upon holding that a United
rental value of the possessory interest States Court of Appeals erred in conclud
transferred by the lease, and upon a ing that under the New Mexico-Arizona
subsequent condemnation of the land by Enabling Act (36 Stat 557), a lessee of
the United States, the trust must receive school trust lands held by Arizona under
the then full value of the reversionary federal grants was not entitled to com
interest that is subject to the outstand
pensation for the unexpired leasehold
mg lease, plus the value of the rental interest upon federal condemnation of
rights under the lease, the trust is not the lands, the United States Supreme
entitled, in addition, to receive the com
Court will remand the case for the Court
pensable value, if any, of the leasehold
interest, which if it exists and if the of Appeals' determination of the ques
tions, not initially determined by the
lease is valid, is the lessee's
Court of Appeals, (1) whether, under
state law and the lease provisions, the
Damages § 122 — condemnation of lessee could not possess a compensable
leasehold interest
leasehold interest upon the federal con
6 Ordinarily, upon condemnation of a demnation, (2) if the lessee did possess
leasehold interest by the United States, such an interest, how it is properly to be
the leasehold interest has a compensable evaluated and calculated (with the subvalue whenever the capitalized fair sidiary questions of the relevance of pos
3
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Bible lease renewals and of possible value
additions by reason of the lessee's devel
o p m e n t of adjoining properties), and (3)
if such interest proves to be substantial,
w h e t h e r it is permissible to find from
such fact a violation of the Enabling
Act's requirement that a lease, w h e n
offered, shall be appraised at its true
value and be given at not less t h a n such
value
D a m a g e s § 1 2 2 ; P u b l i c L a n d s § 26 —
Arizona trust l a n d s — l e a s e h o l d
interest

47 L Ed 2d

10a f 10b Under t h e N e w Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act (36 Stat 557), rentals
under a grazing lease of lands held in
trust by Arizona under federal grants
m u s t be adjusted to reflect current fair
rental value before any renewal of t h e
lease, and thus upon federal condemnation of the lands, the calculation of t h e
lessee's compensable leasehold interest
cannot include t h e prospect of r e n e w i n g
t h e lease at less t h a n fair rental value

1 N o t h i n g in the Enabling Act, apart,
possibly, from t h e e x t e n t it m a y incorporate Arizona law by reference, prevents

t h e usual application of Fifth Amendm e n t protection of t h e outstanding leasehold interest whereby the holder of such
an interest is entitled to just compensation for the value of that interest w h e n
it is taken upon condemnation by t h e
United States
2 To be determined on remand are (1)
whether, under state law and t h e provisions of the lease, petitioner could not
possess a compensable leasehold interest
upon the federal condemnation, (2) if
petitioner did possess such an interest,
how it is properly to be evaluated a n d
calculated (with t h e subsidiary questions
of the relevance of possible lease renewa l s and of possible value additions by
reason of petitioner's development of adjoining properties), and (3) if t h a t interest proves to be substantial, w h e t h e r it is
permissible to find from that fact a violation of the Enabling Act's requirement
t h a t a lease, when offer<*d, shall be appraised at its "true value" and be g i v e n
at not less than that value
495 F2d 12 reversed and remanded
Blackmun, J , delivered the opinion of
t h e Court, in w h i c h Burger, C J , and
Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ , joined White, J , filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J ,
joined, post p 311, 47 L Ed 2d, p 13
Stevens, J , took no part in the consideration or decision of the case

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

J. Gordon Cook argued the cause for petitioner
Peter C. Gullato argued the cause for respondent
Briefs of Counsel, p 839, infra
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OPINION OF THE COURT

Mr Justice Blackmun delivered
the opinion of the Court

were granted to Arizona "for the
support of common schools " By § 282

This case presents an issue of federal condemnation law—as it relates
to an outstanding lease of trust
lands—that, we are told, affects substantial acreage in our Southwestern
and Western States

of the same Act, 36 Stat 574, as
amended by the Act of June 5, 1936,
c 517, 49 Stat 1477, and by the Act
of June 2, 1951, 65 Stat 51, the lands
transferred "shall

I

SYLLABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS
In 1962 Arizona, a s lessor, and petitioner, as lessee, e x e c u t e d a 10-year
grazing lease of certain tracts of land
which had been granted to Arizona to be
held in trust under the N e w M e x i c o - A n
zona Enabling Act In 1966 t h e United
States filed a c o n d e m n a t i o n complaint in
connection with a flood control d a m and
reservoir which included t h e leased
tracts In allocating t h e stipulated com
pensation payable by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
for t h e tracts the District Court awarded
Arizona a certain a m o u n t for its fee
interest and petitioner o n e a m o u n t for
t h e improvements and a n o t h e r a m o u n t
for "its leasehold interest at t h e t i m e of
taking and its reasonable prospective
leasehold i n t e r e s t " T h e Court of Appeals, while recognizing t h a t petitioner
w a s entitled to c o m p e n s a t i o n for t h e
improvements, and finding it unnecessary to d e t e r m i n e petitioner's rights
based upon t h e provisions of t h e lease or
upon state law, held t h a t under the
Enabling Act Arizona, a s t r u s t e e , had no
power to grant a c o m p e n s a b l e leasehold
interest and that petitioner therefore
never
acquired a property right for
which it is entitled to compensation
Held

ALAMO LAND & CA1PTLE CO v ARIZONA

Under § 24' of the New MexicoArizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat 572
(1910), specified sections of every
township in the then proposed State
1. "Sec 24 That in addition to sections
sixteen and thirty six, heretofore reserved for
the Territory of Arizona, sections two and
thirty two in every township in said proposed
State not otherwise appropriated at the date
of the passage of this Act are hereby granted
to the said State for the support of common
schools
2 "Sec 28 That it is hereby declared that
all lands hereby granted, including those
which, having been heretofore granted to the
said Territory, are hereby expressly transfer
red and confirmed to the said State, shall be
by the said State held in trust, to be disposed
of in whole or in part only in manner as
herein provided and for the several objects
specified in the respective granting and conhr
matory provisions, and that the natural prod
ucts and money proceeds of any of said lands
shall be subject to the same trusts as the
lands producing the same
"Disposition of any of said lands, or of any
money or thing of value directly or indirectly
derived therefrom, for any object other than
for which such particular lands, or the lands
from which such money or thing of value
shall have been derived, were granted or
confirmed, or in any manner contrary to the
provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a
breach of trust
"No mortgage or other encumbrance of the
said lands, or any part thereof, shall be valid
in favor of any person or for any purpose or
under any circumstances whatsoever
Nothing herein contained shall prevent (I)
the leasing of any of the lands referred to in
this section, in such manner as the Legisla
ture of the State of Arizona may prescribe,
for grazing, agricultural, commercial, and
homesite purposes, for a term of ten years or

[424 US 297]

[424 US 298]

be by
the said State held in trust, to be
disposed of in whole or in part only
in manner as herein provided and
for the several objects specified
less,
or (4) the Legislature of the State of
Arizona from providing by proper laws for the
protection of lessees of said lands, whereby
such lessees shall be protected in their rights
to their improvements (including water
rights) in such manner that in case of lease or
sale of said lands to other parties the former
lessee shall be paid by the succeeding lessee
or purchaser the value of such improvements
and rights placed thereon by such lessee
'AH lands leaseholds, timber and other
products of land, before being offered, shall be
appraised at their true value, and no sale or
other disposal thereof shall be made for a
consideration less than the value so ascer
tained
No lands shall be sold for less than their
appraised value
"A separate fund shall be established for
each of the several objects for which the said
grants are hereby made or confirmed, and
whenever any moneys shall be in any manner
derived from any of said land the same shall
be deposited by the state treasurer in the
fund corresponding to the grant under which
the particular land producing such moneys
was by this Act conveyed or confirmed No
moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for
deposit in any other or for any object other
than that for which the land producing the
same was granted or confirmed
Every sale lease conveyance or contract
of or concerning any of the lands hereby
granted or confirmed, or the use thereof or
the natural products thereof not made in
substantial conformity with the provisions of
this Act shall be null and void any provision
of the constitution or laws of the said State to
the contrary notwithstanding

5
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ALAMO LAND & CATTLE CO. v ARIZONA
424 US 295, 47 L Ed 2d 1, 96 S Ct 910

and . . . the . . . proceeds of any of
said lands shall be subject to the
same trusts as the lands producing
the same." Arizona, by its Constitution, Art 10, § l,a accepted the lands
so granted and its trusteeship over
them.
Among the lands constituting the
grant to Arizona were two parcels
herein referred to as Tract 304 and
Tract 305, respectively.4 On February 8, 1962, Arizona, as lessor, and
petitioner Alamo Land and Cattle
Company, Inc. (Alamo), as lessee,
executed a grazing lease of
[424 US 299]

these
tracts for the 10-year period ending
February 7, 1972. App 6-14. By Arizona statute, Ariz Rev Stat Ann 37281D (1974), incorporated by general
reference into the lease, App 7,
Alamo may not use the lands for
any purpose other than grazing.
On May 31, 1966, while the two
tracts were subject to the grazing
lease and were utilized as part of
Alamo's larger operating cattle
ranch, the United States filed a complaint in condemnation in the
United States District Court for the
District of Arizona in connection
with the establishment of a flood
control dam and reservoir at a site
on the Bill Williams River. The
3. "All lands expressly transferred and confirmed to the State by the provisions of the
Enabling Act approved June 20, 1910, including all lands granted to the State and all
lands heretofore granted to the Territory of
Arizona, and all lands otherwise acquired by
the State, shall be by the State accepted and
held in trust to be disposed of in whole or in
part, only in manner as in the said Enabling
Act and in this Constitution provided, and for
the several objects specified in the respective
granting and confirmatory provisions The
natural products and money proceeds of any
of said lands shall be subject to the same
trusts as the lands producing the same."
4. "Tract 304

6

tracts in their entirety were among
the properties that were the subject
of the complaint in condemnation.
The District Court duly entered the
customary order for delivery of possession.8
Thereafter, the United States and
Arizona and, separately, the United
States and Alamo, stipulated that
"the full just compensation" payable
by the United States "for the taking
of said property, together with all
improvements thereon and appurtenances thereunto belonging" was
$48,220 for Tract 304 and $70,400
for Tract 305, and thus a total of
$118,620 for the two. 1 Rec 166, 162.6
At a distribution hearing held to
determine the proper allocation of
the compensation amounts, the only
parties claiming an interest in the
awards for the two tracts were respondent Arizona, asserting title
through the federal grants to it, and
petitioner Alamo, asserting a compensable leasehold interest in the
lands and a compensable
[424 US 300]

interest in
the improvements thereon. The
State conceded that Alamo was entitled to receive the value of the improvements, but contested Alamo's
right, as lessee, to participate in the
"All of Section 2, Township 10 North,
Range 13 West, Gila and Salt River Base and
Meridian, Yuma County, Arizona."
"Tract 306
"All of Section 36, Township 11 North,
Range 13 West, Gila and Salt River Base and
Meridian, Yuma County, Arizona." App 1-2.
5. No question is raised as to the propriety
or effectiveness of the condemnation procedure.
6. These figures were also the compensation
estimated for the respective tracts in the
declaration of taking and paid into court. 1
Rec 15.

portion of the award allocated to
land value. The District Court, with
an unreported opinion, App 1-5,
awarded Arizona $57,970 for its fee
interest, and awarded Alamo $3,600
for the improvements and $57,050
for "its leasehold interest at the
time of taking, and its reasonable
prospective leasehold interest." 1
Rec pp 227-228. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, while recognizing
that Alamo was entitled to compensation for the improvements, held
that under the Enabling Act Arizona
"had no power to grant a compensable property right to Alamo," and
that "Alamo therefore never acquired a property right for which it
is entitled to compensation." United
States v 2562.92 Acres of Land, 495
F2d 12, 14 (1974). The Court of Appeals thus reversed the judgment of
the District Court insofar as it concerned the leasehold interests. It remanded the cause for the entry of a
new judgment in accordance with its
opinion. Id., at 15. Because the
Ninth Circuit's decision appeared to
implicate this Court's decision in
Lassen v Arizona ex rel. Arizona
Highway Dept. 386 US 458, 17 L Ed
2d 515, 87 S Ct 584 (1967), and because it was claimed to be in conflict
with Nebraska v United States, 164
F2d 866 (CA8 1947), cert denied, 334
US 815, 92 L Ed 1745, 68 S a 1070
(1948), we granted Alamo's petition
for certiorari. 420 US 971, 43 L Ed
2d 650, 95 S Ct 1390 (1975).

by Arizona in trust pursuant to the
provisions of the Enabling Act. What
was involved,
[424 US 301]

therefore, was the acquisition of interests in trust lands
by the State itself. The Supreme
Court of Arizona held that it could
be presumed conclusively that highways constructed across trust lands
always enhanced the value of the
remainder in amounts at least equal
to the value of the areas taken and
therefore refused to order the Highway Department to compensate the
trust. State v Lassen, 99 Ariz 161,
407 P2d 747 (1965). This Court unanimously reversed. In so doing, it observed that the more recent federal
grants to newly admitted States, including Arizona, "make clear that
the United States has a continuing
interest in the administration of
both the lands and the funds which
derive from them." 385 US, at 460,
17 L Ed 2d 515, 87 S Ct 584.

The Court read § 28 of the Enabling Act with particularity. It emphasized the Act's requirements that
trust lands be sold or leased only to
" 'the highest and best bidder' "; that
no lands be sold for less than their
appraised value; that disposal of
trust lands be " 'only in manner as
herein provided'"; that disposition
in any other way " 'shall be deemed
a breach of trust' "; and that every
sale or lease " 'not made in substantial conformity with the provisions
of this Act shall be null and void.'"
385 US at 461-462, 17 L Ed 2d 515,
87 S Ct 584. The Court then examII
ined the purposes of the Act and
The Lassen case was an action concluded that the grant "was
instituted by the Arizona Highway plainly expected to produce a fund,
Department to prohibit the applica- accumulated by sale and use of
tion by the State Land Commis- the trust lands, with which the
sioner of rules governing the acquisi- State could support the public intion of rights-of-way and material stitutions designated by the Act."
sites in federally donated lands held Id., at 463, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87
7
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S Ct 584. Sales and leases were intended. The "central problem" was
"to devise constraints which would
assure that the trust received in full
fair compensation for trust lands."
Ibid. The Court concluded, for reasons stated in the opinion, that the
Act's procedural restrictions did not
apply when the State itself sought
trust lands for its highway program.

compensate the trust in money for
the full appraised value of any material sites or rights-of-way which it
obtains on or over trust lands." Id.,
at 469, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87 S a 584.'
(footnotes omitted) This standard, it
was said, "most consistently reflects
the essential purposes of the grant."
Id., at 470, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87 S Ct
584.

[424 US 302]

Much of what was said in Lassen
had also been said, several decades
earlier, in Ervien v United States,
251 US 41, 64 L Ed 128, 40 S a 75
(1919), when the provisions of the
same Enabling Act were under consideration in a federal case from
New Mexico. The Court's concern for
the integrity

[1a] The Court then turned to the
standard of compensation Arizona
must employ to recompense the
trust for the interests the State acquired. It concluded that the terms
and purposes of the grant did not
permit Arizona to diminish the actual monetary compensation payable
to the trust by the amount of any
enhancement in the value of remaining trust lands. The Court emphasized that the Enabling Act "unequivocally demands both that the
trust receive the full value of any
lands transferred from it and that
any funds received be employed only
for the purposes for which the land
was given." Id., at 466, 17 L Ed 2d
515, 87 S Ct 584. It again stressed
the requirements of the Act and
noted that "these restrictions in
combination indicate Congress' concern both that the grants provide
the most substantial support possible
to the beneficiaries and that only
those beneficiaries profit from the
trust." Id., at 467, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87
S Ct 584. All this was confirmed by
the background and legislative history of the Enabling Act. Accordingly, it held that even where the
State itself is the acquisitor, the
Act's designated beneficiaries were
to derive the full benefit of the
grant. Thus, "Arizona must actually
7. [ 1 b ] The full-value provision does not
exclude an appropriate deferred-payment arrangement. Lassen v Arizona ex rel. Arizona

8

[424 US 303]

of the conditions imposed by the Act, therefore, has long
been evident.
[2a, 3] But to say, as the Court did
in Ervien and in Lassen, that the
trust is to receive the full value of
any lands transferred from it is not
to say that the Act requires, in every
Arizona case where a leasehold is
outstanding at the time of the federal condemnation, that the trust is
to receive the entire then value of
the land and the possessor of the
leasehold interest is to receive nothing whatsoever. What the Act requires—and we think that this is
clear from Ervien and Lassen—is
that the trust is to receive, at the
time of its disposition of any interest
in the land, the then full value of
the particular interest which is being dispensed.
[4, 5] It has long been established
that the holder of an unexpired leasehold interest in land is entitled,
Highway Dept. 386 US 458, 469, n 21, 17 L Ed
2d 515, 87 S C t 584 (1967)

under the Fifth Amendment, " to
just compensation for the value of
that interest when it is taken upon
condemnation by the United States.
United States v Petty Motor Co. 327
US 372, 90 L Ed 729, 66 S Ct 596
(1946); A. W. Duckett & Co. v United
States, 266 U S 149, 69 L Ed 216, 45
5 Ct 38 (1924). See United States v
General Motors Corp. 323 US 373,
89 L Ed 311, 65 S Ct 357, 156 ALR
390 (1945); Almota Farmers Elevator
6 Warehouse Co. v United States,
409 U S 470, 35 L Ed 2d 1, 93 S Ct
791 (1973); 2 P. Nichols, Eminent
Domain § 5.23 (Rev 3d ed 1975); 4 id.
§ 12.42 [1]. It would therefore seem
to follow that when a lease of trust
land is made, the trust must receive
from the lessee the then fair rental
value of the possessory interest .
transferred by the lease, and t h a t |
upon a subsequent condemnation by
the United States, the trust must
receive the then full value of the
reversionary interest that is subject
to the outstanding lease, plus, of
course, the value of the rental rights
under the lease. The trust should
not be entitled,

"The measure of damages is the
value of the use and occupancy of
the leasehold for the remainder of
the tenant's term, plus the value
of the right to renew . . ., less the
agreed rent which the tenant
would pay for such use and occupancy." United States v Petty Motor Co. 327 US, at 381, 90 L Ed
729, 66 S Ct 596.
See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v United States, supra.
A number of factors, of course, could
operate to eliminate the existence of
compensable value in the leasehold
interest. Presumably, this would be
so if the Enabling Act provided, as
the New Mexico-Arizona Act does
not, that any lease of trust land was
revocable at will by the State, or if it
provided that, upon sale or condemnation of the land, no compensation
was payable to the lessee. The State,
of course, may require that a provision of this kind be included in the
lease. See United States v Petty Motor Co. 327 US, at 375-376 and, n 4,
90 L Ed 729, 66 S Ct 596; see also 4
Nichols, supra, § 12.42 [1], pp 12-488
and 12-489.

[424 US 304]

in addition to
all this, to receive the compensable
value, if any, of the leasehold interest. That, if it exists and if the lease
is valid, is the lessee's. See State ex
rel. La Prade v Carrow, 57 Ariz 429,
433-434, 114 P2d 891, 893 (1941).
[6] Ordinarily, a leasehold interest
has a compensable value whenever
the capitalized then fair rental value
for the remaining term of the lease,
plus the value of any renewal right,
exceeds the capitalized value of the
rental the lease specifies. The Court
has expressed it this way:
8. "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."

[7] A difference between the rental
specified in the lease and the fair
rental value plus the renewal right
could arise either because the lease
rentals were set initially at less than
fair rental value, or because during
the term of the lease the value of
the land, and consequently its fair
rental value, increased. The New
Mexico-Arizona Enabling
[424 US 305]

Act has
a protective provision against the
initial setting of lease rentals at less
than fair rental value. This is specifically prohibited by § 28. The prohibition is given bite by the further
very drastic provision that a lease
9
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not made in substantial conformity
with the Act "shall be null and
void." Thus, if the lease of trust
lands calls for a rental of substantially less than the land's then fair
rental value, it is null and void and
the holder of the claimed leasehold
interest could not be entitled to compensation upon condemnation.
[2b] On the other hand, the fair
rental value of the land may increase during the term of the lease.*
If this takes place, the increase in
fair rental value operates to create a
compensable value in the leasehold
interest. It is at this point, we feel,
that the Court of Appeals erred
when it held that the Act by its
terms, and apart from the extent to
which it incorporated Arizona law
by reference, barred Arizona from
leasing trust land in any manner
that might result in the lessee's becoming constitutionally entitled to
just compensation for the value of
its unexpired leasehold interest at
the time of the federal condemnation. Instead, the Act is completely
silent in this respect.
Ill
[•] Arizona, however, suggests
that this usually acceptable analysis
may not be applied under the N e w
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act. It argues, as the Court of Appeals held,
495 F2d, at 14, that under that Act
the State, as trustee, has no power
to grant a compensable property
9. The Arizona statutes governing grazing
leases of trust lands recognize this possibility
and provide for adjustment of rent at specified
times to account for fluctuations in fair rental
value. Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§37-283, 37-286
(1974) Indeed, under § 28 of the Enabling Act,
at the termination of a lease, a re-evaluation
would appear to be required before release or
renewal.
10. The Supreme Court of New Mexico long

10

[424 US 306)

interest to Alamo, as lessee. It bases
this thesis on the Enabling Act's
provision in § 28 that no "mortgage
or other encumbrance" of trust land
shall be valid, and it claims that a
lease is an encumbrance, citing,
among other cases, Hecketsweiler v
Parrett, 185 Or 46, 52, 200 P2d 971,
974 (1948) (agreement to sell real
estate free and clear of encumbrances), and Hartman v Drake, 166
Neb 87, 91, 87 NW2d 895, 898 (1958)
(partition). One seemingly apparent
and complete answer to this argument is that § 28 goes on to authorize specifically a lease of trust land
for grazing purposes for a term of 10
years or less, and further provides
that a leasehold, before being offered, shall be appraised at "true
value." See n 2, supra. These provisions thus plainly contemplate the
possibility of a lease of trust land
and, in so doing, intimate that such
a lease is not a prohibited "mortgage
or other encumbrance." 10 Furthermore, Arizona statutes in other contexts specifically protect the lessee's
interest. Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 41511.06, 37-291 (1974). See Ehle v
Tenney Trading Co 56 Ariz 241, 107
P2d 210 (1940). To this the State responds that, while a lease is possible,
it falls short of being a compensable interest when the property is sold
because the Act prohibits the sale
unless the trust receives the full apago ruled that a grazing lease of state lands is
not a "mortgage or . . . encumbrance," within
the meaning of the identical prohibition, applicable to New Mexico, in § 10 of the New
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat 563.
American Mortgage Co. v White, 34 NM 602,
605-606, 287 P 702, 703 (1930). See United
States v 40,021.64 Acres of Land, 387 F Supp
839, 848-849 (NM 1975); State ex rel. State
Highway Comm'n v Chavez, 80 NM 394, 456
P2d 868 (1969).

praised value of the land. The argument assumes that such compensation is to be measured by the entire
land value despite the presence of
the outstanding lease. That approach overlooks the actuality of a
two-step disposition
[424 US 307]

of interests in
the land, the first at the time of the
granting of the lease, and the second
at the time of the condemnation.
Full appraised value is to be determined and measured at the times of
disposition of the respective intere s t , and if the State receives those
values at those respective times, the
demands of the Enabling Act are
met. The State's argument would
serve to convert and downgrade a
10-year grazing lease, fully recognized and permitted by the Act, into
a lease terminable at will or into
one automatically terminated whenever the State sells the property or
it is condemned. The lessee is entitled to better treatment than this if
neither the Enabling Act nor the
lease contains any such provision.
We have noted above that the Act or
the lease, or both, could provide for
that result. The Act, however, does
not specifically so provide. Whether
either the Act or the lease does so
through incorporation of state law is
an issue not addressed by the Court
of Appeals, and it is to be considered
on remand. We merely note that the
fact that it is within Arizona's power
to insert a condemnation clause in a
lease it makes of trust land does not
mean that the State may claim the
same result when its lease contains
no such clause.
IV
Alamo suggests that the Court of
Appeals' decision is at odds with the
above-cited case of Nebraska v
United States, 164 F2d 866, cert de-

nied, 334 US 815, 92 L Ed 1745, 68 S
Ct 1070. There, in the face of a
totality claim like that made by Arizona here, the Eighth Circuit ruled
that trust lands in Nebraska were to
be treated as any other property and
that condemnation proceeds were
subject to allocation between the
State as trustee and the holder of an
outstanding agricultural lease. The
Nebraska Enabling Act of April 19,
1864, c 59, 13 Stat 47, was an earlier
edition of this type of statute, and
was adopted
[424 US 308]

more
than four decades before the N e w
Mexico-Arizona Act. It did not contain the detailed restrictive provisions that appear in the 1910 Act
and that were developed and utilized
as passing years and experience
demonstrated a need for them. Because of this, one may say, as Arizona does, that the Nebraska case is
distinguishable from the present
one. But the decision is not devoid of
precedential value, for it is consistent with our analysis of the New
Mexico-Arizona Act in its recognition of the possibility of a compensable leasehold interest in trust land
upon federal condemnation, and it
demonstrates that the existence of
that interest is not incompatible
with the trust land concept. See also
United States v 78.61 Acres of Land,
265 F Supp 564 (Neb 1967), a postLassen case; United States v
40,021.64 Acres of Land, 387 F Supp
839, 848-849 (NM 1975).

[9a] Finally, the Court of Appeals
observed, but only in passing, 495
F2d, at 14, that the lease recited
that it was made subject to the laws
of Arizona; that if the State "relinquished" the property to the United
States, the lease "shall be null and
11
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void as it may pertain to the land so
relinquished"; and that no provision
of the lease "shall create any vested
right in the lessee " The court also
observed, ibid., that Ariz Rev Stat
Ann §§37-242 and 37-293" restrict a
lessee's participation in the
[424 US 309]
11.5 37 242:
"A. When state lands on which there are
improvements for which the owner thereof is
entitled to be compensated are offered for
sale, and the purchaser is not the owner of
the improvements, the purchaser shall pay
the person conducting the sale ten percent of
the appraised value of the improvements and
the balance within thirty days thereafter. If
the state land department determines that
the amount at which the improvements are
appraised is so great that competitive bidding
for the land will be thereby hindered, the
department may sell the improvements on
installments payable ten per cent upon announcement of the successful bidder, fifteen
per cent thirty days thereafter, and fifteen
per cent annually thereafter for five years,
together with six per cent interest on the
balance remaining unpaid, which amount,
until paid, shall be a lien upon the land The
purchaser shall at all times, keep the insurable improvements insured for the benefit of
the state. Payments shall be made at the time
and in the manner prescribed for payments
on the land, and any default in the payments
for improvements shall be deemed a default
in the payments for the land.
"B. When improvements are sold on installments, the first twenty-five per cent, after
deducting all rents, penalties and costs owing
to the state on account of the land, shall be
paid to the owner of the improvements, and
the balance shall become a legal charge
against the state.
"C Upon surrendering possession of any
such land, the owner of the improvements
thereof shall file with the commissioner of
finance his claim for the balance on the improvements remaining unpaid, and if the
claim bears the approval of the department as
to correctness, and a certificate that possession of the lands and improvements has been
surrendered by all persons having lawful
claims for improvements on the land, it shall
be paid by the state treasurer on the warrant
of the cammifwioner of finance from any fund
in which there is money subject to investment As payments for the improvements are
made by the purchaser, they shall be depos-

12

proceeds
of a sale of public land to the value
of improvements. Having made
these observations, however, the
court thereupon concluded that it
did not find it necessary
[424 US 310]

"to determine the
ited with the state treasurer and both principal and interest shall be returned by him to
the fund from which they were taken.
"D. Failure to pay the balance of the purchase price or the fifteen per cent within
thirty days after the announcement of the
successful bidder shall constitute a forfeiture
of all rights to the land and all payment*
made."
§ 37-293:
"A. A lessee of state lands shall be reimbursed by a succeeding lessee for improvements placed on the lands which are not
removable. If the retiring lessee and the new
lessee do not agree upon the value of the
improvements, either party may file with the
state land department an application for appraisal of the improvements. Thereafter an
appraisal of the improvements shall be made
in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions as appraisals of improvements are
made when state lands are sold.
"B Upon making the appraisal, the department shall give notice of the amount thereof
by registered mail to each person interested
in the appraisal. The notice shall require that
the new lessee pay to the department for the
prior lessee the entire amount of the appraisal within thirty days from the date of
the notice, or the department, when the value
is greater than the rental for the period of
the lease, may require that payment of ten
per cent of the appraised value be made
within thirty days, fifteen per cent within
sixty days, twenty-five per cent at the end of
the first year of the new lease, and twenty-five
per cent at the end of each year thereafter
until the entire balance is paid.
"C If the improvements are not paid for as
required in the notice, the succeeding lessee
shall not be permitted to sell, assign, or transfer his lease, nor sell, assign or remove any
improvements whatever from the land until
the entire amount of the appraised value of
the improvements has been paid. Upon default he shall be subject to the Bame penalties
and liabilities as provided by § 37-288 for
failure to pay rents, including a cancellation
of the lease"

rights of Alamo based upon these
lease provisions or the state law."
495 F2d, at 14.
The significance of the provisions
referred to and of the cited statutes
will now be for determination upon
remand. We note only that the land
in question was condemned and thus
does not appear to have been technically "relinquished" by Arizona to
the United States; that we are not at
all sure that there is language of
restriction in §§37-242 and 37-293;
and that Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§37288 and 37-290 respectively permit
forfeiture for violation of the conditions of a lease or for nonpayment of
rent, and cancellation of a lease if
the leased land is reclassified to a
higher use, and thus could explain
the lease's provision against vesting
in the technical sense that it is not
subject to any contingency whatsoever.
[424 US 311]

[2cf 9b, 10a] To repeat: we hold
that nothing in the Enabling Act
apart, possibly, from the extent it
may incorporate Arizona law by reference, prevents the usual application of Fifth Amendment protection
of the outstanding leasehold interest.

We leave for determination on remand the following: (1) whether, under state law and the lease provisions, Alamo could not possess a
compensable leasehold interest upon
the federal condemnation; (2) if
Alamo did possess such an interest,
how it is properly to be evaluated
and calculated (with the subsidiary
questions of the relevance of possible
lease renewals' 2 and of possible
value additions by reason of Alamo's
development of adjoining properties,
cf. United States v Fuller, 409 US
488, 35 L Ed 2d 16, 93 S Ct 801
(1973)); and, (3) if that interest
proves to be substantial, whether it
is permissible to find from that fact
a violation of the Enabling Act's
requirement that a lease, when offered, "shall be appraised at [its]
true value" and be given at not less
than that value.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part
in the consideration or decision of
this case.

SEPARATE OPINION

Mr. Justice White with whom Mr.
Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
The question in this
whether, under § 28 of the

case

is

[424 US 312]

New Mexico-Arizona Enabling
Act (Act), 36 Stat 574, the State of
Arizona had the power to grant to
12. [ 1 0 b ] We note in regard to the possible
value of renewal rights that leases of the kind
in issue here are limited by statute to 10
years in duration, and that the Act requires
that rentals be adjusted to reflect current fair
rental value before any renewal. See n 9,

petitioner a compensable leasehold
interest in the property in issue. The
question is solely one of statutory
construction. As I agree with the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that Congress intended that lessees of land covered by the Act
should acquire a compensable interest in leased land only to the extent
supra Therefore, although we do not foreclose
the relevance of possible renewals, the calculation of the lessee's interest cannot include
the prospect of renewing the lease at less
[haVfaTr'rtntaT val
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of " i m p r o v e m e n t s . . . p l a c e d
thereon by such lessee," United
Stntps v 2562 92 Acres of Land, 495

47 L Ed 2d

to square them with the Act's unqualified ban on encumbrances.
ft

jv CnMiT'*'^' policv,

hovvover

h i mm.Hut* .niioiii.ii ii ,II I v O|>UJI >.ut'
leases terminable at will or by sale
or condemnation, is clearly an "enor condemnation. In 1888 Congress
cumbrance." 7 G. Thompson, Real provided, with respect to school trust
Property § 3183, p 277 (1962); 2 Bou- lands granted to Wyoming, that the
vier's Law Dictionary 1530 (8th ed lands could be leased for 5-year peri1914). A lease not so terminable is, ods but that such leases could be
therefore expressly prohibited by the annulled at will by the Secretary of
Act. The majority opinion, however, the Interior. 25 Stat 393. Of far
finds implicit in the Act an excep- more significance to this case was
tion to the express ban on encum- Congress' treatment of the lands
brances in the case of leases for granted to Oklahoma—the State to
terms of 10 years or less. It points to enter the Union most recently prior
the fact that 10-year leases of school to the entry of Arizona and N e w
trust lands are expressly permitted Mexico—in the Oklahoma Enabling
by the Act and states that to treat a Act. C 3335, 34 Stat 267. In that Act,
lease as an "encumbrance" under Congress expressly provided Oklathe circumstances would be to homa with the authority to lease
"downgrade a 10-year grazing lease, school trust lands for 10-year periods
fully recognized and permitted by while also clearly providing that
the Act, into a lease terminable at upon sale of the lands during the
will or into one automatically termi- period of the lease, the lessee would
nated whenever the State sells the receive only the value of its improveproperty or it is condemned." Ante, ments. That Act states with respect
at 307, 47 L Ed 2d 11. Treating the to sales of lands subject to a lease
lease as an encumbrance would cer- that "preference right to purchase at
tainly have the effect which the ma- the highest bid [is] given to the lesjority says it would. The majority see at the time of such sale," ibid,
does not disclose, however, why such (emphasis added); and then provides:
an effect is contrary to the intent of
"[I]n case the leaseholder does not
the Act. Apparently, it simply finds
become the purchaser, the purillogical
chaser at said sale shall, under
, [424 US 313]
such rules and regulations as the
the notion
legislature may prescribe, pay to
that a lease could be terminable on
or for the leaseholder the apsale or condemnation and still be a
praised value of . . . improve"10-year" lease, notwithstanding the
ments, and to the State
the
fact that treating 10-year leases as
amount bid for said lands, exclubeing so terminable is the only way
14
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[424 US 314]

iVloieo\ei, HI I lie hin^lr pieie ol leg
islative history shedding any light
on* the relevant portion of the Act,
the Senate sponsor of the Act—Senator Beveridge—spoke approvingly of
the restrictions placed on Oklahoma
in dealing with school trust lands
granted to it in the Oklahoma Enabling Act and indicated his belief
that the restrictions on Arizona and
New Mexico were more stringent.
He stated:
"We took the position [in drafting
the Act] that the United States
owned this land, and in creating
these States we were giving the
lands to the States for specific purposes, and that restrictions should
be thrown about it which would
assure its being used for those
purposes." 45 Cong Rec 8227
(1910).

"We have thrown conditions
around land grants in several
States heretofore, notably in the
case of Oklahoma, but not so thorough and complete as this."
The Oklahoma Enabling Act prevents the creation of a compensable
interest in a lessee of school trust
lands except to the extent of improvements placed thereon by him.
A literal application of the New
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act at issue here reaches the same result.

The latter Act, passed only four
years after the Oklahoma Enabling

discernible horn the Act and its leg
islative history. Congress anticipated
that the value of the school trust
lands would increase over time and
it intended that the schools, not leaseholders, benefit from this increase.
Pursuing this end, the Act set a
minimum sales price for school trust
lands of $3 per acre, 36 Stat 574, the
House committee report explaining:
"The bill fixes a minimum price
at which the lands granted for
educational purposes subject to
sale may be sold. . . .
"It is recognized by the committee as well as by other earnest
advocates of a minimum price,
that practically none of these
lands are worth now anything like
the minimum price fixed. . . . It is
believed, however, that the advance of science, the extension of
public and private irrigation projects, and the tendency toward the
higher development of smaller
holdings will, in the case of Arizona and New Mexico, as in the
case of other States, result in a
sure, although possibly slow, increase of land values.
"The educational lands which
are subject to sale would probably
not bring on the market now
much more than 25 cents an acre,
but if the history of other states in
15
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which minimum prices, which at
the time were considered prohibitive, were fixed shall be repeated
in Arizona and New Mexico, it is
of the utmost importance that
some restriction be placed upon
the sale of these lands.
"The experience of other States
and the importance of fixing a
minimum selling price for educational lands is indicated in the
following extract
[424 U8 316]

from a letter
from former Secretary of the Interior Garfield addressed to the
chairman of the committee in the
last Congress:

47 L Ed 2d

sections. Colorado seems to have
an exceedingly low minimum,
$2 50; and nevertheless it has administered its land grants unusually well, securing from them very
large returns, both from sales and
from leases. For these reasons, I
urge that a minimum price be
fixed for these proposed new
States. They will be able to lease
most of their land, if it is not
worth to-day the minimum price,
and will thereby obtain an
income.'" HR Rep No. 152 61st
Cong, 2d Sess, at 2-3 (1910).
If leases were permitted to encumber school trust lands

47 L Ed 2d

ing by proper laws for the protec- lands increased after the lease was
tion of lessees of said lands, entered into, and if the lease had
whereby such lessees shall be pro- not expired at the time of any sale
tected in their rights to their im- or condemnation, receive
[424 US 318]
provements (including water
rights) in such manner that in a portion of the sale or condemnacase of lease or sale of said lands tion price over and above the value
to other parties the former lessee of any improvements. In Lassen v
shall be paid by the succeeding Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway
lessee or purchaser the value of Dept. 385 US 458, 466, 17 L Ed 2d
such improvements and rights 515, 87 S Ct 584 (1967), we said that
placed thereon by such lessee." 65 Act "unequivocally demands . . .
Stat 52.
that the trust receive the full value
of lands transferred from it." The
The Act provides for no other kind majority now construes the Act to
of compensation to the lessee of authorize a result contrary to the
lands sold. Under the majority opin- Act's "unequivocal demand" and, acion a lessee could, if the value of the cordingly, I dissent.

[424 US 317]

" T h e history of the public-land
States in the matter of the disposal of granted school lands has
convinced me that those States
which have a minimum price fixed
on their lands granted for educational purposes get a much larger
return from their lands. I am informed that most States with no
minimum have not disposed of
their lands to the best advantage,
thus seriously failing to derive the
full benefit to which the schools
are entitled. The States of North
and South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, and Washington have
a $10 minimum fixed on their
lands, and I am informed that
none of these States, unless it is
Wyoming, feels that this high minimum is harmful.

at a time
when they were worth less than the
minimum sales price, then when the
land rose in value—as Congress anticipated it would—and was sold for
the minimum price or more, the
State would have to give part of
such sales price to the lessee. Such a
result is utterly irreconcilable with
the reasons for setting minimum
sales prices. Plainly, Congress intended the school trust to receive
the full sales price and to prevent
the States from disposing of the
lands in any fashion which would
result in its receiving any less. Lessees were to receive none of the
proceeds of sale of the land itself
even if the land had appreciated in
value subsequent to the creation of
the lease.

" 'On the contrary, I find that
officials of these States are zealous
and proud of the splendid school
funds which they are creating
from the sale of school lands.
North Dakota, which a few years
ago seemed to contain immense
areas of poor land, is, I am informed, obtaining in many cases
$15 or $20 per acre for its school

To make its purpose even clearer,
Congress, in dealing with the very
question of whether the lessee
should share in the proceeds when
lands subject to the lease are sold,
provided:

16
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"Nothing herein contained shall
prevent . . . (4) the Legislature of
the State of Arizona from provid17
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a dispute, however, over whether Malnar
had notice of the amendment at the time of
SAM Oil's ratification. In its findings of
fact, after discussing the transmission of
the ratification documents to be signed by
SAM Oil and Robertson, the Board states,
"SAM Oil maintains that the April 27, 1983
amendment to the Unit Operating Agreement was not included with these materials.^ BHP maintains that it was standard procedure to include all amendments." 8 Over the dissent of one member,
the Board's conclusions of law state, "SAM
Oil is subject to the 300% nonconsent penalty provided in the Unit Operating Agreement, as amended." We cannot find a
logical connection between the Board's
findings of fact and its conclusion of law.
The Board's findings of fact do not expressly state whether SAM Oil received
notice of the amendment prior to executing
the ratification agreement; yet implicit in
its conclusion of law is the premise that
Malnar did have notice of the amendment

unit agreement Finally, based on the revised date of accrual, the Board will need
to reconsider whether the well has yet paid
out the appropriate costs and penalty and
therefore whether SAM Oil is owed any
proceeds from production to date.

We are unable to review the amount of
the penalty imposed by the Board without a
further finding.of fact regarding whether
SAM Oil, through Malnar, had notice of the
amendment Because this is a question
depending in part on credibility, we remand
for clarification. Depending on its finding
regarding notice, the Board should enter an
order holding that SAM Oil is subject to its
proportionate share of the costs and the
risk penalty (at either the 150 or the 300
percent level) described in section 9 of the
unit operating agreement The order
should further provide that SAM Oil's
working interest share of production from
the well began to accrue on the first day of
the month following the filing of the appropriate papers with the Bureau of Land
Management pursuant to section 27 of the

No. 880121.

onshore, and the depth to which it is to be
drilled. The well at issue in this case was a
relatively deep, exploratory well. The 300 percent risk compensation was therefore reasonable under the circumstances, and at the hearing, there was expert testimony to this effect.
7. Although there is evidence that Malnar was
subsequently made aware of the amount of the
amended penalty, BHP presented no evidence to
the Board that he knew of the amendment at
the time of the ratification. The cover letter

HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ., and
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ„ concur.
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CORNISH TOWN, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Evan O. ROLLER and Marlene B.
Roller, husband and wife, Defendants and Appellants.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 1, 1991.
Town brought condemnation action to
create protection zones around springs on
landowners' property, which springs were
source of water for town's culinary system.
The First District Court, Cache County,
VeNoy J. Christoffersen, J., rendered judgment on special jury verdict for landowners
and they appealed. The Supreme Court,
Howe, Associate CJ., held that (1) court
was not obligated to allow landowners to
relitigate issue of necessity of proposed
taking; (2) landowners were not entitled to
jury determination of public necessity of
dated January 4, 1984, does not refer to the
1983 amendment
8. The weight of this allegation is misleading
because it was not BHP who corresponded with
Malnar concerning SAM Oil's joinder of the
unit; it was the unit operator, Rio Bravo.
While perhaps enlightening on the subject of
industry practice, BHFs standard procedure
does not have any direct relevance to the question in this case.
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proposed taking; (3) landowners were not
entitled to valuation of land as of date of
first ordinance enacted to protect town's
water supply; (4) court erred in refusing to
admit evidence of existence of mineral deposits and their enhancement of value of
land; and (5) town did not abandon condemnation action for purposes of award of attorney fees when it amended complaint to
seek only perpetual easement
Remanded.
1. Eminent Domain «=»195
Where trial court permitted both landowner and town to fully present and litigate issue of necessity of proposed taking
of landowner's property at hearing on motion for order of immediate occupancy and
court entered written findings of fact sustaining town's right to condemn, court was
not obligated to allow parties to again litigate that issue at trial, even though order
of immediate occupancy was interlocutory
in nature.
2. Jury «=>19<11)
Landowner whose property was subject of condemnation action was not entitled to jury determination of public necessity of proposed taking. U.C.A.1953, 78-3410.
3. Jury <*=»19U1)
Under federal law, there is no constitutional right to trial by jury in condemnation
cases.
4. Eminent Domain <*»124
Landowners whose property was subject of eminent domain action by town for
purpose of creating protection zones
around springs on property to reduce high
nitrate level in spring water were not entitled to have land valued as of effective date
of first town ordinance enacted to protect
town's culinary water supply, inasmuch
neither ordinance nor its successors
amounted
to
regulatory
taking.
U.C.A.1963, 78-34-11.
5. Eminent Domain *»2(1)
For purposes of recovering compensation for "regulatory taking" of one's prop-

erty, even "temporary" regulatory taking
requires denial of all uses of property.
6. Eminent Domain *»2(1)
Mere diminution in property value is
insufficient to meet burden of demonstrating taking by regulation.
7. Eminent Domain <*»202(1)
Trial court in condemnation action
erred in refusing to admit evidence of existence of mineral deposits and their enhancement of value of land sought to be condemned on basis that there had been no
extraction of minerals to that date; court
should have determined at time of trial
whether deposits could be removed later by
landowners without being impeded by easement taken by town, rather than requiring
landowners to litigate question later, if and
when they attempted to remove any mineral deposits.
8. Eminent Domain <*»131
Generally, existence of mineral deposits in or on land is element to be considered
in determining market value of such land
for condemnation purposes.
9. Eminent Domain <*=>317(2), 319
Only perpetual easement may be taken
over surface of land sought to be condemned when land is underlaid with minerals sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, and in those instances, landowner retains right to underlying minerals which
condemning agency has not sought or cannot afford to buy, and landowner is entitled
to later recover those minerals.
10. Eminent Domain *»131
Where landowner will be unable to later remove mineral deposits underlying
land sought to be condemned because operation of condemnor impedes their removal,
value of minerals left in place should be
considered in determining compensation to
which landowner is entitled.
11. Eminent Domain <*»265(5)
Landowners whose property was subject of condemnation proceeding were not
entitled to attorney fees and costs on basis
of abandonment of action when town
amended its complaint to seek only perpetual easement over property, inasmuch as
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town's condemnation action was not both
totally abandoned and dismissed prior to
conclusion. U.C.A.1958, 7&-34-16.
12. Eminent Domain *»134
Landowners whose property was subject of condemnation proceeding were not
entitled to valuation of the use of the property for hunting access permits independently of, and as a separate calculation
from, the land of which it was a part
13. Eminent Domain e=»202(4)
Evidence comparing business potential
for hunting permits on property that was
subject of condemnation with nearby landowner's use of hunting permits on its property was properly excluded in condemnation action due to dissimilarities in properties.
14. Eminent Domain *»265(3)
Trial court in condemnation action did
not abuse its discretion in determining that
expenses for preparation and presentation
of photographic maps, graphic exhibits and
transcripts of pretrial hearings that were
used at trial were not taxable as costs.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 54(dXD; U.C.A.1953,
21-5-8.
M. Byron Fisher, Michelle Mitchell, Salt
Uke City, for the Rollers.
George W. Pratt, Jody K. Burnett, Salt
Lake City, for Cornish Town.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
Defendants Evan 0. Roller and Marlene
B. Roller, his wife, appeal from a judgment
for $59,670 entered on a special jury verdict in their favor and against plaintiff
Cornish Town.
FACTS
Cornish Town commenced this action in
July 1986 to condemn approximately one
hundred acres pf Rollers' land for the purpose of creating protection zones around
Griffiths and Pearson Springs, which are
on Rollers' property. The springs are a
source of water for Cornish Town's culinary system as well as for Rollers' house-

hold. Cornish sought protection zones
which cover a 1,500-foot radius around the
springs in an attempt to reduce the high
nitrate level in the water. Cornish also
sought rights-of-way and access to the
springs over another seven acres of Rollers' land. State water quality officials had
advised Cornish that agricultural fertilization contributed to the high nitrate level.
In response, commencing on September 24,
1981, Cornish enacted a series of ordinances authorizing the creation of these
protection zones and prohibiting within
them the use of pesticides and fertilizers,
the keeping or grazing of animals, and
human habitation.
After commencing the action, Cornish
filed a motion for an order of immediate
occupancy. After a three-day hearing
where both parties presented evidence, the
trial court granted the motion, concluding
that there was competent evidence that it
was "necessary and essential" that Cornish
acquire the protection zones. The court
further found that Cornish had not acted in
bad faith and had not abused its discretion
in bringing its action. Rollers filed a motion for partial summary judgment to fix
the date of the taking of the property at
September 24, 1981, when the first ordinance, No. 81-1, took effect The motion
was denied.
At the outset of the trial, Cornish moved
to amend its complaint to seek only a perpetual easement over the one hundred
acres after Rollers disclosed that they were
going to claim that mineral deposits underlay the land. The amendment was granted.
Rollers proffered evidence that deposits of
zeolite underlay 94 acres of the property
sought to be condemned, but the court
would not admit that evidence or evidence
that the estimated value of the deposits
was $38 million, opining that their claim of
mineral deposits was speculative. The
court ruled that the issue of whether Rollers had a right to extract the minerals
should be determined if and when they
decided to mine the zeolite. Rollers also
presented evidence as to wildlife resources
on the land, specifically, a deer herd protected by them. However, they were not
allowed to present a mathematical calcula-
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tion of the potential monetary loss of future sales of hunting access permits.
Rollers attempted to present evidence
that the taking would not improve the quality of the spring water. The trial court
refused to hear the evidence, stating that
public use and necessity had already been
determined at the hearing on the motion
for an order of immediate occupancy. The
jury returned a special verdict in favor of
Rollers for $59,670; they appeal.
I
[1] Rollers contend that the trial court
erred in denying them the opportunity to
present evidence at trial on the question of
whether the taking by Cornish was necessary and that they were entitled to have
the jury determine that issue. Cornish responds that at the hearing on the motion
for an order of immediate occupancy, the
court properly determined, as a matter of
law, that public use and necessity had been
established by Cornish and that no showing
had been made of bad faith, fraud, or
abuse of discretion on its part
A
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 provides in
part
Before property can be taken it must
appear:
(1) That the use to which it is to be
applied is a use authorized by law;
(2) That the taking is necessary to
such u s e . . . .
Rollers' contention that they were entitled to a trial on the issue of necessity is
based upon Utah State Road Commission
v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 832 (Utah 1984).
In that case, this court primarily addressed
the issue of the effect of delay in the
prosecution of a condemnation action on
the valuation of the property. We also
determined that the hearing on the motion
for an order of immediate occupancy was
not a trial on the merits and thus res
judicata did not operate. IcL at 833.
An order of immediate occupancy is
entered pendente lite and only authorizes the State to take immediate posses-

sion until a final adjudication of the merits....
The State's right to condemn, if challenged, can finally be determined only
after a trial on the merits, not at a hearing on the motion for immediate occupancy. Since an order of immediate occupancy only requires prima facie proof of
the right to condemn, that order is not a
final adjudication on the merits. Res
judicata has no application in the absence
of a final adjudication.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
There are important differences between
the procedure followed by the trial court in
Friberg and that followed by the trial court
in the instant case. First, it appears that
in Friberg, the state, the condemnor,
presented only prima facie proof of the
right to condemn at the hearing on the
motion for an order of immediate occupancy. It does not appear that the condemnee
presented any evidence. However, at the
hearing in the instant case, both Rollers
and Cornish Town introduced testimony
and evidence in a three-day hearing, with
Rollers vigorously challenging the necessity for the proposed taking. Second, following the hearing in Friberg, the order of
immediate occupancy contained no findings
or conclusions on the state's authority to
condemn. The order stated that issues relating to the state's authority to condemn
were to be decided in a "further hearing"
and that the order was issued "pending
further hearing and trial on the issues that
may be presented in the action." Id. In
contrast, in the instant case the trial court
made and entered written findings as to
the state's authority to condemn:
6. Although some experts may differ
as to both the source of the nitrate contamination and the recommendations
with respect to action which should be
taken to alleviate the problem, that is not
for the court to decide and there is substantial support in the record for the
conclusions reached by Cornish town
based on valid recommendations in doing
the best they could to protect and improve the water supply. The Town has
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acted reasonably and in good faith in its
plan to improve the System as outlined to
the Court
7. In order to carry out its plan for
improving the water supply, it is necessary and essential that Cornish acquire
the protection zones in the watershed of
the Griffiths Spring and Pearson Spring.
We therefore conclude that under the
facts of this case, where the trial court
permitted both parties to fully present and
litigate the issue of the necessity of the
proposed taking at the hearing on the motion for an order of immediate occupancy
and entered written findings of fact sustaining the condemnor's right to condemn,
the trial court was not obligated to allow
the parties to a#ain htignte that issue at
trial. While it is true as pointed out in
Friberg that an order of immediate occupancy is interlocutory and is subject to
change should the trial court become convinced of the nefed to do so, it would be a
waste of judicial resources to require a
trial court to allow the condemnee to represent his evidence and arguments at trial. Id
B
[2,3] Rollers contend that they are entitled to a jury trial on the issue of necessity of the proposed taking. Utah's statutes
on eminent domain, Utah Code Ann. §§ 7&34-1 to -20 (1987), are silent regarding the
manner of determining necessity, i.e.,
whether it is done by the court or the jury.
Section 78-34-8 specifically mentions the
powers of "the court or the judge thereof."
Notably, the jury's power is not mentioned:
The court or judge thereof shall have
power
(1) to hear and determine all adverse
or conflicting claims to the property
sought to be condemned, and to the damages therefor, and

(2) to determine the respective rights
of different parties seeking condemnation of the same property.
Only section 78-S4-10 specifically mentions the jury:
The court, jury or referee must hear
such legal evidence as may be offered by
any of the parties to the proceedings, and
thereupon must ascertain and assess:
(1) the value of the property sought to
be condemned and all improvements
thereon appertaining to the realty, and of
each and every separate estate or interest therein.
Some jurisdictions specifically provide for
jury trial of the issue of necessity. 1A J.
Sackman & P. Rohan, Nichols* The Law of
Eminent Domain § 4.11[4] (3d ed. 1990).
Generally, however, the only question an
owner is entitled to try to a jury is the
amount of his compensation or damages,
and he has no right to be heard by the jury
on the necessity of the taking, which is a
question of law for the court 27 Am.
Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 408, at 292
(1966); see also Coachella Valley Water
Diet v. Western Allied Properties, Inc.,
190 Cal.App.3d 969, 235 Cal.Rptr. 725
(1987) (pursuant to Cal. Const a r t I, § 19,
the property owner in an eminent domain
action is entitled to a jury trial on the
question of just compensation; all other
issues of fact and law must be decided by
the court).1
It does not appear that the precise question which confronts us has been heretofore presented to this court for determination. However, dicta in two cases give
support to the proposition that a landowner
is not entitled to a jury determination on
the question of the necessity for a proposed
taking. In Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82
Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (1933), we stated,
"Whether the property is being taken for a
use authorized by law, that is a public use,
is by statute in this state, and by the general rule of law, a judicial question and may

1. Under federal law, there is no constitutional
right to a trial by jury in condemnation cases.
Wright Si Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3051, rule 71A, at 120 n. 41 (Supp.1991). "Under rule 71A(h) as finally adopted, therefore,
trial of all issues is by the court, except for the

issue of just compensation." Wright & Miller,
§ 3051, at 122 n. 46; see also United States v.
105.40 Acres of Land, 471 F.2d 207, 212 (7th
Cir.1972); United States v. 21.54 Acres of Land,
491 F.2d 301, 304 (4th Cir.1973).
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be inquired into by the courts.'1 82 Utah at
165-66, 22 P.2d at 346 (citations omitted).
Later, in Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236
(Utah 1975), we stated, 'The trial judge,
among other things, is given the power to
hear and decide if the conditions precedent
to taking are met" Id. at 1238. In both
cases, we found support for those statements in a former subsection of section 7834-8 which provided that the "court or
judge thereof' shall have power to determine if the conditions precedent to taking
contained in section 78-34-4 have been
met, including whether the use to which
the property is to be applied is a use authorized by law. That subsection was deleted
from section 78-34-8 in 1981. See 1981
Utah Laws ch. 161, § 2. No reason for the
deletion is apparent, but we have no reason
to think that there was any legislative intent that the question of public use and
necessity should be determined by a jury.
We therefore conclude that based on what
appears to be the majority rule in this
country, on section 7&-34-10, which limits,
the jury's role in condemnation cases, and
dicta in former cases of this court, a landowner is not entitled to a jury determination of the public necessity of a proposed
taking.
II
[4] Kollers next contend that the date
of taking for purposes of assessing just
compensation should be the effective date
of Cornish's original ordinance, No. 81-1,
which was September 24, 1981. Cornish
counters that the date of the taking was
appropriately held to be the date of service
of summons, July 29, 1986, and that the
enactment of town ordinances, including
ordinances No. 81-1, No. 83-1, and No. 851, which it argues were never enforced, did
not rise to the status of a regulatory taking.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11 (1987) provides that the right to damages is deemed
to accrue at the date of the service of
summons:
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto
shall be deemed to have accrued at the

date of the service of summons, and its
actual value at that date shall be the
measure of compensation for all property
to be actually taken, and the basis of
damages to property not actually taken,
but injuriously affected, in all cases
where such damages are allowed
See City of South Ogden v. Fujiki, 621
P.2d 1254, 1255 (Utah 1980); State v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 167 n. 1, 397 P.2d 463 n. 1
(1964) (service of summons is controlling
date for valuation purposes); State ex rel
Eng'g Comm'n v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265
P.2d 630 (1953); Oregon Short Line R.R.
v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732 (1905).
Kollers rely on Friberg, 687 P.2d at 833,
to support their contention. They argue
that the presumption—that the date to determine valuation shall be the date of service of process—is rebutted here "by a
showing that a valuation as of the date of
service of summons would result in an
award that would not provide 'just compensation' to a landowner." Id. However, the
trial court specifically found that the special circumstances and factors of Friberg
were not present here. It also determined
that the enactment of ordinance No. 81-1
did not prohibit the use of Kollers' property, but rather attempted to control pollution of the town's water supply and was
therefore not a regulatory taking.
In Friberg, the property owners argued
that they were entitled to compensation
and damages based on the value of their
condemned property as of the date on
which the state's right to condemn was
finally determined—which was over seven
years after service of summons. There
was a substantial delay in the entry of a
final decree, and the property had appreciated in value in the interim. It was stated
in part III of the plurality opinion that the
delay in the condemnation proceedings,
which was caused by suits in the federal
court to enforce compliance with federal
law, should not work a penalty on the
owners by denying them the appreciated
value of their property. Friberg, 687 P.2d
at 835. In part II of the Friberg opinion,
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Durham,
stated:
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We are, of course, constrained to construe § 78-34-11 within the limitations
of constitutional requirements. When
valuation is fixed at a date prior to the
actual taking and the value of the property increases during a prolonged condemnation proceeding so that the valuation does not reflect a fair valuation of
the property and does not therefore constitute "just compensation," the statute
fixing the time of valuation is unconstitutional as applied.
Id. at 829. Justice Oaks, concurring specially, disagreed with the necessity of a
constitutional discussion in part II, but
nevertheless concluded that the date of valuation was the later date.
fn the instant case, ordinance 81-1 was
effective immediately upon posting on September 24, 1981. Subsequent ordinances,
all to protect Cornish's culinary water supply, were enacted in succeeding years
through 1988. Upon the passage of each
new ordinance, the prior ordinance was repealed. There is no evidence in the record
that Cornish enforced any of these ordinances against Rollers prior to 1985. Evan
Roller was contacted directly by letter dated June 11, 1985, and notified that he must
comply with all terms of ordinance 85-1.
However, not until July 29, 1986, was a
summons and complaint in condemnation
served on Rollers and the motion for an
order of immediate occupancy filed with
the court.
Rollers point to numerous restrictions
put upon their use of the land under each
<?/ the ordinances. They argue that the
value of the property in 1981 was significantly greater than its value in 1986, because Cornish first devalued the property
by regulatory restrictions and then five
years later commenced this condemnation
action. This contention is without merit
Despite Rollers' argument, ordinance 81-1
and the succeeding ordinances had little, if
any, effect on Rollers until the service of
summons.
2. The appellant was unable to rebuild Lutherglen, a retreat center and recreational area for
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At trial, the court permitted Evan Roller
to testify that crop production declined during the post-ordinance years but before the
service of summons. He also testified that
there had been times when the Pearson and
Griffiths zones yielded as much as 100
bush^| s of wheat per acre, but this requireti application of 20O-plus pounds per
acre of nitrogen, which he was prohibited
from doing. Nevertheless, Roller admitted
that He continued to fertilize with nitrogen
in the Pearson and Griffiths protection areas ft-om 1981 to 1986, with the exception
of 1982, when he applied none. In fact,
Rollers' appraiser testified that their farm
had one of the highest agricultural yields in
Utah during that five-year period.
KoUers rely on First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96
L.Ed.2d 250 (1987), to support their claim
that they are entitled to be compensated
based on the September 1981 value of the
property. First English involved a "temporary regulatory taking" in which a subsequently invalidated county ordinance deprive^ a property owner of all uses of his
land.1 The court held that the landowner
was entitled to compensation for the taking
in th^t interim period of years before invalidation. 482 U.S. at 319, 107 S.Ct. at 2388,
96 L.Ed.2d at 266-67. The Court stated:
We merely hold that where the government's activities have already worked a
^king of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.
We also point out that the allegation of
the complaint which we treat as true for
purposes of our decision was that the
ordinance in question denied appellant all
use of its property.
482 Ij.s. at 321, 107 S.Ct at 2389, 96
L.Ed.2d at 268.
[5] That case can easily be distinguished. Although Rollers point to ordinance 81-1, which authorized the town to
handicapped children.
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restrict their use of their property,, they
continued their farming practices—albeit in
apparent violation of that ordinance. Even
a "temporary" regulatory taking would require a denial of "all uses" of their property. First English, 482 U.S. at 318, 107
S.Ct at 2387, 96 L.Ed.2d at 265-66. We
agree with the trial court that such a denial
did not occur here.
Kollers also rely on Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 107
S.Ct 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), to argue
that ordinance 81-1 amounted to a taking
in denial of all beneficial and economically
viable use of 85 percent of their total property and decreased the value of their property by 85-90 percent Nollan is unsupportive of that argument because the majority opinion did not address whether the
ordinance denied the owners any economically viable uses of their land. 483 U.S. at
841-42, 107 S.Ct at 3151, 97 L.EA2d at
691-93.

extraction of minerals to that date. However, the judge commented that Kollers
retained the right to extract any minerals
and, should that right ever be denied them
because of the perpetual easement taken
by Cornish, they would have tfie right to
return to court to seek further damages.

[8-10] As a general rule in this country,
the existence of mineral deposits in or on
land is an element to be considered in determining the market value of such land. 4
J. Sackman & P. Rohan, Nichols' The Law
of Eminent Domain § 13.22, at 13-119 (3d
ed. 1990); see also State v. Noble, 6 Utah
2d 40, 44, 305 P.2d 495, 499 (1957) (it is
proper to admit evidence that the land contains valuable mineral deposits). Utah
Code Ann. § 78-34-2 provides special protection to a landowner whose land containing valuable minerals is condemned:
The following is & classification of the
estates and rights in lands subject to
being taken for public use:
(1) a fee simple, when taken for public
[6] In other case law on the subject, for
buildings or grounds or for permanent
there to be a taking under a zoning ordibuildings, for reservoirs and dams and
nance, the landowner must show that he
permanent flooding occasioned thereby,
has been deprived of all reasonable uses of
his land. See C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491
or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for
P.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir.1974). For example,
the deposit of debris or tailings of a
almost all zoning decisions have some ecomine, mill, smelter or other place for the
nomic impact on property values. Howreduction of ores, or for solar evapoever, mere diminution in property value is
ration ponds and other facilities for the
insufficient to meet the burden of demonrecovery of minerals in solution; providstrating a taking by regulation. See Penn
ed that where surface ground is underCentral Transp. Co. v. New York City,
laid with minerals, coal or other depos438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631
its sufficiently valuable to justify ex(1978); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
traction, only a perpetual easement
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct 114, 71 L.Ed. 303
may be taken over the surface ground
(1926); Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239
over such deposits.
U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct 143, 60 L.EA 348 (1915). (Italics added.) Thus, only a perpetual
easement may be taken over the surface
Ill
when it is underlaid with minerals "suffi1
[7] Kollers next contend that the value ciently valuable to justify extraction. ' In
of zeolite deposits allegedly underlying 94 those instances, the landowner retains the
acres should have been considered by the rights to the underlaid minerals which the
jury in determining just compensation. condemning agency has not sought or canTheir counsel proffered evidence of the de- not afford to buy, and the landowner is
posits and that they had an estimated value entitled to later recover those minerals.
of $38 million. The trial court denied Rol- However, where the landowner will be unlers the right to present this evidence to able to later remove the mineral deposits
the jury, opining that the evidence was because the operation of the condemnor
speculative inasmuch as there had been no impedes their removal, the value of the
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minerals left in place should be considered
in determining the compensation to which
the owner is entitled. 4 J. Sackman & P.
Rohan, Nichols* The Law of Eminent Domain § 13.22[1], at 13-144 (3d ed. 1990).
In Lomax v. Henderson, 559 S.W.2d 466,
467 (Tex.Ct.App.1977), evidence was admitted on the diminution of the mineral owner's estate due to the taking of an easement which restricted the recovery of oil
and gas on the condemned land. The court
stated Texas law to be that "the ownership
of minerals in place carries with it, as a
necessary appurtenance thereto, the right
to reasonably use so much of the surface
as may be necessary to enforce and enjoy
the mineral estate." Id. The proper measure of loss of use of the surface of the
land in question is the diminution in value
of the landowner's mineral estate by the
taking.
The trial court denied the admission of
evidence of minerals because of the speculative nature of Rollers' counsel's offer of
proof. Portions of the trial transcript show
the discussion between counsel and the
court on this issue:
Mr. Preston [Rollers' counsel]: If the
court feels this is speculative, let me
redefine our offer of proof. We're going
to prove that we've drilled test holes in
this property under the protection zone
and the test holes go down through the
topsoil, go into bentonite soil which holds
water, as the court Svell knows and then
it goes into the zeolite in the bottom.
Everything is wet all the way down to
the bentonite because it holds the water.
When you hit the zeolite, all of a sudden
it's dry powdery just like the rock we've
shown here. We drilled five holes in the
subject property in the Pearson Spring
area. In every case the hard rock surface underneath was hit indicating that
there is in fact throughout this area the
zeolite that has been mentioned.
We h%ve taken samples and we have
had the samples tested and the samples
show that they are of commercial quality
where they have been selected in the
protection zone.
Utah Rap 818-819 P 2d—6
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Mr. Fisher [Rollers* co-counsel]: When
the mine can't be built because the surface will be destroyed by the taking, then
you must compensate for the mineral.
The Court But how do you know you
must compensate him for mineral until
you know whether if s going to do something to their rights?
Mr. Fisher Because he has told me I
cannot enter the property except the
three locations that are shown on that
map. He told me that himself, the mayor on the stand yesterday. I cannot enter the property except at those three
locations.
The Court* I think it's a question to be
decided if and whenever this should come
up. I don't see any of us will in our
lifetime ever see any bulldozer or anything out there.
Mr. Fisher. I beg to differ, your Honor.
I've already had two.
The Court That's my opinion.
Mr. Fisher. We've already had two mineral companies approach us to mine that
product after they have known of the
quality of the product that's there, two
of them.
The Court Okay. I'll believe it when I
see ;t
The trial court noted but distinguished William Russell Coal Co. v. Board of County
Commissioners, 129 Colo. 330, 270 P.2d
772, 775 (1954), where condemnation of an
easement across realty underlaid with coal
was sought Removal of the coal would
allegedly impair support of the surface.
The court held that the amount of damages
sustained by the owner because coal was
left in place was a question for a jury or a
commission to determine, and the trial
court had erred in refusing to admit such
evidence. The trial court in the instant
case distinguished William Russell Coal
Co. because the extraction there was ongoing, whereas no extraction had yet occurred on Rollers' property. Such a distinction is unhelpful in light of Montana
Railway Co. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 35253, 11 S.Ct. 96, 98, 34 L.Ed. 681, 683 (1890),
in which the Court held that evidence of "in
place" minerals is admissible to determine
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land value. The Court commented as follows with regard to a claim that the existence of minerals was "speculative":
Until there has been full exploiting of the
vein its value is not certain, and there is
an element of speculation, it must be
conceded, in any estimate thereof. And
yet, uncertain and speculative as it is,
such "prospect" has a market value; and
the absence of certainty is not a matter
of which the Railroad Company can take
advantage, when it seeks to enforce a
sale. Contiguous to a valuable mine,
with indications that the vein within such
mine extends into this claim, the Railroad
Company may not plead the uncertainty
in respect to such extension as a ground
for refusing to pay the full value which it
has acquired in the market by reason of
its surroundings and possibilities.
137 U.S. at 352-53, 11 S.Ct at 98, 34 L.Ed.
at 683.
This authority was recently noted with
approval in Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605, 628 n. 3, 109 S.Ct 2037, 2051 n. 3, 104
L.Ed.2d 696, 722 n. 3 (1989). The Tenth
Circuit has also held that expert testimony
regarding in-place minerals, limestone preserves, although speculative, was clearly
admissible. United States v. 179.26 Acres
of Land in Douglas County, Kansas, 644
F.2d 367, 372-73 (10th Cir.1981).
It follows from what we have written
that the trial court erred in refusing to
admit evidence of the existence of the zeolite deposits and their enhancement of the
value of the land sought to be condemned
without first determining whether the deposits could be removed later by Rollers
without being impeded by the existence of
the easement taken. The trial court should
have determined that question at the time
of trial rather than requiring Rollers to
litigate it later, if and when they attempt to
remove any of the deposits. The record
before us does not contain any evidence as
to the methods employed in mining zeolite
or whether the mining would interfere with
the utility of the protection zones. The
case therefore must be remanded to the
trial court for a new trial on the issue of
damages if the trial judge preliminarily de-

termines that the existence of the easement
taken by Cornish will either totally prevent
or enhance the cost of removing the zeolite.
The jury will then consider, in fixing Rollers' damages, the existence of the mineral
deposits. If the trial court finds that the
zeolite may be mined and removed without
being prevented or impeded by the easement, a new trial on the issue of damages
will be unnecessary.
However, preliminary to the determination of the question discussed above and a
new trial, if necessary, the trial court
should determine whether the existing water rights held by Corsish prohibit the extraction of minerals claimed by Rollers in
the area of the protection zones. Both
parties recognize the existence of the legal
question of whether Rollers can, in any
event, extract minerals from their land if in
doing so it would destroy or diminish the
water rights to the springs owned by Cornish. This question will need to be resolved before Rollers can establish an entitlement to extract the zeolite.
IV
[11] When the trial commenced, Cornish moved to amend its complaint to seek
only a perpetual easement over the one
hundred acres instead of a fee simple estate therein. Cornish asserts that it was
prompted to do so because it only then
learned that Rollers intended to claim that
their land was underlaid with valuable mineral deposits. In view of that claim, Cornish decided that it was obligated under
section 78-34-2(1), set out above, to seek
only a perpetual easement. The motion to
amend was granted by the trial court, and
in the final order of condemnation, Cornish
acquired only a perpetual easement. Rollers contended in the trial court that by
amending its complaint, Cornish had abandoned the condemnation and that under
section 78-34-16, they were entitled to an
award of attorney fees, expenses, and
costs. The trial court denied that relief.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-16 provides for
a condemnee's recovery of all damages sustained and reasonable and necessary expenses incurred when the condemnor aban-
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dons the proceedings and causes the action
to be dismissed without prejudice:
Condemnor, whether a public or private
body, may, at any time prior to final
payment of compensation and damages
awarded the defendant by the court or
jury, abandon the proceedings and
cause the action to be dismissed without prejudice, provided, however, that
as a condition of dismissal condemnor
first compensate condemnee for all damages he has sustained and also reimburse
him in full for all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by condemnee because of the filing of the action by condemnor, including attorneys
fees.
(Italics added.) We applied this statute in
Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d
1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972), where the condemning agency withdrew and dismissed its condemnation action before trial because the
land as appraised was too expensive to
acquire. The plaintiff advised the court
that the defendant's property was no longer needed for public use. Consequently,
the case was stricken from the trial calender, and the court made and entered an
order dismissing the action without prejudice. The defendants were awarded expenses and attorney fees. This court held
that the statute was controlling, and upon
abandonment and dismissal of the action to
avoid a trial, the condemnee was entitled to
recover expenses and attorney fees. 28
Utah 2d at 3, 497 P.2d at 630.
In contrast, Cornish proceeded with its
acquisition and did not move for dismissal
of the condemnation proceedings. We interpret the statute as providing for payment of costs and fees only when the condemnation is totally abandoned and dismissed prior to a conclusion. Although the
statute is quite liberal in covering every
conceivable expense, damage, and cost in
order to protect owners of private property
from an unfair burden when the condemnor elects to abandon the action,3 an actual
abandonment and dismissal must first occur. Although the case authority from other jurisdictions cited by the Rollers allows

recovery of attorney fees and expenses for
partial abandonment or for abandonment in
the absence of a dismissal, those cases are
inapplicable here because the statutory
framework in Utah is different from those
jurisdictions cited.

3. Note, The Condemnors Liability for Damages
Arising Through Instituting, Litigating or Abandoning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967 Utah
LRev. 548, 560.

4. Deseret Land & Livestock is located in Rich,
Morgan, Weber, and Summit Counties in Utah
and in western Wyoming, covering 200,000
acres.

[12] Rollers contend that they should
have been permitted to introduce evidence
of the value of hunting access permits in
the determination of the value of the highest and best use of their property. Cornish
responds that Rollers were permitted to
present extensive evidence regarding the
wildlife potential of the property, including
evidence that the deer herd on the property
added to its total value and was a factor to
be considered in determining fair market
value.
[13] We find no abuse of discretion.
The trial court excluded only evidence
which compared the business potential for
hunting permits on Rollers' property with
Deseret Land and Livestock's use of hunting permits on its property.4 That exclusion was proper. See State ex rel Road
Comm'n v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 299,
495 P.2d 817, 820 (1972) (court properly
excluded evidence of sales of allegedly
comparable property located on other interchanges of interstate highways because of
dissimilarities in the properties). Cornish's
counsel also objected to the presentation of
Rollers' evidence as a disguised lost profits
claim. See State v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40,
44, 305 P.2d 495, 498 (1957) (courts have
rejected with great unanimity the proposition that just compensation is the equivalent of the total profits which would be
realized from the future operations of the
property; proper measure is the market
value of property and not output thereof);
State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 449,
491 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1971) (business profits
are not subject of independent compensation aside and apart from market value of
land on which business has been conducted). Rollers are not entitled to a valuation
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of the use of the property for hunting
access permits independently, as a separate
calculation, of the land of which it is a part.
The land was properly valued giving the
wildlife resource due consideration as a
component part of the land.
VI
[14] Finally, Rollers contend that they
should have been awarded costs of $2,252
for preparation and presentation of photographic maps, graphic exhibits, and transcripts of pretrial hearings that were used
at trial. The court awarded Rollers only
$74 in taxable costs for the jury fee and a
witness fee. We find no error. In Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah
1980), we held that expenses for a model,
photographs, and certified copies of documents which were necessary for litigation
were not properly taxable as costs. Costs
were defined by the court as "those fees
which are required to be paid to the court
and to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be included in the judgment" Id.; Utah R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1); Utah
Code Ann. § 21-5-8. Rollers argue that in
Frampton we approved the costs of depositions in the taxing of costs and that the
costs of transcripts of pretrial hearings
should be similarly treated. In that case,
however, this court warned that the taxing
of costs of depositions is subject to limitations, i.e., depositions must be taken in
good faith and essential for the development and presentation of the case.
Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. Further, the
fact that we approved the taxing of deposition costs "was not intended and should not
be taken as opening the door to other expenses." Id. The trial court may exercise
reasonable discretion in awarding taxable
costs, and we conclude that no abuse of
discretion has been shown here.
This case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
(o
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QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent
No. 900228.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 1, 1991.

State Tax Commission issued findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and final decision holding that gas used to fuel pipeline
company's compressors within state of
Utah was subject to state's use tax. Company filed petition for review. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that Commission did not violate commerce clause by
applying use tax to compressor-fuel gas
diverted from flowing gas in company's
pipeline and consumed in fuel in company's
compressors.
Affirmed.

1. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=>316, 796
Constitutional Law <s=»44
Constitutional questions are questions
of law, and agency determinations of general law, including interpretations of State
and Federal Constitutions, are to be reviewed under correction of error standard,
giving no deference to agency's decision.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l to 63-46b-22.
2. Taxation e»1294
Utah pipeline company, through its activities in conducting operations of a pipeline and compressors, had substantial aexus with Utah, and thus gas used to fuel
those compressors was subject to Utah's
use tax; company had its corporate offices
in state, owned and operated extensive network of pipelines throughout state and conducted transportation, sales, and storage
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DAVID H. LUCAS, Petitioner
v
SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
505 U S — , 120 L Ed 2d 798, 112 S Ct 2886
[No. 91-453]

Argued March 2, 1992. Decided June 29, 1992.
Decision: South Carolina court held to have applied wrong standard in
determining whether state beachfront management statute, by barring
construction, effected "taking" of property under Fifth Amendment.
SUMMARY

Under 1977 legislation, the state of South Carolina required owners of
certain "critical area" coastal-zone land to obtain a permit from a coastal
council before changing the use of the land. In 1986, a developer purchased
two lots on a barrier island—which lots did not then qualify as a "critical
area" and were zoned for single-family residential construction—and made
plans to erect such residences on the lots. In 1988, however, the state
enacted a Beachfront Management Act (BMA) which established a new
baseline on the island and prohibited any construction of occupable improvements seaward of a hne parallel to and 20 feet landward of the
baseline, thereby barring the developer's plans. The developer, filing suit
against the council in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, did not
challenge the validity of the BMA as an exercise of the state's police power,
but contended that the BMA's complete extinguishment of the value of his
property effected a "taking" of the property for which he was entitled to
just compensation. The Court of Common Pleas found that the BMA decreed
a permanent ban on construction on the developer's lots, where there had
been no restrictions on such use before, and had thereby deprived the
developer of any reasonable economic use of the lots, rendering the lots
valueless; accordingly, the court ordered the council to pay just compensation of more than $1.2 million. While the case was pending before the
Supreme Court of South Carolina, the BMA was amended to authorize the
council, in certain circumstances, to issue special permits for construction of
habitable structures seaward of the baseline. The Supreme Court of South
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Carolina, reversing the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, held that
(1) in the absence of an attack on the validity of the BMA as such, the court
was bound to accept the state legislature's uncontested findings that new
construction in the coastal zone threatened a public resource; and (2) when
a regulation respecting the use of property is designed to prevent serious
public harm, no compensation is owed regardless of the regulation's effect
on the property s value <304 SC 376, 404 SE2d 895).
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
In an opinion by SCALIA, J., joined by REHN^UIST, Ch. J., and WHITE,
O'CONNOR, and THOMAS, JJ., it was held that «1> the decision below was ripe
for review, even though the EMA had been amended to allow the issuance
of special permits and even though Supreme Court precedents reflect an
insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted development
before adjudicating the constitutionality of regulations purporting to limit
such development, because although the above considerations would preclude review had the court below rested its judgment on ripeness grounds,
that court had instead disposed of the developer's claim on the merits; (2)
where a state seeks to sustain a regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use. the state1 may resist an asserted right to
compensation under the takings clause, on the theory that there has been
no 'taking," only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of the
owner's title to begin with, so that the severe limitation on property use is
not newly legislated or decreed, but inheres in the title itself through the
restrictions that background principles of the state's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership; 'S) the court below therefore
erred in rejecting the developer's claim on the merits on the basis of the
state legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification for the BMA; and
• 4) the case would be remanded for a determination of the state-law question
whether common-law principles would have prevented the erection of any
habitable or productive improvements on the developer's land.
KENNEDY, J., concurred in the judgment, expressing the view that (1) the
issues presented in the case were ready for the Supreme Court's decision; (2)
although the trial court's finding that the developer's property had been
rendered valueless was questionable, the Supreme Court—unlike the court
below on remand—had to accept the finding as entered; (3) nuisance prevention accorded with the most common expectations of owners who faced
regulation, but was not the sole source of state authority to impose severe
restrictions; and s4) the court below erred by reciting thu general purposes
for which the BMA was enacted without a determination that those purposes were in accord with the owner's reasonable expectations, and therefore sufficient to support a severe restriction on specific parcels of property.
BLACKMUN, J., dissented, expressing the view that (1) the case was not
ripe for review; >.2) even if there were no jurisdictional barrier, it was
unwise to decide issues based on the erroneous factual premise that regulation had rendered the subject property entirely valueless; (3) the court's
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decision improperly placed on state legislatures the burden of showing that
their legislative judgments are correct; and (4) previous takings clause
jurisprudence rested on the principle that a state has full power to prohibit
an owner's use of property without compensation if such use is harmful to
the public, with the determination of harmfulness resting on legislative
judgment rather than on common-law nuisance principles.
STEVENS, J., dissented, expressing the view that (1) the developer was not
entitled to an adjudication of the merits of his permanent takings claim
under the amended BMA until he exhausted his right to apply for a special
permit; (2) it was not clear whether the developer had a viable "temporary
taking" claim under the preamendment BMA; (3) the doctrine of judicial
restraint, under which the Supreme Court will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding, properly applied
to the case at hand; (4) a categorical rule that total regulatory takings must
be compensated was unsupported by prior decisions, arbitrary and unsound
in practice, and theoretically unjustified; and (5) the court's nuisance exception unwisely froze state common law and denied legislatures their traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property.
SOUTER, J., would have dismissed the writ of certiorari in the case as
improvidently granted, because the case came to the Supreme Court on an
unreviewable assumption—that the BMA deprived the developer of his
entire economic interest in the property at issue—that was both questionable as a conclusion of Fifth Amendment law and sufficient to frustrate the
Supreme Court's ability to render certain the legal premises on which the
court's holding rested.
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right to compensation under the takings clause of the Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment, on the theory that there has been no "taking,"
only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's
estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of the owner's title to begin with, so that the
severe limitation on property use is
not newly legislated or decreed, but
inheres in the title itself through the
restrictions that background principles of the state's law of property
and nuisance already place upon
land ownership—based on an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents, rather than artful,
harm-preventing characterizations—
and is merely duplicated by the regulation at issue; prior United States
Supreme Court takings decisions
which suggested that harmful or
noxious uses of property may be
proscribed by government regulation
without the requirement of compensation were merely an early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain, without
compensation, any regulatory diminution in property value, and "noxious use" logic cannot serve as a
touchstone to distinguish regulatory
"takings," which require compensation, from regulatory deprivations
which do not require compensation;
thus, a btate appellate court—in considering a developer's claim that a
state . beachfront management statute, which prohibited any construction of occupable improvements on
certain coastal lands, had deprived
him of any economically viable use
of beachfront lots which he had acquired with the intention of building
single-family residences thereon, and
thereby effected a "taking" of the
land for which he was entitled to
just compensation—errs in rejecting
S02
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the developer's claim on the merits,
on the theory that no compensation
is owing under the takings clause
regardless of a regulation's effect on
property values when the regulation
is designed to prevent serious public
harm, for the state legislatures recitation of a noxious-use justification,
in uncontested statutory findings
that new coastal-zone construction
threatened a public resource, cannot
be the basis for departing from the
categorical rule that total regulatory
takings must always be compensated. (Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.,
dissented from this holding.]
Appeal §§386, 413; Eminent Domain § 98 — state court decision — review by Supreme
Court — ripeness of federal
question — land-use regulation as taking — pleadings
2a-2c. A state appellate court decision—which held that, since a state
beachfront management statute was
designed to protect a public resource, a developer whose beachfront
property was allegedly rendered valueless by the statute's barring construction of habitable structures
thereon was not entitled to just compensation for an alleged "taking" of
the property—is ripe for plenary review by the United States Supreme
Court on certiorari, even though the
statute was amended after briefing
and argument before the state appellate court to allow the issuance of
special permits for construction of
habitable structures on such property under certain circumstances,
and even though Supreme Court precedents reflect an insistence on
knowing the nature and extent of
permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of regulations purporting to limit such development, because (1) although the
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above considerations would preclude
review had the state appellate court
rested its judgment on ripeness
grounds, the court instead disposed
of the developer's takings claim on
the merits; <2) this unusual disposition did not preclude the developer
from applying for a permit under
the amended statute and challenging
any denial under the takings clause
of the Federal Constitution's Fifth
Amendment, but would practically
and legally preclude any takings
claim with respect to the loss of
construction rights in the period between the statute's enactment and
amendment; (3> the developer had no
reason to proceed on such a "temporary taking" claim at trial, or to
seek remand for that purpose prior
to submission of the case to the htate
appellate court, because prior to the
amendment the taking was unconditional and permanent; (4) given the
breadth of the state appellate court's
holding and judgment, the developer
would be unable, absent the Supreme Court's intervention, to obtain further adjudication with respect to the period between enactment and amendment; and (5) in
these circumstances, it would not
accord with sound process to insist
that the developer pursue the special permit procedure before his takings claim could be considered ripe,
given that he had properly alleged
injury-in-fact under the Constitution's Article III with respect to both
the preamendment and postamendment constraints on the use of his
property, and given that the state
appellate court's dismissive foreclosure of further pleading and adjudication with respect to the preamendment component of the takings
claim makes it appropriate to address that component as if the case
were before the Supreme Court on

the pleadings alone, in which posture nothing more than a proper
allegation of injury-in-fact can reasonably be demanded. 'Blatkmun
and Stevens, JJ., dissented from this
holding; Soutt r, J , dissented in part
from this holding.)
A p p e a l § 1892.5 — r e m a n d — eminent domain — change in law
3a, 3b. The United State.-. Supreme
Court—in reviewing on certiorari a
state appellate court decision which
held that, since a state beachfront
management statute was designed to
protect a public resource, a developer whose beachfront property was
allegedly rendered valueless by the
statute's barring construction of habitable structures thereon was not
entitled to just compensation for an
alleged "taking'* of the property—is
not required by ''prudence" or any
other principle of judicial restraint
to vacate the judgment below and
remand for reconsideration in the
light of an amendment to the statute, which amendment allowed the
issuance of special permits for construction of habitable structures on
euch property under certain circumstances, where the state appellate
court rendered its categorical disposition of the case after the statute
had been amended and after the
state appellate court had been invited to consider the effect of the
amendment on the case. (Blackmun,
J., dissented from this holding.)
Eminent Domain §98 — taking —
land-use regulation
4a-4c. The takings clause of the
Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies
an owner economically viable use of
his or her land.
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Eminent Domain § 47 — interests
in land
5a, 5b. There are a number of
noneconomic interests in land whose
impairment will invite exceedingly
close scrutiny under the takings
clause of the Federal Constitution's
Fifth Amendment.
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Eminent Domain §§ 78, 103 — taking — lakebed — nuclear
plant
9. The owner of a lakebed is not
entitled to compensation, under the
takings clause of the Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment, when the
owner is denied the requisite permit
to engage in a landfilling operation
Appeal §§ 1087-5(2), 1088 — issue that would have the effect of flooding
not raised in briefs — premise others' lands, nor is the corporate
of certiorari petition
owner of a nuclear power plant enti6a, 6b. The United States Supreme tled to compensation when the
Court—in reviewing on certiorari a owner is directed to remove all imstate appellate court decision which provements from the land upon the
held that a developer was not enti- discovery that the plant sits astride
tled _ to just compensation for an al- an earthquake fault, because such
leged "taking" of his beachfront regulatory action, while it may have
property by means of a state beach- the effect of eliminating the land's
front management statute, which only economically productive use,
had been found by the trial court to does not proscribe a productive use
have rendered the property value- that was previously permissible unless by barring construction of habit- der relevant property and nuisance
able structures thereon—will not principles.
consider the argument in the respondent coastal commission's brief on Eminent Domain § 105 — remedy
the merits that the trial court's findfor temporary taking
ing was erroneous, where the finding
10a, 10b. Under the takings clause
was the premise of the developer's of the Federal Constitution's Fifth
petition for certiorari and was not Amendment, where a regulation has
challenged in the commission's brief already worked a taking of all use of
in opposition to certiorari.
property, no subsequent action by
Eminent Domain § 98 — taking — the government, such as rescinding
the regulation, can relieve the govproperty-use regulation
7a. 7b. The takings clause of the ernment of the duty to provide comFederal Constitution's Fifth Amend- pensation for the period during
ment applies to regulation of prop- which the taking was effective.
erty, as well as to physical deprivaEminent Domain § 98; Nuisances
tion of property.
§ 1 — taking — noxious uses
11. A "total taking" inquiry under
Eminent Domain § 103 — taking
the takings clause of the Federal
— easement
Constitution's
Fifth Amendment—
8. The government may assert a
permanent easement that was a pre- which inquiry implements the rule
existing limitation on the landown- that, where a state regulation dee r s title, without being required to prives land of all economically beneprovide compensation under the tak- ficial use, the state may resist an
ings clause of the Federal Constitu- asserted right to compensation, on
the theory that there is no "taking,"
tion's Fifth Amendment.
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only if the proscribed use interests
were not part of the owner's title to
begin with due to restrictions im
posed by background principles of
the state's law of property and nuisance—will ordinarily entail, as the
application of state nuisance law ordinarily entails, analysis of, among
other things, (1) the degree of harm
to public lands and resources, or
adjacent private property, posed by
the claimant's proposed activities on
the property in question, (2) the social value of the claimant's activities
and their suitability to the locality
in question, and (3) the relative ease
with which the alleged harm can be
avoided through measures taken by
the claimant and the government, or
adjacent private homeowners, alike;
for these purposes, the fact that a
particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any
common-law
prohibition—although
c h a n g e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s or new
knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so—
and so also does the fact that other
landowners, similarly situated, are
permitted to continue the use denied
to the claimant. (Blackmun and Stevens, J J., dissented in part from this
holding.)

Appeal § 1750 — remand — question to be decided
12. The United States Supreme
Court—having reversed on certiorari
a state appellate court decision
which held that, since a state beachfront management statute was designed to protect a public resource, a
developer whose beachfront property
was allegedly rendered valueless by
the statute's barring construction of
habitable structures thereon was not
entitled to just compensation for an
alleged "taking" of the property—
will remand the case to the state
appellate court to determine the
state-law question whether commonlaw principles would have prevented
the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on the developer's land, where the Supreme
Court rules that when a state regulation deprives land ot all economically beneficial use, the state may
resist an asserted right to compensation, on the theory that there is no
"taking," only if the proscribed use
interests were not part of the owner's title to begin with due to restrictions imposed by background principles of the state's law of property
and nuisance.

SYLLABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS

In 1986, petitioner Lucas bought
two residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island, intending to
build single-family homes such as
those on the immediately adjacent
parcels. At that time, Lucas's lots
were not subject to the State's
coastal zone building permit requirements. In 1988, however, the state
legislature enacted the Beachfront
Management Act, which barred Lucas from erecting any permanent
habitable structures on his parcels.

He filed suit against respondent
state agency, contending that, even
though the Act may have been a
lawful exercise of the State's police
power, the ban on construction deprived him of all "economicallv viable use" of his property and therefore effected a "taking" under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
that requ ed the payment of just
compensation See, e.g., Agins v Tiburon. 447 US 255, 261. 65 L Ed 2d
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106, 100 S Ct 2138. The state
trial court agreed, finding that the
ban rendered Lucas's parcels "valueless/' and entered an award exceeding $1.2 million. In reversing, the
State Supreme Court held itself
bound, in light of Lucas's failure to
attack the Act's validity, to accept
the legislature's "uncontested .
findings" that new construction in
the coastal zone threatened a valuable public resource. The court ruled
that, under the Mugler v Kansas,
123 US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273,
line of cases, when a regulation is
designed to prevent "harmful or
noxious uses" of property akin to
public nuisances, no compensation is
owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the regulations effect on
the property's value.
Held:
1. Lucas's takings claim is not
rendered unripe by the fact that he
may yet be able to secure a special
permit to build on his property under an amendment to the Act passed
after briefing and argument before
the State Supreme Court, but prior
to issuance of that court's opinion.
Because it declined to rest its judgment on ripeness grounds, preferring to dispose of the case on the
merits, the latter court's decision
precludes, both practically and legally, any takings claim with respect
to Lucas's preamendment deprivation. .Lucas has properly alleged injury-in-fact with respect to this
preamendment deprivation, and it
would not accord with sornd process
in these circumstances to insist that
he pursue the late-created procedure
before that component of his takings
claim can be considered ripe.
2. The State Supreme Court erred
in applying the ''harmful or noxious
uses" principle to decide this case.
(a) Regulations that deny the prop-
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erty owner all "economically viable
use of his land" constitute one of the
discrete categories of regulatory deprivations that require compensation
without the usual case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.
Although the Court has never set
forth the justification for this categorical rule, the practical—and economic— equivalence of physically
appropriating and eliminating all
beneficial use of land counsels its
preservation.
(b) A review of the relevant decisions demonstrates that the "harmful or noxious use" principle was
merely this Court's early formulation of the police power justification
necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in value; that the distinction
between regulation that "prevents
harmful use" and that which "confers benefits" is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective,
value-free basis; and that, therefore,
noxious-use logic cannot be the basis
for departing from this Court's categorical rule that total regulatory
takings must be compensated.
(c) Rather, the question must turn,
in accord with this Court's "takings"
jurisprudence, on citizens' historic
understandings regarding the content of, and the State's power over,
the "bundle of rights" that they acquire when they take title to property. Because it is not consistent
with the historical compact embodied in the Takings Clause that title
to real estate is held subject to the
State s subsequent decision to eliminate all economically beneficial use,
a regulation having that effect cannot be newly decreed, and sustained,
without compensation's being paid
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the owner. However, no compensation is owed—in this setting as with
all takings claims—if the State's affirmative decree simply makes explicit what already inheres in the
title itself, in the restrictions »hat
background principles of the State's
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. Cf.
Scranton / Wheeler, 179 US 141,
163, 45 L Ed 128, 21 S Ct 48.
(d) Although it seems unlikely
chat common-law principles would
have prevented the erection of any
habitable or productive improvements on Lucas's land, this state-law
question must be dealt with on remand. To win its case, respondent
cannot simply proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lu-

cas desires are inconsistent with the
public interest, or the conciusory
assertion that they violate a common-law maxim such as sic utere
tuo ut alienum non iaedas, but must
identify background principles of
nuisance and pioperty law that prohibit the uses Luca.-; now intends in
the property's present circum
stances.
304 SC 376, 404 SE2d 895, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of
the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J.,
and White, O'Connor, and Thomas,
JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment.
Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., filed
dissenting opinions. Souter, J., filed
a separate statement.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

A. Camden Lewis argued the cause for petitioner.
C. C. Harness, III argued the cause for respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
[1a] In 1986, petitioner David H.
Lucas paid 8975,000 for two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in
Charleston County. South Carolina,
on which he intended to build singlefamily homes. In 1988, however, the
South Carolina Legislature enacted
the Beachfront Management Act, SC
Code § 48-39-250 et seq. (Supp 1990)
(Act), which had the direct effect of
barring petitioner from erecting any
permanent habitable structures on
his two parcels. See § 48-39-290(A). A
state trial court found that this prohibition rendered Lucas's parcels
"valueless." App to Pet for Cert 37.
This case requires us to decide
whether the Act's dramatic effect on
the economic value of Lucas's lots
accomplished a taking of private

property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments requiring the
payment of "just compensation." US
Const, Amdt 5
I
A
South Carolina's expressed interest in intensively managing development activities in the so-called
"coastal zone" dates from 1977
when, in the aftermath of Congress's
passage of the federal Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 86 Stat
1280, as amended, 16 USC § 1451 et
seq. [16 USCS §§ 1451 et seq.], the
legislature enacted a Coastal Zone
Management Act of its own. See SC
Code §48-39-10 et seq. (1987). In its
original form, the South Carolina
x\ct required owners of coastal zone
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land that qualified as a "critical
area" (defined in the legislation to
include beaches and immediately adjacent sand dunes, § 48-39-KXJ)) to
obtain a permit from the newly created South Carolina Coastal Council
(respondent here) prior to committing the land to a "use other than
the use the critical area was devoted
to on [September 28, 1977]." § 48-3913CXA).
In the late 1970's, Lucas and others began extensive residential development of the Isle of Palms, a
barrier island situated eastward of
the City of Charleston. Toward the
close of the development cycle for
one residential subdivision known as
"Beachwood East," Lucas in 1986
purchased the two lots at issue in
this litigation for his own account.
No portion of the lots, which were
located approximately 300 feet from
the beach, qualified as a "critical
area" under the 1977 Act; accordingly, at the time Lucas acquired
these parcels, he was not legally
obliged to obtain a permit from the
Council in advance of any development activity. His intention with
respect to the lots was to do what
the owners of the immediately adjacent parcels had already done: erect
single-family residences. He commissioned architectural drawings for
this purpose.
The Beachfront Management Act
brought Lucas's plans to an abrupt
1. This specialized historical method of determining the baseline applied because the
Beachwood East subdivision is located adjacent to a so-called "inlet erosion zone"
defined in the Act to mean Ma segment of
shoreline along or adjacent to tidal inlets
wnich is influenced directly by the inlet and
its associated shoals," SC Code §48-39-270(7)
Supp 1988)) that is "not stabilized by jetties,
terminal groins, or other structures," § 48-39280(AK2). For areas other than these unstabi-
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end. Under that 1988 legislation, the
Council was directed to establish a
"baseline" connecting the landwardmost "point[s] of erosion . . . during
the past forty years" in the region of
the Isle of Palms that includes Lucas's lots. § 48-39-280(A)(2) <Supp
1988).1 In action not challenged here,
the Council fixed this baseline landward of Lucas's parcels. That was
significant, for under the Act construction of occupable improvements2 was flatly prohibited seaward
of a line drawn 20 feet landward of,
and parallel to, the baseline, § 48-39290(A) (Supp 1988). The Act provided
no exceptions.
B
Lucas promptly filed suit in the
South Carolina Court of Common
Pleas, contending that the Beachfront Management Act's construction bar effected a taking of his
property without just compensation.
Lucas did not take issue with the
validity of the Act as a lawful exercise of South Carolina's police power,
but contended that the Act's complete extinguishment of his property's value entitled him to compensation regardless of whether the legislature had acted in furtherance of
legitimate police power objectives.
Following a bench trial, the court
agreed. Among its factual determinations was the finding that "at the
time Lucas purchased the two lots,
lized inlet erosion zones, the statute directs
that the baseline be established "along the
crest of the primary oceanfront sand dune."
§48-39-28CHArtl).
2. The Act did allow the construction of
certain nonhabitable improvements, e.g.,
"wooden walkways no larger in width than
six feet," and "small wooden decks no larger
than one hundred forty-four 3quare feet."
§§48-39-2901 AX 1) and i2) (Supp 1988).
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both were zoned for singlefamily residential construction and . . . there
were no restrictions imposed upon
such use of the property by either
the State of South Carolina, the
County of Charleston, or the Town
of the Isle of Palms." App to Pet for
Cert 36. The trial court further
found that the Beachfront Management Act decreed a permanent ban
on construction insofar as Lucas's
lots were concerned, and that this
prohibition "deprive[dj Lucas of any
reasonable economic use of the lots,
. . . eliminated the unrestricted
right of use, and renderfed] them
valueless." Id., at 37. The court thus
concluded that Lucas's properties
had been "taken" by operation of
the Act, and it ordered respondent
to pay "just compensation" in the
amount of $1,232,387.50. Id., at 40.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed. It found dispositive
what it described as Lucas's concession "that the Beachfront Management Act [was] properly and validly
designed to preserve . . . South Carolina's beaches." 304 SC 376, 379,
404 SE2d 895, 896 (1991). Failing an
attack on the validity of the statute
as such, the court believed itself
bound to accept the "uncontested
. . . findings" of the South Carolina
legislature that new construction in
the coastal zone—such as petitioner
intended—threatened this public resource. Id., at 383, 404 SE2d, at 898.
The Court ruled that when a regulation respecting the use of property is
designed "to prevent serious public
harm," id., at 383, 404 SE2d, at 899
(citing, inter alia, Mugler v Kansas,
123 US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273
(1887)), no compensation is owing
under the Takings Clause regardless
of the regulation's effect on the property's value
Two justices dissented. They ac-

knowledged that our Mugler line of
cases recognizes governmental power
to prohibit "noxious" uses of property—i.e., uses of property akin to
"public nuisances"—without having
to pay compensation. But they would
not have characterized the Beachfront Management Acts
"primary
purpose [as] the prevention of a nuisance." 304 SC, at 395, 404 3E2d, at
906 (Harwell, J., dissenting). To the
dissenters, the chief purposes of the
legislation, among them the promotion of tourism and the creation of a
"habitat for indigenous flora and
fauna," could not fairly be compared
to nuisance abatement. Id., at 396,
404 SE2d, at 906. As a consequence,
they would have affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that the Act's
obliteration of the value of petitioner's lots accomplished a taking.
We granted certiorari. 502 US
, 116 L Ed 2d 455, 112 S Ct 436
(1991).
II
[2a] As a threshold matter, we
must briefly address the Council's
suggestion that this case is inappropriate for plenary review. After
briefing and argument before the
South Carolina Supreme Court, but
prior to issuance of that court's opinion, the Beachfront Management
Act was amended to authorize the
Council, in certain circumstances, to
issue "special permits" for the construction or reconstruction of habitable structures seaward of the baseline. See SC Code § 48-39-290(D)(l>
(Supp 1991). According to the Council, this amendment renders Lucas's
claim of a permanent deprivation
unripe, as Lucas may yet be able to
secure permission to build on his
property. "[The Court's] cases," we
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are reminded, "uniformly reflect an
insistence on knowing the nature
and extent of permitted development
before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport
to limit it." MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v County of Yolo, 477 US 340,
351, 91 L Ed 2d 285, 106 S Ct 2561
(1986). See also Agins v Tiburon, 447
US 255, 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S
Ct 2138 (1980). Because petitioner
'has not yet obtained a final decision regarding how [he] will be allowed to develop [his] property," Williamson County Regional Planning
Comrn'n of Johnson Citv v Hamilton
Bank, 473 US 172, 190, 87 L Ed 2d
126, 105 S Ct 3108 (1985), the Council argues that he is not yet entitled
to definitive adjudication of his takings claim in this Court.

120 L Ed 2d

struction rights during the period
before the 1990 amendment. See
generally First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v
Countv of Los Angeles, 482 US 304,
96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 2378 (1987)
(holding that temporary deprivations
of use are compensable under the
Takings Clause). Without even so
much as commenting upon the consequences of the South Carolina Supreme Court's judgment in this respect, the Council insists that permitting Lucas to press his claim of a
past deprivation on this appeal
would be improper, since "the issues
of whether and to what extent [Lucas] has incurred a temporary taking . . . have simply never been addressed." Brief for Respondent 11.
Yet Lucas had no reason to proceed
on a "temporary taking" theory at
trial, or even to seek remand for
that purpose prior to submission of
the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court, since as the Act then
read, the taking was unconditional
and permanent. Moreover, given the
breadth of the South Carolina Supreme Court's holding and judgment, Lucas would plainly be unable
(absent our intervention now) to obtain further state-court adjudication
with respect to the 1988-1990 period.

We think these considerations
would preclude review had the
South Carolina Supreme
Court
rested its judgment on ripeness
grounds, as it was (essentially) invited to do by the Council, see Brief
for Respondent 9, n 3. The South
Carolina Supreme Court shrugged
off the possibility of further administrative and trial proceedings, however, preferring to dispose of Lucas's
takings claim on the merits. Compare, e.g., San Diego Gas & Electric
Co., 450 US 621, 631-632, 67 L Ed 2d
551, 101 S Ct 1287 (1981). This unusual disposition does not preclude
Lucas from applying for a permit
under the 1990 amendment for future construction, and challenging,
on takings grounds, any denial. But
it does preclude, both practically and
legally, any takings claim with respect to Lucas's past deprivation, i.
e., for his having been denied con-

[2b, 3a] In these circumstances, we
think it would not accord with sound
process to insist that Lucas pursue
the late-created "special permit"
procedure before his takings claim
can be considered ripe. Lucas has
properly alleged Article III injury-infact in this case, with respect to both
the pre-1990 and post-1990 constraints placed on the use of his
parcels by the Beachfront Management Act.3 That there is a discre-

3. [2c] Justice Blackmun insists that this
aspect of Lucas's claim is "not justiciable."

post. at
. 120 L Ed 2d, at 829, because
Lucas never fulfilled his obligation under Wil-
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rionary "special permit" procedure
by which he may regain—for the
future, at least—beneficial use of his
land goes only to the prudential
''ripeness" of Lucas's challenge, and
for the reasons discussed we do not.
think it prudent to apply that prudential requirement here. See Espo-

sito v South Carolina Coastal Coun
cil, 939 F2d 165, 168 (CA4 1991), cert
pending. No. 91-941.4 We leave for
decision on remand, of course, the
questions left unaddressed by the
South Carolina Supreme Court as a
consequence of its categorical disposition.*

hamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 US 172,
87 L fid 2d 126. 105 S Ct 3108 (1985), *o
"--.ubmijtj a plan for development of jhisj property ' to the proper state authorities. Id., at
187, 87 L Ed 2d 126, 105 S Ct 3108. See post,
at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 830. But such a
submission would have been pointless, as the
Council stipulated below that no building permit would have been issued under the 1988
Act, application or no application. Record 14
(Stipulations). Nor does the peculiar posture ot
this case mean that we are without Article III
jurisdiction, as Justice Blackmun apparently
believes, see post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 830,
and n 5. Given the South Carolina Supremo
Court's dismissive foreclosure of further
pleading and adjudication with respect to the
p r e 1990 component of Lucas's taking claim,
it is appropriate for us to address that component as if the case were here on the pleadings
alone. Lucas properly alleged injury-in-fact in
his com plaint, see App to Pet for Cert 154
•complaint;; id., at 156 (asking "damages for
the temporary taking of his property" from
the date of the 1988 Act's passage to "such
time as this matter is finally resolved"). No
more can reasonably be demanded. Cf. First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church ox
Glendale v Countv of Los Angeles, 482 US
304, 312-313, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 2378
1987). Justice Blackmun finds it "battling,"
post, at
, n 5. 120 L Ed 2d, at 830. that we
grant standing here, whereas "just a lew days
ago. in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US
119 L Ed 2d 351. 112 S Ct
(1992),"
we denied standing. He sees in that strong
evidence to support his repeated imputations
that the Court "presses" to take this case,
post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d. at 826, is 'V-ager to
decide' it, post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 831,
and is unwilling to "be denied," post, at
.
i20 L Ed 2d, at 829. He has a point: The
decisions are indeed very close in time, yet
one grants standing and the other denies it.
Hie distinction, however, rests in law rather
than chronology. Lujan. since it involved the
establishment of injury-in-fact at the sum-

marv judgment stage, required specific facts
to be adduced by sworn testimony; had the
same challenge to a generalized allegation of
injury-m-fact been made at the pleading
stage, it would have been unsuccessful.
4. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reached the merits of a takings challenge to the 1988 Beachfront Management Act identical to the one Lucas brings
here even though the Act was amended, and
the special permit procedure established,
while :he case was under submission. The
court observed:
"The enactment of the 1990 Act during the
pendency of this appeal, with its provisions
for special permits and other changes that
may affect the plaintiffs, does not relieve us of
the need to address the plaintiffs' claims under the provisions of the 1988 Act. Even if the
amended Act cured all of the plaintiffs' concerns, the amendments would not foreclose
the possibility that a taking had occurred
during the years when the 1988 Act was in
effect/' Esposito v South Carolina Coastal
Council, 939 F2d 165, 168 (CA4 1991).
5. [ 3 b ] Justice Blackmun states that our
"intense interest in Lucas' plight . . . would
have been more prudently expressed by vacating the judgment below and remanding for
further consideration in light of the 1990
amendments'' to the Beachfront Management
Act. Post, at
, n 7, 120 L Ed 2d, at 831.
That is a strange suggestion, given that the
South Carolina Supreme Court rendered its
categorical disposition m this case after the
Act had been amended, and after it had been
invited to consider the effect of those amendments on Lucas's case. We have no reason to
believe that the justices of the South Carolina
Supreme Court are any more desirous of using a narrower ground now than they were
then; and neither "prudence'' nor any other
principle of judicial restraint requires that we
remand to find out. whether they have
changed their mind.
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A
Prior to Justice Holmes' exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US 393, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S
Q 158, 28 ALR 1321 (1922), it was
generally thought that the Takings
Clause reached only a "direct appropriation " of property, Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall 457, 551, 20 L Ed 287
(1871), or the functional equivalent
of a "practical ouster of [the owner's]
possession." Transportation Co. v
Chicago, 99 US 635, 642, 25 L Ed
336 (1879). See also Gibson v United
States, 166 US 269, 275-276, 41 L Ed
996, 17 S Ct 578 (1897). Justice
Holmes recognized in Mahon, however, that if the protection against
physical appropriations of private
property was to be meaningfully enforced, the government's power to
redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of property
was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits. 260 US, at 414415, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28
ALR 1321. If, instead, the uses of
private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification
under the police power, "the natural
tendency of human nature [would
bel to extend the qualification more
and more until at last private property disappeared]." Id., at 415, 67 L
Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28 ALR 1321.
These considerations gave birth in
that case to the oft-cited maxim
that, "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking." Ibid.
Nevertheless, our decision in Mahon offered little insight into when,
and under what circumstances, a
ijiven regulation would be seen as
going "too far" for purposes of the

312

120 L Ed 2d

Fifth Amendment. In 70-odd years of
succeeding "regulatory takings" jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any " 'set formula' " for determining how far is too far, preferring to "engagfel in . . . essentially
ad hoc, factual inquiries," Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York
City, 438 US 104, 124, 57 L Ed 2d
631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978) (quoting
Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590,
594, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S Ct 987
(1962)). See Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup Ct
Rev 1, 4. We have, however, described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry
into the public interest advanced in
support of the restraint. The first
encompasses regulations that compel
the property owner to suffer a physical "invasion" of his property. In
general (at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how
minute the intrusion, and no matter
how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation. For example, in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 US 419, 73 L Ed 2d 868, 102 S
Ct 3164 (1982), we determined that
New York's law requiring landlords
to allow television cable companies
to emplace cable facilities in their
apartment buildings constituted a
taking, id., at 435-440, 73 L Ed 2d
868, 102 S Ct 3164, even though the
facilities occupied at most only 1^2
cubic feet of the landlords' property,
see id., at 438, n 16, 73 L Ed 2d 868,
102 S Ct 3164. See also United
States v Causby, 328 US 256, 265,
and n 10, 90 L Ed 1206, 66 S Ct 1062
(1946) (physical invasions of airspace); cf. Kaiser Aetna v United
States, 444 US 164, 62 L Ed 2d 332,
100 S Ct 383 (1979) (imposition of
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495, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232
(1987); Hodel v Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.,
[4a] The second situation in which 452 US 264, 295-296, 69 L Ed 2d 1,
• /e have found categorical treatment 101 S Ct 2352 (1981 .^ As we have
appropriate is where regulation de- said on numerous occasions, the
nies all economically beneficial or Fifth Amendment is violated when
productive use of land. See Agins, landuse regulation 'fdoes not sub447 US, at 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 stantially advance legitimate state
S Ct 2138; see also Nollan v Califor- interests or denies an owner economnia Coastal Comm'n, 483 US 825, ically viable use of his land." Agins,
834, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141 supra, at 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S
11987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ct 2138 (citations omitted) t emphasis
7
Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, added).

navigational servitude upon private
marina).

6. We will net attempt to respond to all of
Justice Blackmun's mistaken citation of case
precedent. Characteristic of its nature is his
assertion that the cases we discuss here stand
merely for the proposition "that proof that a
regulation does not deny an owner economic
use of his property is sufficient to defeat a
facial taking challenge" and not for the point
that "denial of such use is sufficient to establish a taking claim regardless of any other
consideration. ' Post, at
, n 11, 120 L Ed
2d. at 835. The cases say. repeatedly and
unmistakably, that " *[t]he test to be applied
in considering [a] facial [takings] challenge is
fairly straightforward. A statute regulating
the uses that can be made of property effects
a taking if it 'denies an owner
economically
•viable use of bis land." ' " Keystone, 480 US,
at 495, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (quoting
Hodel, 452 US, at 295-296, 69 L Ed 2d i. 101
S Ct 2352 (quoting Agins. 447 US. at 160))
(emphasis added).
[4b] Justice Blackmun describes that rule
•which v e Jo not invent but merely apply
today* as "altering] the long-settled rules of
review" by foisting on the State "the burden
of showing [its] regulation is not a taking."
Post, at
.
. 120 L Ed 2d. at 832. This
ia of course wrong. Lucas had to do more than
simpiy rile a lawsuit to establish his constitutional entitlement; he had to show that the
Beachfront Management Act denied him economically beneficial use of his land. Our analysis presumes the unconstitutionality of state
land-use regulation only in the sense that any
rule-with-exceptions presumes the invalidity
of a law that violates it—for example, the
rule generally prohibiting content-based restrictions on speech. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v New York Crime Victims Board,
502 US
.
. 116 L Ed 2d 476, 112 S Ct

501 (1991) ("A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial hurden on speakers because
of the content of their speech'*). Justice Blackmun's real quarrel ih with the substantive
standard of liability we apply in this case, a
long-established standard we ^ee no need to
repudiate.
7. Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our
"deprivation ot all economically feasible use"
rule : gTeater than its precision, since the
rule does not make clear the "property interest ' against which the loss of value is to be
measured When, for example, a regulation
requires a developer to leave 909c of a rural
tract in its natural state, it is unclear
whether we would analyze the situation as
one m which the owner has been deprived of
all economically beneficial use of the burdened poition of the tract, or as one in which
the owner has suffered a mere diminution in
value of the tract as a whole. >For an extreme
—and, we think, unsupportable—view of the
relevant calculus, see Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York City, 42 NrY2d 324.
333-334. 366 NE2d 1271, 1276-1277 <1977i,
alfd, 438 US 104, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct
2646 (I97e>, where the state court examined
the diminution in a particular parcel's value
produced by a municipal ordinance in light of
total value of the taking claimant's other
holdings in the vicinity.) Unsurprisingly, this
uncertainty regarding the composition of the
denominator in our "deprivation" fraction has
produced inconsistent pronouncements by the
Court. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Manor., 260 US 393. 414, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct
158, 28 ALR 1321 (1922) ilaw restricting subsurface extraction of coal held to effect a
taking;, with Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn.
v DeBf netHctis. 480 US 470. 497-502, 94 L Ed
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relatively rare situations where the
government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial
uses.

We have never set forth the justification for this rule. Perhaps it is
simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's
point of view, the equivalent of a
physical appropriation. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v San Diego,
450 US, at 652, 67 L Ed 2d 551, 101
S Ct 1287 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"[F]or what is the land but the
profits thereof]?]" 1 E. Coke, Institutes ch 1, §1 (1st Am ed 1812).
Surely, at least, in the extraordinary
circumstance when no productive or
economically beneficial use of land is
permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the
legislature is simply "adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic
life," Penn Central Transportation
Co., 438 US, at 124, 57 L Ed 2d 631,
98 S Ct 2646, in a manner that
secures an "average reciprocity of
advantage" to everyone concerned.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260
US, at 415, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158,
28 ALR 1321. And the functional
basis for permitting the government,
by regulation, to affect property values without compensation—that
"Government hardly could go on if
to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished
without paying for every such
change in the general law," id., at
413, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28
ALR 1321—does not apply to the

On the other side of the balance,
affirmatively supporting a compensation requirement, is the fact that
regulations that leave the owner of
land without economically beneficial
or productive options for its use—
typically, as here, by requiring land
to be left substantially in its natural
state—carry with them a heightened
risk that private property is being
pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating
serious public harm. See, e.g., Annicelli v South Kingstown, 463 A2d
133, 140-141 (RI 1983) (prohibition
on construction adjacent to beach
justified on twin grounds of safety
and "conservation of open space");
Morris County Land Improvement
Co. v Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 NJ 539, 552-553, 193 A2d
232, 240 (1963) (prohibition on filling
marshlands imposed in order to preserve region as water detention basin and create wildlife refuge). As
Justice Brennan explained: "From
the government's point of view, the
benefits flowing to the public from
preservation of open space through
regulation may be equally great as
from creating a wildlife refuge
through formal condemnation or increasing
electricity
production

2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (1987) (nearly identical
law held not to effect a taking); see also id., at
515-520. 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232
< Rehnquist, C.J , dissenting;; Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a
Muddle, 57 S Cal L Rev 561, 566-569 (1984).
The answer to this difficult question may lie
:n how the owner's reasonable expectations
have been shaped by the State's law of prop-ty—i. e., whether and to what degree the
, mate's law has accorded legal recognition and

protection to the particular interest in land
with respect to which the takings claimant
alleges a diminution in (or elimination of)
value. In any event, we avoid this difficulty in
the present case, since the interest in land"
that Lucas has pleaded (a fee simple interest)
is an estate with a rich tradition of protection
at common law, and since the South Carolina
Court of Common Pleas found that the Beachfront Management Act left each of Lucas's
beachfront lots without economic value.
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through a dam project that floods
private property." San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co., supra, at 652, 67 L Ed 2d
551, 101 S Ct 1287 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The many statutes on
the books, both state and federal,
that provide for the use of eminent
domain to impose servitudes on private scenic lands preventing develop
mental uses, or to acquire such
lands altogether, suggest the practical equivalence in this setting of
negative regulation and appropriation. See, e.g., 16 USC § 410ff-l(a) [16
USCS § 410ff-l(a)] (authorizing acquisition of "lands, waters, or interests
[within Channel Islands National
Park] (including but not limited to
scenic easements)"); § 460aa-2(a) (authorizing acquisition of ''any lands,
or lesser interests therein, including
mineral interests and scenic easements" within Sawtooth National
Recreation Area); §§3921-3923 (authorizing acquisition of wetlands);
NC Gen Stat § 113A-38 (1990: (au-

thorizing acquisition of, inter alia,
" 'scenic e a s e m e n t s ' " within the
North Carolina natural and scenic
rivers system); Tenn Code Ann §§ 11
15-101—11-15-108 (1987) (authorizing
acquisition of "protective easements''
and other rights in real property
adjacent to State's historic, architectural, archaeological, or cultural resources).

8. Justice Stevens criticizes the "deprivation
of all economically beneficial use" rule as
"wholly arbitrary ', in that "[the] landowner
whose property is diminished in value 95%
recovers nothing." while the landowner who
suffers a complete elimination of value "recovers the land's full value." Post, at
.
120 L Ed 2d, at 844. This analysis errs in its
assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one step short of complete is not
entitled to compensation. Such an owner
might not be able to claim the benefit of our
categorical formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time and again. "[t]he economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and
. . . the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations" are keenly relevant to takings
analysis generally Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York City, 438 US 104, 124, 57
L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978). It is tiue
that in at least some cases the landowner
with 95<?c loss will get nothing, while the
landowner with total loss will recover in full.
But that occasional result is no more strange

than the gross disparity between the landowner whose premises are taken for a highway (who recovers in full) and the landowner
whose property is reduced to 5% of its former
value by the highway 'who recovers nothing).
Takings law is full of these "all-or-nothing"
situations.
[5b] Justice Stever.h similarly misinterprets our focus on "developmental" uses of
property ;the uses proscribed by the Beachfront Management Act) as betraying an "assumption that the only uses of property cognizable under the Constitution are developmental uses." Post, at
, n 3, 120 L Ed 2d, at
844. We make no such assumption. Though
our prior takings cases evince an abiding
concern tor the productive uee of, and economic investment in, land, there are plainly a
number of noneconomic interests in land
whose impairment will invite exceedingly
close scrutiny under the Takings Ciause. See.
e g., Ix)retto v Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 US 419, 436, 73 L Ed 2d
868. 102 S Ct 3164 (1982) (interest in excluding strangers from one's land).

[4c, 5a] We think, in short, that
there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when
the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of
the common good, that is, to leave
his property economically idle, he
has suffered a taking. 8
B
[6a] The trial court found Lucas's
two beachfront lots to have been
rendered valueless by respondent's
enforcement of the coastal-zone con-
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struction ban.9 Under Lucas's theory
of the case, which rested upon our
"no economically viable use" statements, that finding entitled him to
compensation. Lucas believed it unnecessary to take issue with either
the purposes behind the Beachfront
Management Act, or the means chosen by the South Carolina Legislature to effectuate those purposes.
The South Carolina Supreme Court,
however, thought otherwise. In its

view, the Beachfront Management
Act was no ordinary enactment, but
involved an exercise of South Carolina's "police powers" to mitigate the
harm to the public interest that petitioner's use of his land might occasion. 304 SC, at 384, 404 SE2d, at
899 By neglecting to dispute the
findings enumerated in the Act10 or
otherwise to challenge the legislature's purposes, petitioner "concede[d] that the beach/dune area of

9. [6b] This finding was the premise of the
Petition for Certiorari, and since it was not
challenged in the Brief in Opposition we decline to entertain the argument in respondent's brief on the merits, see Brief for Respondent 45-50, that the fending was erroneous Instead, we decide the question presented
under the same factual assumptions as did
the Supreme Court of South Carolina. See
Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 US 808, 816, 85
L fid 2d 791, 105 S Ct 2427 (1985)

"<2) Beach/dune system vegetation is
unique and extremely important to the vitality and preservation of the system
'(3) Many miles of South Carolina's beaches
have been identified as critically eroding.
"(4)
[Development unwisely has been
sited too close to the [beach/dune] system
This type of development has jeopardized the
stability of the beach/dune system, accelerated erosion, and endangered adjacent property. It is in both the public and private
interests to protect the system from this unwise development.
"(5) The use of armoring in the form of
hard erosion control devices such as seawalls,
bulkheads, and rip-rap to protect erosionthreatened structures adjacent to the beach
has not proven effective These armonng devices have given a false sense of security to
beachfront property owners In reality, these
hard structures, in many instances, have increased the vulnerability of beachfront property to damage from wind and waves while
contributing to the deterioration and loss of
the dry sand beach which is so important to
the tourism industry
"(6) Erosion is a natural process which
becomes a significant problem for man only
when structures are erected in close proximity to the beach/dune system It is in both the
public and private interests to afford the
beach/dune system space to accrete and erode
in its natural cycle This space can be provided only by discouraging new construction
in close proximity to the beach/dune system
and encouraging those who have erected
structures too close to the system to retreat
from it

10. The legislature's express findings include the following
' The General Assembly finds that*
"(1) The beach/dune system along the coast
of South Carolina is extremely important to
the people of this State and serves the following functions.
"(a) protects life and property by serving as a storm barrier which dissipates
wave energy and contributes toshorehne
stability in an economical and effective
manner.
"(b) provides the basis for a tourism
industry that generates approximately
two-thirds of South Carolina's annual
tourism industrv revenue which constitutes a significant portion of the state's
economy The tourists who come to the
South Carolina coast to enjoy the ocean
and dry sand beach contribute significantly to state and local tax revenues;
"(c) provides habitat for numerous species of plants and animals, several of
which are threatened or endangered Waters adjacent to the beach/dune system
also provide habitat for many other marine species,
,T,
d) provides a natural health environment for the citizens of South Carolina to
spend leisure time which serves their
physical and mental well-being

816

"(8) It is in the state's best interest to
protect and to promote increased public access to South Carolina's beaches for out-ofstate tourists and South Carolina residents
alike " SC Code § 48-39-250 (Supp 1991)

LUCAS v SO. CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
(1992) 120 L Ed 2d 798

South Carolina's shores is an extremely valuable public resource;
that the erection of new construction, inter alia, contributes to the
erosion and destruction of this public resource; and that discouraging
new construction in close proximity
to the beach/ dune area is necessary
to prevent a great public harm." Id.,
at 382-383. 404 SE2d, at 898. In the
c o u r t ' s view, t h e s e concessions
brought petitioner's challenge within
a long line of this Court's cases sustaining against Due Process and
T a k i n g s Clause c h a l l e n g e s t h e
State's use of its "police powers" to
enjoin a property owner from activities akin to public nuisances. See
Mugier v Kansas, 123 US 623, 31 L
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887) (law prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic
beverages); Hadacheck v Sebastian,
239 US 394, 60 L Ed.348, 36 S Ct
143 (1915) (law barring operation of
brick mill in residential area); Miller
v Schoene, 276 US 272, 72 L Ed 568.
48 3 Ct 246 11928) (order to destroy
diseased cedar trees to prevent infection of nearbv orchards); Goldblatt v
Hempstead. 369 US 590, 8 L Ed 2d
130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962) (law effectively preventing continued operation of quarry in residential area*.

values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate—a
reality sve nowadays acknowledge
explicitly with respect to the full
scope of the State's police power.
See ; e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co , 438 US, at 125. 57 L Ed 2d
631, M S Ct 2646 (where State "reasonably concludefsj that 'the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare'
would be promoted by prohibiting
particular contemplated uses of
land." compensation need not accompany prohibition); see also Nollan v
California Coastal Commission, 483
US, at 834-835, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107
S Ct 3141 ( 'Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a f legit i
mate state interest[,]' |but) ft]he>
have made clear . . . that a broad
range of governmental purposes and
regulations satisfy these requirements"). We made this very point in
Penn Central Transportation Co.,
where, in the course of sustaining
New York City's landmarks preservation program against a takings
challenge, we rejected the petitioner's suggestion that Mugier and the
cases following it were premised on,
and thus limited by, some objective
conception of "noxiousness":

[1b] It is correct that many of our
prior ooinions have suggested that
' harmful or noxious uses" of property maj be proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of compensation. For a number
of reasons, however, we think the
South Carolina Supreme Court was
too quick to conclude that that principle decides the present case. The
"harmful or noxious uses" principle
was the Court's early attempt to
describe in theoretical terms why
government may, consistent with
the Takings Clause, affect property

"(T]he uses in issue in Hadacheck,
Miller, and Goldblatt were perfectly lawtul in themselves. They
involved no 'blameworthiness, . . .
moral wrongdoing or conscious act
of dangerous risk-taking which inducefd society] to shift the cost to
a pafrt]icular individual.' Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74
Yale LJ 36, 50 (1964). These cases
are better understood as resting
not on any supposed 'noxious'
quality of the prohibited uses but
rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related
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ing" and "benefit-conferring" regulation is often in the eye of the beholder. It is quite possible, for example, to describe in either fashion the
ecological, economic, and aesthetic
concerns that inspired the South
Carolina legislature in the present
case. One could say that imposing a
"Harmful or noxious use" analysis servitude on Lucas's land is neceswas, in other words, simply the pro- sary in order to prevent his use of it
genitor of our more contemporary from "harming" South Carolina's
statements that "land-use regulation ecological resources; or, instead, in
does not effect a taking if it 'substan- order to achieve the "benefits" of an
tially advancefs] legitimate state in- ecological preserve.11 Compare, e.g.,
terests' . . . ." Nollan, supra, at 834, Claridge v New Hampshire Wet97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141 lands Board, 125 NH 745, 752, 485
(quoting Agins v Tiburon, 447 US, at A2d 287, 292 (1984) (owner may,
260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138); without compensation, be barred
see also Penn Central Transporta- from filling wetlands because landtion Co., supra, at 127, 57 L Ed 2d tilling would deprive adjacent coastal
631, 98 S Ct 2646; Euclid v Ambler habitats and marine fisheries of ecoRealty Co., 272 US 365, 387-388, 71
logical support), with, e.g., Bartlett v
L Ed 303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016
Zoning Comm'n of Old Lyme, 161
(1926).
Conn 24, 30, 282 A2d 907, 910 (1971)
[1c] The transition from our early (owner barred from filling tidal
focus on control of "noxious'' uses to marshland must be compensated, deour contemporary understanding of spite municipality's "laudable" goal
the broad realm within which gov- of "preserving] marshlands from enor
destruction'').
ernment may regulate without com- croachment
Whether
one
or
the
other of the
pensation was an easy one, since the
distinction between ''harm-prevent- competing characterizations will
to the implementation of a policy
—not unlike historic preservation
—expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property." 438 US, at 133-134, n 30, 57
L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646.

11. In the present case, in fact, some of the described in "harm-preventing" fashion.
"[South Carolina] legislature's 'findings' " to
Justice Blackmun, however, apparently inwhich the South Carolina Supreme Court sists that we must make the outcome hinge
purported to defer in characterizing the pur- (exclusively) upon the South Carolina Legislapose of the Act as "harm-preventing," 304 SC ture's other, "harm-preventing" characteriza376, 385, 404 SE2d 895, 900 (1991), seem to us tions, focusing on the declaration that "prohiphrased in "benefit-conferring" language in- bitions on building in front of the setback line
stead. For example, they describe the impor- are necessary to protect people and property
tance of a construction ban in enhancing from storms, high tides, and beach erosion."
"South Carolina's annual tourism industry Post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 828. He says
revenue," SC Code § 48-39-250(1 Kb) (Supp "[n)othing in the record undermines [this]
1991», in "providing] habitat for numerous assessment," ibid., apparently seeing no
species cf plants and animals, several of significance in the fact that the statute perwhich are threatened or endangered," § 48-39- mits owners of existing structures to remain
250(1 Kc), and in "provid[ingJ a natural land even to rebuild if their structures are
healthy environment for the citizens of South not "destroyed beyond repair," SC Code Ann
Carolina to spend leisure time which serves § 48-39-290(B)), and in the fact that the 1990
their physical and mental well-being." § 48-39- amendment authorizes the Council to issue
250(lXd). It would be pointless to make the permits for new construction in violation of
outcome of this case hang upon this terminol- the uniform prohibition, see SC Code § 48-39ogy, since the same interests could readily be 290tDXl) (Supp 1991).
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When it is understood that "prevention of harmful use" was merely

our early formulation of the police
power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in value; and
that the distinction between regulation that "prevents harmful iibe"
and that which 'confers benefits" is
difficult, if not impossible, to discern
on an objective, value-free basis: it
becomes self-evident that noxioususe logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory "takings"—which require compensation
—from regulatory deprivations that
do not require compensation. A fortiori the legislature's recitation of a
noxious-use justification cannot be
the basis for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory
takings must be compensated. If it
were, departure would virtually always be allowed. The South Carolina
Supreme Court's approach would essentially nullify Mahon's affirmation
of limits to the noncompensable exercise of the police power. Our cases
provide no support for this: None of
them that employed the logic of
"harmful use" prevention to sustain
a regulation involved an allegation
that the regulation wholly eliminated the value of the claimant's
land. See Keystone Bituminous Coal
Assn., 480 US, at 513-514, 94 L Ed
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). 13

12. [ 1 d ] In Justice Blackmun's view, even
with respect to regulations that deprive an
owner of all developmental or economically
beneficial land uses, the test tor required
compensation is whether the legislature has
recited a harm-preventing justification tor its
action See post, at
.
. 120 L Ed
2d, at 828. 833-836. Since such a justification
can be formulated in practically every case,
this amounts to a test of whether the legisla
ture has a stuDid staff. We think the Takings
Clause requires courts to do more than insist
upon artful harm-preventing characterisations

13. E.g, Mugler v K a n s a s 123 US 623, 31 L
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887) (prohibition jpon
use of a building as a brewery; other uses
permitted); Plymouth Coal Co v Pi nnsylvania. 232 US 531. 58 L Ed 713 34 S Ct 359
(1914' (requirement that "pillar" of coal be
lelt in ground to safeguard mine workers,
mineral rights could otherwise be exploited);
Remman v Little ROCK, 237 US 171, 59 L Ed
900. J5 S Ct 511 (1915) (declaration tnat
livery stable constituted a public nuisance,
other uses ot the property permitted); Haducheck v Sebastian. 239 US 394, 60 L Ed 348,
36 S Ct 143 (1915) (prohibition of brick rnanu-

come to one's lips in a particular
case depends primarily upon one's
evaluation of the worth of competing
uses of reai estate. See Restatement
'Second) of Torts §822, Comment g,
p 112 1979) ("[practically all human activities unless carried on in a
wilderness interfere to some extent
with others or involve some risk of
interference^. A given restraint will
be seen as mitigating " h a r m " to the
adjacent parcels or securing a "benefit" for them, depending upon the
observer's evaluation of the relative
importance of the use that the restraint favors. See Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 Yale LJ 36, 49
<1964) ("[T]he problem [in this area|
is not one of noxiousness or harmcreating activity at all; rather it is a
problem of inconsistency between
perfectly innocent and independently desirable uses"'. Whether Lucas's construction of single-family
residences on his parcels should be
describee as bringing " h a r m " to
South Carolina's adjacent ecological
resources thus depends principally
upon whether the describer believes
that the State's use interest in nurturing those resources is so important that any competing adjacent
use must yield.12
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[1e, 7a] Where the State seeks to
sustain regulation that deprives land
of all economically beneficial use, we
think it may resist compensation
only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner s
estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to
begin with.14 This accords, we think,
with our "takings" jurisprudence,
which has traditionally been guided
by the understandings of our citizens
regarding the content of, and the
State's power over, the "bundle of
rights" that they acquire when they
obtain title to property. It seems to
us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property
to be restricted, from time to time,
by various measures newly enacted
by the State in legitimate exercise of
its police powers; "[a]s long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must
yield to the police power." Pennsyl-

vania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US, at
413, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158. And
in the case of personal property, by
reason of the State's traditionally
high degree of control over commercial dealings, he ought to be aware
of the possibility that new regulation
might even render his property economically worthless (at least if the
property's only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for
sale), bee Andrus v Allard, 444 US
51, 66-67, 62 L Ed 2d 210, 100 S Ct
318 (1979) (prohibition on sale of
eagle feathers). In the case of land,
however, we think the notion
pressed by the Council that title is
somehow held subject to the "implied limitation" that the State may
subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent
with the historical compact recorded
in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture.15

factunng in residential area, other uses permitted) Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590,
3 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962) (prohibition
on excavation, other uses permitted)
14. Drawing on our First Amendment jurisprudence, see, e g, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources ot Oregon v
Smith. 494 US 872. ^78-879, 108 L Ed 2d 876,
110 S Ct 1595 (1990i, Justice Stevens would
T
loo(k] to the generality of a regulation of
property" to determine whether compensation
is owing Post, at
120 L Ed 2d, at 849
The Beachfront Management Act is general,
in his view because it "regulates the use of
the coastline of the entire state" Post, at
120 L Ed 2d, at 850 There may be some
validity to the principle Justice Stevens proposes, but it does not properly appiy to the
present case The equivalent of a law of general application that inhibits the practice of
religion without being aimed at religion, see
Oregon v Smith, supra, is a law that destroys
the value of land without being aimed at
land Perhaps such a law—the generally applicable criminal prohibition on the manufacturing jf alcoholic beverages challenged in
Mugler comes to mind—cannot constitute a

compensable taking See 123 US, at 656-656,
31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 But a regulation
specifically directed to land use no more acquires immunity by plundering landowners
generally than does a law specifically directed
at religious practice acquire immunity by
prohibiting all religions Justice Stevens' approach renders the Takings Clause little more
than a particularized restatement of the
Equal Protection Clause.
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15. [7b] After accusing us of "launching] a
missile to kill a mouse," post, at
, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 825, Justice Biackmun expends a
good deal of throw-weight of his own upon a
noncombatant, arguing that our description of
the "understanding" of land ownership that
informs the Takings Clause is not supported
by early American experience That is largely
true, but entirely irrelevant The practices of
the States prior to incorporation of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses, see Chicago, D & Q R C o v Chicago, 166 US 226, 41
L Ed 979, 17 S Ct 581 U897V-which, as
Justice Biackmun acknowledges, occasionally
included outright physical appropriation of
lana without compensation, see post, at
,
120 L Ed Id, at 839—were out of accord with
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[1f, 8] Where "permanent physical
occupation" of land is concerned, we
have refused to allow the government to decree it anew (without
c o m p e n s a t i o n ) , no m a t t e r how
weighty the asserted "public interests" involved. Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US,
at 425, 73 L Ed 2d 868, 102 S Ct
3164—though we assuredly would
permit the government to assert a
permanent easement that was a preexisting limitation upon the landowner's title. Compare Scranton v
Wheeler, 179 US 141, 163, 45 L Ed
126, 21 S Ct 48 '1900) (interests of
"riparian owner in the bubmerged
iands . . . bordering on a public navigable water" held subject to Government's navigational servitude),
with Kaiser Aetna v United States.
444 US, at 178-180, 62 L Ed 2d 332,
100 S Ct 383 (imposition of navigational servitude on marina created
and rendered navigable at private
expense held to constitute a taking).
We believe similar treatment must
be accorded confiscatory regulations,
l. e., regulations that prohibit all
economically beneficial use of land:
Any limitation no severe cannot be
newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in
iha title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the

State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership.
A law or decree with such an effect
must, in other words, do no more
than duplicate the result that could
have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners lor other
uniquely affected persons) under the
State's law of private nuisance, or by
the State under its complementary
power to abate nuisances that affect
the public generally, or otherwise. 18

J/IV plausible interpretation of those provisions «Ju=tice B'ackmun is correct that early
constitutional theorists did not believe the
l i k i n g s Oiau.se embraced regulations ot property at all, see post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
**39. and n 23. but even he does not suggest
explicitly, at least) rhat v\e renounce the
Jourt's contrary conclusion in Mahon Since
the text of th * Clause can be read to encom
pass reguiaioiv as well as physical deprivations un contrast to the text originally proposed by Madron, see Speech Proposing Bill
J Rights 'June *. 17"*9). in 12 .1. Madison.
The Papers ct James Madison 201 «C. riobson.
R. Rutland. W Rachai & J Sisson ed 1979)

'"No person shall be . . obliged to relinquish
his property, where it may be necessary lor
public iiae, without a just compensation"), we
decline to do no as well.

[1g, 9, 10a] On this analysis, the
owner of a lake bed. for example,
would not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the requisite
permit to engage in a landfilling
operation that would have the effect
of flooding others' land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it is directed to
remove all improvements from its
land upon discovery that the plant
sits astride an earthquake fault.
Such regulatory action may well
have the effect of eliminating the
land's only economically productive
use, but it does not proscribe a productive use that was previously permissible under relevant property
and nuisance principles. The use of
these properties for what are now
expressly prohibited purposes was
always unlawful, and (subject to
other constitutional limitations) it

16. The principal "otherwise" that we have
>n mind is litigation absolving the State lor
private parties) of liabilit> for the destruction
of "real and personal property, in cases of
actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a
lire" or to forestall other grave threats IO the
lives and property of others. Bow ditch v Boston. 101 US \6, 18-iy, 25 L Ed 980 <1880i; see
United States v Pacific Kaiiioad. 120 US 227,
238-23U 30 I. LM (334. 7 S Ct -lyo < 1887'
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was open to the State at any point
to make the implication of those
background principles of nuisance
and property law explicit. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 1239-1241
(1967). In light of our traditional
resort to "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law" to
define the range of interests that
qualify for protection as "property"
under the Fifth -and Fourteenth)
Amendments, Board of Regents of
State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564,
577, 33 L Ed 2d 548, 92 S Ct 2701
(1972); see, e.g., Ruckelshaus v Monsanto Co., 467 US 986, 1011-1012, 81
L Ed 2d 815, 104 S Ct 2862 (1984);
Hughes v Washington, 389 US 290,
295, 19 L Ed 2d 530, 88 S Ct 438
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring), this
recognition that the Takings Clause
does not require compensation when
an owner is barred from putting
land to a use that is proscribed by
those "existing rules or understandings" is surely unexceptional. When,
however, a regulation that declares
"off-limits" all economically productive or beneficial uses of land goes
beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate,
compensation must be paid to sustain it.17
[11] The "total taking" inquiry we
require today will ordinarily entail
(as the application of state nuisance
law ordinarily entails) analysis of,
among other things, the degree of
17. [10b] Of course, the State may elect to
rescind its regulation and thereby avoid having to pay compensation for a permanent
deprivation. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 US, at 321, 96 L Ed 2d
250, 107 S Ct 2378 But "where the [reguia-
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harm to public lands and resources,
or adjacent private property, posed
by the claimant's proposed activities,
see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 826, 827, the social value of
the claimant's activities and their
suitability to the locality in question,
see, e.g., id., §§ 828(a) and (b), 831,
and the relative ease with which the
alleged harm can be avoided
through measures taken by the
claimant and the government (or
adjacent private landowners) alike,
see, e.g., id., §§ 827(e), 828(c), 830.
The fact that a particular use has
long been engaged in by similarly
situated owners ordinarily imports a
lack of any common-law prohibition
(though changed circumstances or
new knowledge may make what was
previously permissible no longer so,
see Restatement (Second) of Torts,
supra, § 827, comment g). So also
does the fact that other landowners,
similarly situated, are permitted to
continue the use denied to the claimant.
[1h, 12] It seems unlikely that
common-law principles would have
prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on
petitioner's land; they rarely support
prohibition of the "essential use" of
land, Curtin v Benson, 222 US 78,
86, 56 L Ed 102, 32 S Ct 31 (1911).
The question, however, is one of
state law to be dealt with on remand. We emphasize that to win its
case South Carolina must do more
than proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires
are inconsistent with the public intion has] already worked a taking of all use of
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the
taking was effective." Ibid.
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terest, or the conclusory assertion
that they violate a common-law
maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. As we have said, a
"State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public
property without compensation
. . ." Webbs Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v Beckwith. 449 US 155, 164, 66
L Ed 2d 358. 101 S Ct 446 (1980).
Instead, as it would be required to
do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a
common-law action for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify
background principles of nuisance

v OUNCIL

and property law that prohibit the
uses he now intends in the circumstances in wnich the property is
presently found. Only on this showing can the State fairly claim that,
in proscribing all such beneficial
uses, the Beachfront Management
Act is taking nothing. 18

The judgment is reversed and the
cause remanded for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

SEPARATE OPINIONS

Justice K e n n e d y , concurring in
the judgment.
The case comes to the Court in an
unusual posture, as all my colleagues observe. Ante, at
, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 810; post, at
, 120 L Ed
2d. at 829 (BUckmun, J., dissenting);
post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 842
• Stevens, J., dissenting); post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 851-852
'Statement of Souter, J.). After the
suit was initiated but before it
reached us, South Carolina amended
its Beachfront Management Act to
authorize the issuance of special permits at variance with the Act's general limitations. See SC Code § 48-39290tDXD (Supp 1991). Petitioner has
not applied for a special permit but
may still do so. The availability of
this alternative, if it can be invoked,
may dispose of petitioner's claim of a
permanent taking. As I read the
18. [11] Justice Blackmun decries our reliance on background nuisance principles at
ieast in part because he believes those principles to be as maniDulable as we find the
"harm prevention" "benefit conferral" dichotomy, see post, at
120 L Ed 2d. at
837-^38 fhere is no doubt some leeway in a
court s interpretation of what existing state
law permits—but not remotely as much, we

Court's opinion, it does not decide
the permanent taking claim, but neither does it foreclose the Supreme
Court of South Carolina from considering the claim or requiring petitioner to pursue an administrative
alternative not previously available.
The potential for future relief does
not control our disposition, because
whatever may occur in the future
cannot undo what has occurred in
the past. The Beachfront Management Act was enacted in 1988. SC
Code § 48-39-250 et seq. (Supp 19901
It may have deprived petitioner of
the use of his land in an interim
period. § 48-39-290(A). If this deprivation amounts to a taking, its limited duration will not bar constitutional relief. It is well established
that temporary takings are as protected by the Constitution as are
think, as in a legislative crafting of the reasons for its confiscatory regulation We stress
that an affirmative decree eliminating ail
economically benehcial uses may be defended
only if an objectively reasonable application
of relevant precedents would exclude those
beneficial uses in the circumstances m which
the land is presently loand
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permanent ones. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendaie
v County of Los Angeles, 482 US
304, 318, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct
2378(1987).
The issues presented in the case
are ready for our decision. The Supreme Court of South Carolina decided the case on constitutional
grounds, and its rulings are now
before us. There exists no jurisdictional bar to our disposition, and
prudential considerations ought not
to militate against it. The State cannot complain of the manner in
which the issues arose. Any uncertainty in this regard is attributable
to the State, as a consequence of its
amendment to the Beachfront Management Act. If the Takings Clause
is to protect against temporary deprivations as well as permanent ones,
its enforcement must not be frustrated by a shifting background of
state law.

120 L Ed 2d

has no significant market value or
resale potential. This is a curious
finding, and I share the reservations
of some of my colleagues about a
finding that a beach front lot loses
all value because of a development
restriction. Post, at
, 120
L Ed 2d, at 830-831 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); post, at
, n 3, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 844 (Stevens, J., dissenting); post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
851-852 (Statement of Souter, J.).
While the Supreme Court of South
Carolina on remand need not consider the case subject to this constraint, we must accept the finding
as entered below. See Oklahoma
City v Tuttle, 471 US 808, 816, 85 L
Ed 2d 791, 105 S Ct 2427 (1985).
Accepting the finding as entered, it
follows that petitioner is entitled to
invoke the line of cases discussing
regulations that deprive real property of all economic value. See Agins
v Tiburon, 447 US 255, 260, 65 L Ed
2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138 (1980).

Although we establish a frameThe finding of no value must be
work for remand, moreover, we do
considered
under the Takings Clause
not decide the ultimate question of
by
reference
to the owner's reasonwhether a temporary taking has ocable,
investment-backed
expectacurred in this case. The facts necestions.
Kaiser
Aetna
v
United
States,
sary to the determination have not
444
US
164,
175,
62
L
Ed
2d
332,
100
been developed in the record. Among
S
Ct
383
(1979);
Penn
Central
Transthe matters to be considered on remand must be whether petitioner portation Co. v New York City, 438
had the intent and capacity to de- US 104, 124, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct
velop the property and failed to do 2646 (1978); see also W. B. Worthen
so in the interim period because the Co. v Kavanaugh, 295 US 56, 79 L
State prevented him. Any failure by Ed 1298, 55 S Ct 555, 97 ALR 905
petitioner to comply with relevant (1935). The Takings Clause, while
administrative requirements will be conferring substantial protection on
property owners, does not eliminate
part of that analysis.
the police power of the State to enThe South Carolina Court of Com- act limitations on the use of their
mon Pleas found that petitioner's property. Mugler v Kansas, 123 US
real property has been rendered val- 623, 669, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273
ueless by the State's regulation. App (1887). The rights conferred by the
to Pet for Cert 37. The finding ap- Takings Clause and the police power
pears to presume that the property of the State may coexist without
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conflict. Property is bought and
sold, investments are made, subject
to the State's power to regulate.
Where a taking is alleged from regu
lations which deprive the property
of all value, the test must be
whether the deprivation is contrary
to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.
There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis,
of course: for if the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by
what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what courts
say it is. Some circularity must be
tolerated in these matters, however,
as it is in other spheres. E g , Katz v
United States, 389 US 347, 19 L Ed
2d 576, 88 S Ct 507 (1967) (Fourth
Amendment protections defined by
reasonable expectations of privacy).
r
h e definition moreover, is not circular in its entirety The expectations protected by the Constitution
are based on objective rules and cuscoms that can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved.
In my view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light of
the whole of our legal tradition The
common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of
regulatory power in a complex and
interdependent society Goldblatt v
Hempstead, 369 US 590. 593, 8 L Ed
2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962^ The State
should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, and
^ourts must consider all reasonable
-xpeetations whatever their source.
The Takings Clause does not require
static body of state property law, it
protects private expectations to enare private investment I agree
ith the Court that nuisance pre-

vention accords with the most common expectations of property owners
who face regulation, but I do not
believe this can be the soie source of
btate authority to impose severe restrictions. Coastal property may
present such unique concerns for a
fragile land system that the Stale
can go further in regulating its development and use than the common
law of nuisance might otherwise permit.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina erred, in my view, by reciting
the general purposes for which the
state regulations were enacted without a determination that they were
in accord with the owner's reasonable expectations and therefore sufficient to support a severe restriction
on specific parcels of property. See
304 SC 376, 383, 404 SE2d 895, 899
11991^ The promotion of tourism, for
instance, ought not to suffice to deprive specific property of all value
without a corresponding duty to
compensate
Furthermore,
the
means as well us the ends of regulation must accord with the owner's
reasonable expectations. Here, the
State did not act until after the
property had been zoned for individual lot development and most other
parcels had been improved, throwing
the whole burden of the regulation
on the remaining lots. This too must
be measured in the balance. See
Pennsylvania Ccai Co. v Mahon, 260
US 393, 416, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct
158(1922).
With these observations, I concur
in the judgment of the Couit.

Justice Blackmun, dissenting
Today the Court launches a missile to kill a moube
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The State of South Carolina prohibited petitioner Lucas from building a permanent structure on his
property from 1988 to 1990. Relying
on an unreviewed (and implausible)
state trial court finding that this
restriction left Lucas* property valueless, this Court granted review to
determine whether compensation
must be paid in cases where the
State prohibits all economic use of
real estate. According to the Court,
such an occasion never has arisen in
any of our prior cases, and the Court
imagines that it will arise "relatively rarely" or only in "extraordinary circumstances.'' Almost certainly it did not happen in this case.
Nonetheless, the Court presses on
to decide the issue, and as it does, it
ignores its jurisdictional limits, remakes its traditional rules of review,
and creates simultaneously a new
categorical rule and an exception
(neither of which is rooted in our
prior case law, common law, or common sense). I protest not only the
Court's decision, but each step taken
to reach it. More fundamentally, I
question the Court's wisdom in issuing sweeping new rules to decide
such a narrow case. Surely, as Justice Kennedy demonstrates, the
Court could have reached the result
it wanted without inflicting this
damage upon our Taking Clause jurisprudence.
My fear is that the Court's new
policies will spread beyond the nar1. The country has come to recognize that
uncontrolled beachfront development can
cause serious damage to life and property. See
Brief for Sierra Club, et al. as Amici Curiae 25. Hurricane Hugo's September 1989 attack
upon South Carolina's coastline, for example,
caused 29 deaths and approximately $6 billion
n property damage, much of it the result of
uncontrolled beachfront development. See
Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines:
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row confines of the present case. For
that reason, I, like the Court, will
give far greater attention to this
case than its narrow scope suggests
—not because I can intercept the
Court's missile, or save the targeted
mouse, but because I hope perhaps
to limit the collateral damage.
I
A
In 1972 Congress passed the
Coastal Zone Management Act. 16
USC § 1451 et seq. [16 USCS §§ 1451
et seq.]. The Act was designed to
provide States with money and incentives to carry out Congress' goal
of protecting the public from shoreline erosion and coastal hazards. In
the 1980 Amendments to the Act,
Congress directed States to enhance
their coastal programs by "[preventing or significantly reducing threats
to life and the destruction of property by eliminating development and
redevelopment in high-hazard areas."1 16 USC § 1456b(a)(2) (1988 ed,
Supp ID [16 USCS § 1456b(aX2)].
South Carolina began implementing the congressional directive by
enacting the South Carolina Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1977. Under the 1977 Act, any construction
activity in what was designated the
"critical area" required a permit
from the Council, and the construction of any habitable structure was
The Supreme Court's Changing Takings Doctrine and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Statute, 79 Cal L Rev 205, 212-213 (1991). The
beachfront buildings are not only themselves
destroyed in such a storm, "but they are often
driven, like battering rams, into adjacent inland homes." Ibid. Moreover, the development
often destroys the natural sand dune barriers
that provide storm breaks. Ibid.
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prohibited. The 1977 critical
was relatively narrow.

area

This effort did not stop the loss of
shoreline. In October 1986, the
Council appointed a "Blue Ribbon
Committee on Beachfront Management" to investigate beach erosion
and propose possible solutions. In
March 1987, the Committee found
that South Carolina's beaches were
"critically eroding," and proposed
land-use restrictions. Report of the
South Carolina Blue Ribbon Committee on Beachfront Management i,
6-10 (March 1987). In response,
South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Management Act on July 1,
1988. SC Code §48-39-250 et seq.
(Supp 1990). The 1988 Act did not
change the uses permitted within
the designated critical areas. Rather,
it enlarged those areas to encompass
the distance from the mean high
watermark to a setback line established on the basis of "the best scientific and historical data" available. 2
SC Code § 48-39-280 (Supp 1991).

B
Petitioner Lucas is a contractor,
manager, and part owner of the
Wild Dune development on the Isle
of Palms. He has lived there since
1978. In December 1986, he purchased two of the last four pieces of
vacant property in the development. 1
The area is notoriously unstable. In
roughly half of the last 40 years, all
or part of petitioners property was
part of the beach or flooded twice
2. The setback line was determined by calculating the distance landward from the crest
of an ideal oceanfront sand dune which is
forty times the annual erosion rate. SC Code
§48-39-280 (Supp 1991).
3. The properties were sold frequently at
rapidly escalating prices before Lucas purchased them. Lot 22 was first sold in 1979 for

daily by the ebb and flow of the tide.
Tr 84. Between 1957 and 1963, petitioner's property was under water.
Id., at 79, 81-82. Between 1963 and
1973 the shoreline was 100 to 150
feet onto petitioner's proper .y. Ibid.
In 197;j the first line of stable vegetation was about halfway through
the property. Id., at 80. Between
1981 and 1983, the Isle of Palm's
issued 12 emergency orders for sandbagging to protect property in the
Wild Dune development. Id., at 99.
Determining that local habitable
structures were in imminent danger
of collapse, the Council issued permits for two rock revetments to protect c o n d o m i n i u m d e v e l o p m e n t s
near petitioner's property from erosion; one of the revetments extends
more than halfway onto one of his
lots. Id., at 102.
C
The South Carolina
Supreme
Court found that the Beach Management Act did not take petitioner's
property without compensation. The
decision rested on two premises that
until today were unassailable—that
the State has the power to prevent
any use of property it finds to be
harmful to its citizens, and that a
state statute is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.
The Beachfront Management Act
includes a finding by the South Carolina General Assembly that the
beach/dune system serves the pur$96,660. sold in 1984 for $187,500, then in
1985 for $260,000, and, finally, to Lucas in
1986 for $475,000. lie estimated i's worth in
1991 at $650,000. Ix>t 24 had a similar past.
The record does not indicate who purchased
the properties prior to Lucas, or why none of
the purchasers held on to the lots and buiit
on them. Tr 44-46.
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pose of "protecting] life and property by serving as a storm barrier
which dissipates wave energy and
contributes to shoreline stability in
an economical and effective manner." § 48-39-250(1 )(aj. The General
Assembly also found that "development unwisely has been sited too
close to the [beach/dune] system.
This type of development has jeopardized the stability of the beach/
dune system, accelerated erosion,
and endangered adjacent property."
§ 48-39-250(4); see also § 48-39-250(6)
(discussing the need to "afford the
beach/dune system space to accrete
and erode").
If the state legislature is correct
that the prohibition on building in
front of the setback line prevents
serious harm, then, under this
Court's prior cases, the Act is constitutional. "Long ago it was recognized that all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall
not be injurious to the community,
and the Takings Clause did not
transform that principle to one that
requires compensation whenever the
State asserts its power to enforce it."
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v
DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 491-492,
94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (1987)
(internal quotations omitted); see
also id., at 488-489, and n 18, 94 L
Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. The Court
consistently has upheld regulations
imposed to arrest a significant
threat to the common welfare, whatever their economic effect on the
owner. See e.g., Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590, 592-593, 8 L Ed
2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962); Euclid v
Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, 71 L
Ed 303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016
(1926); Gorieb v Fox, 274 US 603,
608, 71 L Ed 1228, 47 S Ct 675, 53
828
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ALR 1210 (1927); Mugler v Kansas,
123 US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273
(1887).
Petitioner never challenged the
legislature's findings that a building
ban was necessary to protect property and life. Nor did he contend
that the threatened harm was not
sufficiently serious to make building
a house in a particular location a
"harmful" use, that the legislature
had not made sufficient findings, or
that the legislature was motivated
by anything other than a desire to
minimize damage to coastal areas.
Indeed, petitioner objected at trial
t h a t evidence as to the purposes of
the setback requirement was irrelevant. Tr 68. The South Carolina Supreme Court accordingly understood
petitioner not to contest the State's
position that "discouraging new construction in close proximity to the
beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm," 304 SC
376,
, 404 SE2d 895, 898 (1991),
and "to prevent serious injury to the
community." Id., at
, 404 SE2d,
at 901. The court considered itself
"bound by these uncontested legislative findings . . . [in the absence of]
any attack whatsoever on the statutory scheme." Id., at
, 404 SE2d,
at 898.
Nothing in the record undermines
the General Assembly's assessment
that prohibitions on building in
front of the setback line are necessary to protect people and property
from storms, high tides, and beach
erosion. Because that legislative determination cannot be disregarded
in the absence of such evidence, see,
e.g., Euclid, 272 US, at 388, 71 L Ed
303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016;
O'Gorman & Young v Hartford Fire
Ins. Co, 282 US 251, 257-258, 75 L
Ed 324, 51 S Ct 130, 72 ALR 1163
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(1931) (Brandeis, J.), and because its
determination of harm to life and
property from building is sufficient
to prohibit that use under this
Court's cases, the South Carolina
Supreme Court correctly found no
takmg.
II
My disagreement with the Court
begins with its decision to review
this case. This Court has held consistently that a land-use challenge is
not ripe for review until there is a
final decision about what uses of the
property will be permitted. The ripeness requirement is not simply a
gesture of good-will to land-use planners. In the absence of "a final and
authoritative determination of the
type and intensity of development
legally permitted on the subject
property," MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v Yolo County, 477 US 340,
348, 91 L Ed 2d 285, 106 S Ct 2561
•1986), and the utilization of state
procedures for just compensation,
there is no final judgment, and in
the absence of a final judgment
;here is no jurisdiction. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v San Diego,
450 US 621, 633, 67 L Ed 2d 551, 101
S Ct 1287 (1981); Agins v Tiburon.
447 US 255, 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100
SCt 2138(1980).
This rule is "compelled by the
very nature of the inquiry required
by the Just Compensation Clause,"
because the factors applied in deciding a takings claim "simply cannot
oe evaluated until the administra•». The Court's reliance, ante, at
. 120 L
Sd 2d, at SI 1. en Esposito v South Carolina
Coasta* Council. 939 F2d 165, 168 <CA4 1991»
ceii pending, No 91-941. in support oi its
decision io consider Lucas temporary taking
uim ripe is misplaced In Esposito the plamiifs brought a facial challenge to the mere

tive agency has arrived at a final,
definitive position regarding how it
will apply the regulations at issue to
the particular land in question."
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v Han ilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 US 172, 190, 191,
87 L Ed 2d 126, 105 S Ct 3108 (1985).
See also MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates, 477 US, at 348, 91 L Ed 2d
285, 106 S Ct 2561 ("A court cannot
determine whether a regulation has
gone too far' unless it knows how
far the regulation goes") (citation
omitted).
The Court admits that the 1990
amendments to the Beachfront Management Act allowing special permits preclude Lucas from asserting
that his property has been permanently taken. See ante, at
,"l20 L Ed 2d, at 810. The Court
agrees that such a claim would not
be ripe because there has been no
final decision by respondent on what
uses will be permitted. The Court,
however, will not be denied: it determines that petitioner's "temporary
takings" claim for the period from
July 1, 1988, to J u n e 25, 1990, is
ripe. But this claim also is not justiciable. 4
From the very beginning of this
litigation, respondent has argued
that the courts:
"lac[kj jurisdiction in this matter
because the Plaintiff has sought no
authorization from Council for use
of his property, has not challenged
the location of the baseline or setenactment of the Act. Hete, of course, Lucas
has brought an nsapplied challenge See Bnet
fur Petitioner 16 Facial challenges are ripe
when the \ c t is passed; applied challenges
require a r.nai decision on the Act's application to the property in question
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back line as alleged in the Complaint and because no final agency
decision has been rendered concerning use of his property or location of said baseline or setback
line."

That petitioner's property fell
within the critical area as initially
interpreted by the Council does not
excuse petitioner's failure to challenge the Act's application to his
property in the administrative process.
The claim is not ripe until
Tr 10 (answer, as amended). Alpetitioner
seeks a variance from that
though the Council's plea has been
status.
"[W]e
have made it quite
ignored by every court, it is undoubtclear that the mere assertion of regedly correct.
ulatory jurisdiction by a governmenUnder the Beachfront Manage- tal body does not constitute a regulament Act, petitioner was entitled to tory taking." United States v Riverchallenge the setback line or the side Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 US
baseline or erosion rate applied to 121, 126, 88 L Ed 2d 419, 106 S Ct
his property in formal administra- 455 (1985). See also Williamson
tive, followed by judicial, proceed- County, 473 US, at 188, 87 L Ed 2d
ings. SC Code § 48-39-28CXE) (Supp 126, 105 S Ct 3108 (claim not ripe
1991). Because Lucas failed to pur- because respondent did not seek varsue this administrative remedy, the iances that would have allowed it to
Council never finally decided develop the property, notwithstandwhether Lucas' particular piece of
property was correctly categorized as ing the Commission's finding that
a critical area in which building the plan did not comply with the
and subdivision
would not be permitted. This is all zoning ordinance
5
regulations).
the more crucial because Lucas argued strenuously in the trial court
Even if I agreed with the Court
that his land was perfectly safe to
that
there were no jurisdictional
build on. and that his company had
barriers
to deciding this case, I still
studies to prove it. Tr 20, 25, 36. If
he was correct, the Council's final would not try to decide it. The Court
decision would have been to alter creates its new taking jurisprudence
the setback line, eliminating the based on the trial court's finding
construction ban on Lucas* property. that the property had lost all eco5. Even more baffling, given its decision,
just a few days ago, in Lujan v Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 US
, 119 L Ed 2d 351, 112 S
Ct 2130 (1992), the Court decides petitioner
has demonstrated injury in fact. In his complaint, petitioner made no allegations that he
had any definite plans for using his property.
App to Pet for Cert 153-156 At trial, Lucas
testified that he had house plans drawn up,
but that he was "in no hurry" to build "because the lot was appreciating in value." Tr
28-29 The trial court made no findings of fact
that Lucas had any plans to use the property
from 1988 to 1990 " '[S]ome day' intentions—
without any description of concrete plans, or
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indeed even any specification of when the
some day will be—do not support a finding of
the 'actual or imminent* injury that our cases
require " 504 US, at
, , 119 L Ed 2d 351,
112 S Ct 2130 The Court circumvents Defenders of Wildlife by deciding to resolve this case
as if it arrived on the pleadings alone. But it
did not. Lucas had a full trial on his claim for
"damages for the temporary taking of his
property from the date of the 1988 Act's
passage to such time as this matter is finally
resolved," ante, at
, n 3, 120 L Ed 2d, at
811, quoting the Complaint, and failed to
demonstrate any immediate concrete olans to
build or sell
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nomic value. This finding is almost
certainly erroneous. Petitioner still
can enjoy other attributes of ownership, such as the right to exclude
others, "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna v United States.
444 US 164, 176, 62 L Ed 2d 332, 100
S Ct 383 (1979) Petitioner can picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on
the property in a movable trailer.
State courts frequently have recognized that land has economic value
where the only residual economic
uses are recreation or camping. See,
e.g.. Turnpike Realty Co. v Dedham,
362 Mass 221, 284 NE2d 891 (1972);
Turner v County of Del Norte, 24
Cal App 3d 311, 101 Cal Rptr 93
<1972), cert denied, 409 US 1108, 34
L Ed 2d 689, 93 S Ct 908 (1973); Hail
v Board of Environmental Protection, 528 A2d 453 (Me 1987). Petitioner also retains the right to alienate the land, which would have
value for neighbors and for those
prepared to enjoy proximity wO the
ocean without a house.
Yet the trial court, apparently believing that "less value" and "valueless" could be used interchangeably,
found the property "valueless/' The
court accepted no evidence from the
6. Respondent contested the findings of fact
at the trial court in the South Carolina Supreme Court, but that court did not reso 1 e
the issue. This Courts decision to assume ^ r
its purposes that petitioner had been denied
all economic use of his land does not, of
course, dispose of the issue on remand.
7. The Court overlooks the lack of a ripe
and justiciable claim apparently oat of concern that in the absence of its intervention
Lucas will be unable to obtain further adjudiration of his temporary-taking claim. The
r
ourt chastises respondent for arguing that
Lucas's temporary-taking claim is premature
because it failed "so mucn as [to] commen[tj"
upon the effect of the South Carolina Su-

State on the property's value without a home, and petitioner's appraiser testified that he never had
considered what the value would be
absent a residence. Tr 54-55. The
appraiser's value was based on the
fact that the "highest and best use
of these lots . . . [is] luxury single
family detached dwellings." Id., at
48. The trial court appeared to believe that the property could be considered "valueless" if it was not
available for its most profitable use.
Absent that erroneous assumption,
see Goldblatt, 369 13S, at 592, 8 L Ed
2d 130, 82 S Ct 987, I find no evidence in the record supporting the
trial court's conclusion that the
damage to the lots by virtue of the
restrictions was "total." Record 128
(findings of fact). I agree with the
Court, ante, at
, n 9, 120 L Ed
2d, at 816, that it has the power to
decide a case that turns on an erroneous finding, but I question the
wisdom of deciding an issue based on
a factual premise that does not exist
in this case, and in the judgment of
the Court will exist in the future
only in "extraordinary circumstancejs]." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed
2d, at 814.
Clearly, the Court was eager to
decide this case.7 But eagerness, in
preme Court's decision on petitioner's ability
to obtain relief for the 2-year period, and it
frets that Lucas would "be unable (absent our
intervention now) to obtain further statecourt adjudication with respect to the 19881990 period." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d. at
810. Whatever the explanation for the Court's
intense interest in Lucas' plight when ordinarily we are more cautious in granting discretionary review, the concern would have
been more prudently expressed bv vacating
the judgment below and remanding for further consideration in iight of the 1990 amendments. At that point, petitioner could have
brought a temporary-taking claim in the state
courts

831

U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the absence A proper jurisdiction,
must—and in this case should have
been—met with restraint.
Ill
The Court's willingness to dispense with precedent in its haste to
reach a result is not limited to its
initial jurisdictional decision. The
Court also alters the long-settled
rules of review.
The South Carolina Supreme
Court's decision to defer to legislative judgments in the absence of a
challenge from petitioner comports
with one of this Court's oldest maxims: "the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed.'' United States v Carolene
Products Co., 304 US 144, 152, 82 L
Ed 1234, 58 S Ct 778 (1938). Indeed,
we have said the legislature's judgment is "well-nigh conclusive." Berman v Parker, 348 US 26, 32, 99 L
Ed 27, 75 S Q 98 (1954). See also
Sweet v Rechel, 159 US 380, 392, 40
L Ed 188, 16 S Ct 43 (1895); Euclid,
272 US, at 388, 71 L Ed 303, 47 S Ct
114, 54 ALR 1016 ("If the validity of
the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment must be allowed
to control").
Accordingly, this Court always has
required plaintiffs challenging the
constitutionality of an ordinance to
provide "some factual foundation of
record" that contravenes the legislative findings. O'Gorman & Young,
282 US, at 258, 75 L Ed 324, 51 S Ct
130, 72 ALR 1163. In the absence of
such proof, "the presumption of constitutionality must prevail." Id., at
257, 75 L Ed 324, 51 S Ct 130, 72
ALR 1163. We only recently have
reaffirmed that claimants have the
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burden of showing a state law constitutes a taking. See Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 US, at 485, 94 L Ed
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. See also
Goldblatt, 369 US, at 594, 8 L Ed 2d
130, 82 S Ct 987 (citing "the usual
presumption of constitutionality"
that applies to statutes attacked as
takings).
Rather than invoking these traditional rules, the Court decides the
State has the burden to convince the
courts that its legislative judgments
are correct. Despite Lucas' complete
failure to contest the legislature's
findings of serious harm to life and
property if a permanent structure is
built, the Court decides that the legislative findings are not sufficient to
justify the use prohibition. Instead,
the Court "emphasize[sj" the State
must do more than merely proffer
its legislative judgments to avoid
invalidating its law. Ante, at
,
120 L Ed 2d, at 822. In this case,
apparently, the State now has the
burden of showing the regulation is
not a taking. The Court offers no
justification for its sudden hostility
toward state legislators, and I doubt
that it could.
IV
The Court does not reject the
South Carolina Supreme Court's decision simply on the basis of its disbelief and distrust of the legislature's findings. It also takes the opportunity to create a new scheme for
regulations that eliminate all economic value. From now on, there is
a categorical rule finding these regulations to be a taking unless the use
they prohibit is a background common-law nuisance or property principle. See ante, at
, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 821-823.
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A
I first question the Court's rationale in creating a category that obviates a "case-specific inquiry into the
public interest advanced/' ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 812, if all
economic value has been lost. If one
fact about the Court's taking jurisprudence can be stated without contradiction, it is that "the particular
circumstances of each case" determine whether a specific restriction
will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay compensation. United States v Central Eureka
Mining Co., 357 US 155, 168, 2 L Ed
2d 1228, 78 S Ct 1097 (1958). This is
so because although we have articulated certain factors to be considered, including the economic impact
on the property owner, the ultimate
conclusion "necessarily requires a
weighing of private and public interests." Agins, 447 US, at 261, 65 L Ed
2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138. When the
government regulation prevents the
owner from any economically valuable use of his property, the private
interest is unquestionably substantial, but we have never before held
that no public interest can outweigh
it. Instead the Court's prior decisions
"uniformly reject the proposition
that diminution in property value,
standing alone, can establish a
'taking/ " Penn Central Transp. Co.
v New York City, 438 US 104, 131,
57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978).

matter how adverse the financial
effect on the owner may be. More
than a century ago, the Court explicitly upheld the right of States to
prohibit uses of property injurious to
public health, safety, or welfare
without paying compensation. "A
prohibition simply upon the use of
property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be
injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot, in
any just sense, be deemed a taking
or an appropriation of property"
Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 623, 668669, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887).
On this basis, the Court upheld an
ordinance effectively prohibiting operation of a previously lawful brewery, although the ''establishments
will become of no value as property." Id., at 664, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct
273; see also id., at 668, 31 L Ed 205,
8 S Ct 273.

This Court repeatedly has recognized the ability of government, in
certain circumstances, to regulate
property without compensation no

Mugler was only the beginning in
a long line of cases.8 In Powell v
Pennsylvania, 127 US 678, 32 L Ed
253, 8 S Ct 992 Q888), the Court
upheld legislation prohibiting the
manufacture of oleomargarine, despite the owner's allegation that "if
prevented from continuing it, the
value of his property employed
therein would be entirely lost and he
be deprived of the means of livelihood." Id., at 682, 32 L Ed 253, 8 S
Ct 992. In Hadacheck v Sebastian,
239 US 394, 60 L Ed 348. 36 S Ct
143 (1915), the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting a brickyard, although the owner had made excavations on the land that prevented it

8. Prior to Mugler. the Court had held that
owners whose real property is wholly destroyed to prevent the bpread of a fire are not
entitled to compensation. Bowditch v Boston.
101 US 16. 18-19, 25 L Ed 980 (1879) And the

Court recognized in The License Cases. 5 How
504, 589. 12 L Ed 256 (1847) (opinion of McLean. J i. that "jtjhe acknowledged police
power of a State extends often to the destruction of property "
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from being utilized for any purpose
but a brickyard. Id., at 405, 60 L Ed
348, 36 S a 143. In Miller v
Schoene, 276 US 272, 72 L Ed 568,
48 S Ct 246 (1928), the Court held
that the Fifth Amendment did not
require Virginia to pay compensation to the owner of cedar trees
ordered destroyed to prevent a disease from spreading to nearby apple
orchards. The "preferment of [the
public interest] over the property
interest of the individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of
the distinguishing characteristics of
every exercise of the police power
which affects property." Id., at 280,
72 L Ed 568, 48 S Ct 246. Again, in
Omnia Commercial Co. v United
States, 261 US 502, 67 L Ed 773, 43
S Q 437 (1923), the Court stated
that "destruction of, or injury to,
property is frequently accomplished
without a 'taking1 in the constitutional sense." Id., at 508, 67 L Ed
773, 43 S Ct 437.
More recently, in Goldblatt, the
Court upheld a town regulation that
barred continued operation of an
existing sand and gravel operation
in order to protect public safety. 369
US, at 596, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S Ct
987. "Although a comparison of val9. That same year, an appeal came to the
Court asking "[wjhether zoning ordinances
which altogether destroy the worth of valuable land by prohibiting the only economic
use of which it is capable effect a taking of
real property without compensation." Juris
Statement, OT 1962, No. 307, p 5. The Court
dismissed the appeal for lack of a substantial
federal question. Consolidated Rock Products
Co. v Los Angeles, 57 Cal 2d 515, 370 P2d 342,
appeal dism'd, 371 US 36, 9 L Ed 2d 112, 83 S
Ct 145 (1962).
10. On remand, the California court found
no taking in part because the zoning regulation "involves this highest of public interests
—the prevention of death and injury." First
Lutheran Church v Los Angeles, 210 Cal App
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ues before and after is relevant," the
Court stated, "it is by no means
conclusive."9 Id., at 594, 8 L Ed 2d
130, 82 S Ct 987. In 1978, the Court
declared that ffin instances in which
a state tribunal reasonably concluded that 'the health, safety, morals, or general welfare' would be
promoted by prohibiting particular
contemplated uses of land, this
Court has upheld land-use regulation that destroyed . . . recognized
real property interests. ,, Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 US, at 125, 57
L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646. In First
Lutheran Church v Los Angeles
County, 482 US 304, 96 L Ed 2d 250,
107 S Ct 2378 (1987), the owner
alleged that a floodplain ordinance
had deprived it of "all use" of the
property. Id., at 312, 96 L Ed 2d 250,
107 S Ct 2378. The Court remanded
the case for consideration whether,
even if the ordinance denied the
owner all use, it could be justified as
a safety measure.10 Id., at 313, 96 L
Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 2378. And in
Keystone Bituminous Coal, the
Court summarized over 100 years of
precedent: "the Court has repeatedly
upheld regulations that destroy or
adversely affect real property interests."11 480 US, at 489, n 18, 94 L Ed
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232.
3d 1353. 1370, 258 Cal Rptr 893,
(1989),
cert denied, 493 US 1056, 107 L Ed 2d 950,
110 S Q 866 (1990).
11. The Court's suggestion that Agins v
Tiburon, 447 US 255, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S
Ct 2138 (1980), a unanimous opinion, created
a new per se rule, only now discovered, is
unpersuasive. In Agins, the Court stated that
"no precise rule determines when property
has been taken" but instead that "the question necessarily requires a weighing of public
and private interest." Id., at 260-262, 65 L Ed
2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138. The other cases cited
by the Court, ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
812, repeat the Agins sentence, but in no way
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The Court recognizes that f<our
prior opinions have suggested that
'harmful or noxious uses' of property
may be proscribed by government
regulation without the requirement
of compensation/' ante, at
, 120
L Ed 2d, at 817, but seeks to reconcile them with its categorical rule by
claiming that the Court never has
upheld a regulation when the owner
alleged the loss of all economic
value. Even if the Court's factual
premise were correct, its understanding of the Court's cases is distorted. In none of the cases did the
Court suggest that the right of a
State to prohibit certain activities

without paying compensation turned
on the availability of some residual
valuable use.12 Instead, the cases depended on whether the government
interest was sufficient to prohibit the
activity, given the significant private
cost.13

suggest that the public interest is irrelevant if
total value has been taken. The Court has
indicated that proof that a regulation does
r.ot deny an owner economic use of his property is sufficient to defeat a facial taking
challenge. See Hodei v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 US 264,
295-297, 69 L Ed 2d 1. 101 S Ct 2352 (1981).
But the conclusion that a regulation is not on
its face a taking because it allows the landowner some economic use of property is a far
cry from the proposition that denial of such
use is sufficient to establish a taking claim
regardless of any other consideration. The
Court never has accepted the latter proposition.
The Court relies today on dicta in Agins,
Hodei. Nollan v California Coastal Comm'n,
483 US 825, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141
1987), and Keystone Bituminous Coal v DeBenedictis. 480 US 470. 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S
Ct 1232 11987), for its new categorical rule.
Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d. at 813. I prefer to
rely on the directly contrary holdings in cases
such as Mugler and Hadacheck. not to mention contrary statements in the very cases on
which the Court relies. See Agins. 447 US, at
260-262, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138;
Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 US, at 489 n
18, 491-492, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232.

vvhether the timber owned by the petitioner
in that case was commercially saleable, and
nothing in the opinion suggests that the
State's right to require uncompensated felling
of the trees depended on any such salvage
value. To the contrary, it is clear from its
unanimous opinion that the Schoene Court
would have sustained a law requiring the
burning of cedar trees if that had been necessary to protect apple trees in which there was
a public interest: the Court spoke of preferment of the public interest over the property
interest of the individual, "to the extent even
of its destruction." Id., at 280, 72 L Ed 568, 48
S Ct 246.

12. Miller v Schoene. 276 US 272, 72 L Ed
568, 48 S Ct 246 tl923>, is an example. In the
course of demonstrating that apple trees are
more valuable than red cedar trees, the Court
noted that red cedar has "occasional use and
value as lumber." Id., at 279, 72 L Ed 568. 48
S Ct 246 But the Court did not discuss

These cases rest on the principle
that the State has full power to
prohibit an owner's use of property
if it is harmful to the public. "[Sjince
no individual has a right to use his
property so as to create a nuisance
or otherwise harm others, the State
has not 'taken' anything when it
asserts its power to enjoin the nui-

13. The Court seeks to disavow the holdings
and reasoning of Mugler and subsequent
cases by explaining that they were the
Court's early efforts to define the scope of the
police power. There is language in the earliest
taking cases suggesting that the police power
was considered to be the power simply to
prevent harms. Subsequently, the Court ex
panded its understanding of what were government's legitimate interests. But it does not
follow that the holding of those early cases—
that harmful and noxious uses of property
can be forbidden whatever the harm to the
property owner and without the payment of
compensation—was repudiated. To the contrary, as the Court consciously expanded the
scope of the police power beyond preventing
harm, it clarified that there was a core of
public interests that overrode any private
interest. See Kevstone Bituminous Coal, 480
US, at 491, n 20, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct
1232.
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sance-like activity." Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 US, at 491, n 20,
94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. It
would make no sense under this
theory to suggest that an owner has
a constitutionally protected right to
harm others, if only he makes the
proper showing of economic loss.14
See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon,
260 US 393, 418, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S
Ct 158, 28 ALR 1321 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Restriction
upon [harmful] use does not become
inappropriate as a means, merely
because it deprives the owner of the
only use to which the property can
then be profitably put").
B
Ultimately even the Court cannot
embrace the full implications of its
per se rule: it eventually agrees that
there cannot be a categorical rule
for a taking based on economic value
that wholly disregards the public
need asserted. Instead, the Court
decides that it will permit a State to
14. "Indeed, it would be extraordinary to
construe the Constitution to require a government to compensate private landowners because it denied them 'the right' to use property which cannot be used without risking
injury and death." First Lutheran Church,
210 Cal App 3d. at 1366, 258 Cal Rptr, at
15. Although it refers to state nuisance and
property law, the Court apparently does not
mean just any state nuisance and property
law. Public nuisance was first a common-law
creation, see Newark. The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 LQ Rev 480, 482 (1949) (attributing
development of nuisance to 1535), but by the
1800s in both the United States and England,
legislatures had the power to define what is a
public nuisance, and particular uses often
have been selectively targeted. See Prosser,
Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 Va L
Rev 997, 999-1000 .1966); J.F. Stephen, A
General View of the Criminal Law of England
105-107 »2d ed 1890). The Court's references
to "common-law" background principles, how-
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regulate all economic value only if
the State prohibits uses that would
not be permitted under ''background
principles of nuisance and property
law."15 Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
823.
Until today, the Court explicitly
had rejected the contention that the
government's power to act without
paying compensation turns on
whether the prohibited activity is a
common-law nuisance.18 The brewery
closed in Mugler itself was not a
common-law nuisance, and the Court
specifically stated that it was the
role of the legislature to determine
what measures would be appropriate
for the protection of public health
and safety. See 123 US, at 661, 31 L
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273. In upholding the
state action in Miller, the Court
found it unnecessary to "weigh with
nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute a nuisance
according to common law; or
whether they may be so declared by
statute." 276 US, at 280, 72 L Ed
568, 48 S Ct 246. See also Goldblatt,
ever, indicate that legislative determinations
do not constitute "state nuisance and property law" for the Court.
16. Also, until today the fact that the regulation prohibited uses that were lawful at the
time the owner purchased did not determine
the constitutional question. The brewery, the
brickyard, the cedar trees, and the gravel pit
were all perfectly legitimate uses prior to the
passage of the regulation. See Mugler v Kansas. 123 US 623, 654, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273
(1887); Hadacheck v Sebastian, 239 US 394,
60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143 (1915); Miller. 276
US, at 272, 72 L Ed 568, 48 S Ct 246; Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590, 8 L Ed 2d
130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962). This Court explicitly
acknowledged in Hadacheck that "[a] vested
interest cannot be asserted against [the police
power] because of conditions once obtaining.
To so. hold would preclude development and
fix a city forever in its primitive conditions."
239 US, at 410, 60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143
(citation omitted).
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369 US, at 593, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S
Ct 987; Hadacheck, 239 US, at 411,
60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143. Instead
the Court has relied in the past, as
the South Carolina Court has done
here, on legislative judgments of
what constitutes a harm.17
The Court rejects the notion that
the State always can prohibit uses it
deems a harm to the public without
granting compensation because "the
distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d,
at 818. Since the characterization
will depend "primarily upon one's
evaluation of the worth of competing
uses of real estate," ante, at
,
120 L Ed 2d, at 819, the Court decides a legislative judgment of this
kind no longer can provide the desired "objective, value-free basis" for
upholding a regulation. Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 819. The Court,
however, fails to explain how its
proposed common law alternative
escapes the same trap.
The threshold inquiry for imposition of the Court's new rule, "deprivation of all economically valuable
use," itself cannot be determined
objectively. As the Court admits,
whether the owner has been de17. The Court argues that finding no taking
when the legislature prohibits a harmful use,
such as the Court did in Mugler and the
South Carolina Supreme Court did in the
instant case, would nullify Pennsylvania Coal.
See ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 817. Justice
Holmes, the author of Pennsylvania Coal,
joined Miller v Schoene, 276 US 272. 72 L Ed
568, 48 S Ct 246 1928), six years later. In
Miller, the Court adopted the exact approach
of the South Carolina Court: It found the
tedar trees harmful, and their destruction not
a taking, whether or not they were a nuisance. Justice Ho:mes apparently believed
that such an approach did not repudiate his
earlier opinion. Moreover, this Court already

prived of all economic value ot his
property will depend on how "property" is defined. The 'composition of
the denominator in our 'deprivation'
fraction,*' ante, at
, n 7, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 813, is the dispositive inquiry. Yet there is no "objective'*
way to define what that denominatorshould be. "We have long understood
that any land-use regulation can be
characterized as the 'total' deprivation
of
an
aptly
defined
entitlement. . . . Alternatively, the
same regulation can always be characterized as a mere 'partial' withdrawal from full, unencumbered
ownership of the landholding affected by the regulation. . . /',fl Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum L
Rev 1600, 1614 (1988).
The Court's decision in Keystone
Bituminous Coal illustrates this
principle perfectly. In Keystone, the
Court determined that the "support
estate" was "merely a part of the
entire bundle of rights possessed by
the owner." 480 US, at 501, 94 L Ed
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. Thus, the
Court concluded that the support
estate's destruction merely eliminated one segment of the total property. Ibid. The dissent, however,
characterized the support estate as a
distinct property interest that was
has been over this ground live years ago, and
at that point rejected the assertion that Pennsylvania Coal was inconsistent with Mugler,
Hadacheck. Miller, or the others in the string
of "noxious u s e ' cases, recognizing instead
that the nature of the State's action is critical
in takings analysis. Keystone Bituminous
Coal. 480 US, at 490, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct
1232.
18. See also Michelman. Property, Utility,
and Fairness, Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv
L Rev 1165, 1192-1193 U967i; Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 Yale LJ 36, 60
(1964).
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wholly destroyed. Id., at 519, 94 L
Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. The Court
could agree on no "value-free basis"
to resolve this dispute.
Even more perplexing, however, is
the Court's reliance on common-law
principles of nuisance in its quest for
a value-free taking jurisprudence. In
determining what is a nuisance at
common law, state courts make exactly the decision that the Court
finds so troubling when made by the
South Carolina General Assembly
today: they determine whether the
use is harmful. Common-law public
and private nuisance law is simply a
determination whether a particular
use causes harm. See Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52
Va L Rev 997, 997 (1966) ("Nuisance
is a French word which means nothing more than harm"). There is
nothing magical in the reasoning of
judges long dead. They determined a
harm in the same way as state
judges and legislatures do today. If
judges in the 18th and 19th centuries can distinguish a harm from a
benefit, why not judges in the 20th
century, and if judges can, why not
legislators? There simply is no reason to believe that new interpretations of the hoary common law nuisance doctrine will be particularly
"objective" or "value-free."19 Once
one abandons the level of generality
of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
823, one searches in vain, I think,
for anything resembling a principle
in the common law of nuisance.
19. "There is perhaps no more impenetrable
jangle in the entire law than that which
surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant
ail things to all people, and has been applied
indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a
pie." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D.
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of
Torts 616 i5th ed 1984) (footnotes omitted). It

838

120 L Ed 2d

c
Finally, the Court justifies its new
rule that the legislature may not
deprive a property owner of the only
economically valuable use of his
land, even if the legislature finds it
to be a harmful use, because such
action is not part of the "long
recognized" "understandings of our
citizens." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d,
at 820. These "understandings" permit such regulation only if the use is
a nuisance under the common law.
Any other course is "inconsistent
with the historical compact recorded
in the Takings Clause." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 820. It is not
clear from the Court's opinion where
our "historical compact" or "citizens'
understanding" comes from, but it
does not appear to be history.
The principle that the State
should compensate individuals for
property taken for public use was
not widely established in America at
the time of the Revolution.
"The colonists . . . inherited . . . a
concept of property which permitted extensive regulation of the use
of that property for the public
benefit—regulation that could
even go so far as to deny all productive use of the property to the
owner if, as Coke himself stated,
the regulation 'extends to the public benefit . . . for this is for the
is an area of law that "straddles the legal
universe, virtually defies synthesis, and generates case iaw to suit every taste." W Rodgers,
Environmental Law §2.4, at 48 (1986) (footnotes omitted). The Court itself has noted that
"nuisance concepts" are "often vague and
indeterminate." Milwaukee v Illinois, 451 US
304. 317, 68 L Ed 2d 114, 101 S Ct 1734
(1981).
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F. Bosselman, D. Callies & J. Banta,
The Taking Issue 80-81 (1973), quoting The Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 12 Co Rep 12-13
tl606) (hereinafter Bosselman). See
also Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale LJ 694, 697, n 9
U985).20

Yeates 362, 373 (Pa 1802). There was
an obvious movement toward establishing the just compensation principle during the 19th century, but
"there continued to be a strong current in American legal thought that
regarded compensation simply as a
'bounty given . . . by the State' out
of 'kindness' and not out of justice."
Horwitz 65 (quoting Commonwealth
v Fisher, 1 Pen & W 462, 465 (Pa
1830)). See also State v Dawson, 3
Hill 100, 103 (SC 1836)).22

Even into the 19th century, state
governments often felt free to take
property for roads and other public
projects without paying compensation to the owners.21 See M. Horwitz,
The Transformation of American
Law, 1780-1860, pp 63-64 (1977)
(hereinafter Horwitz); Treanor, 94
Yale LJ, at 695. As one court declared in 1802, citizens "were bound
to contribute as much of [land], as
by the laws of the country, were
deemed necessary for the public convenience." M'Clenachan v Curwin, 3

Although, prior to the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, America was replete with land use regulations describing which activities were considered noxious and forbidden, see
Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 Buffalo L Rev
735, 751 (1985); L. Friedman, A History of American Law 66-68 (1973),
the Fifth Amendment's Taking
Clause originally did not extend to
regulations of property, whatever
the effect.23 See ante, at
, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 812. Most state courts

20. See generally Sax. 74 Yale LJ, at 56-59
"The evidence certainly seems to indicate
that the mere fact that government activity
destroyed existing economic advantages and
power did not disturb [the English theorists
who formulated the compensation notion) at
all." Id., at 56 Professor Sax contends that
even Blackstone, 'remembered champion of
the language ot private property," did not
believe that the compensation clause was
meant to preserve economic value. Id., at 5859

public use: and although eminent domain was
mentioned in the Pennsylvania constitution,
its sole requirement was that property not be
taken without the consent of the legislature
See Grant. The "Higher Law" Background of
the Law ot Eminent Domain, in 2 Selected
Essays on Constitutional Law 912, 915-916
(1938) By 1868, live of the original States still
had no just compensation clauses in their
constitutions Ibid.

public, and every one hath benefit
by it.' "

21. In 1796, the Attorney General of South
Carolina responded to property holders' demand for compensation when the State took
their land to build a load by arguing that
"there is not one instance on record, and
certainly none within the memory of the
oldest man now living, o( any demand being
made for compensation tor the soil or freehold
of the lands " Lindsav v Commissioners, 2 SC
L38. 49(1796)
22. Only the constitutions •>! Vermont and
Massachusetts required that compensation be
paid ,vhen private property was taken for

23. James Madison, author of the Taking
Clause, apparently intended it to apply only
to direct, physical takings ot property by the
Federal Government. See Treanor. The Origins and Original Significance of the J u s t
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale LJ, 694, 711 (1985) Professor
Sax argues that although "contemporaneous
commentary upon the meaning ot the compensation clause is in very short supply," 74
Yale LJ at 58, the "few authorities that are
available ' indicate that the clause was "designed to prevent arbitrary government action." not to protect economic value Id , at
58-60
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agreed with this narrow interpretation of a taking. "Until the end of
the nineteenth century . . . jurists
held that the constitution protected
possession only, and not value." Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth
Century Contract Clause: The Role
of the Property-Privilege Distinction
and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S Cal L Rev 1, 76 (1986);
Bosselman 106. Even indirect and
consequential injuries to property
resulting from regulations were excluded from the definition of a taking. See Bosselman 106; Callender v
Marsh, 1 Pick 418, 430 (Mass 1823).
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231 US 761, 58 L Ed 470, 34 S Ct
325 (1913). More recent cases reach
the same result. See Consolidated
Rock Products Co. v Los Angeles, 57
Cal 2d 515, 370 P2d 342, appeal
dismU 371 US 36, 9 L Ed 2d 112, 83
S Ct 145 (1962); Nassr v Commonwealth, 394 Mass 767, 477 NE2d 987
(1985); Eno v Burlington, 125 Vt 8,
209 A2d 499 (1965); Turner v County
of Del Norte, 24 Cal App 3d 311, 101
Cal Rptr 93 (1972).
In addition, state courts historically have been less likely to find
that a government action constitutes
a taking when the affected land is
undeveloped. According to the South
Carolina court, the power of the legislature to take unimproved land
without providing compensation was
sanctioned by "ancient rights and
principles." Lindsay v Commissioners, 2 SC L 38, 57 (1796). "Except for
Massachusetts, no colony appears to
have paid compensation when it
built a stateowned road across unimproved land. Legislatures provided
compensation only for enclosed or
improved land." Treanor, 94 Yale
LJ, at 695 (footnotes omitted). This
rule was followed by some States
into the 1800s. See Horwitz 63-65.

Even when courts began to consider that regulation in some situations could constitute a taking, they
continued to uphold bans on particular uses without paying compensation, notwithstanding the economic
impact, under the rationale that no
one can obtain a vested right to
injure or endanger the public.24 In
the Coates cases, for example, the
Supreme Court of New York found
no taking in New York's ban on the
interment of the dead within the
city, although "no other use can be
made of these lands." Coates v City
of New York, 7 Cow 585, 592 (NY
1827). See also Brick Presbyterian
Church v City of New York, 5 Cow
538 (NY 1826); Commonwealth v Alger, 7 Cush 53, 59, 104 (Mass 1851);
St. Louis Gunning Advertisement
Co. v St. Louis, 235 Mo 99,
, 137
SW 929, 942 (1911), appeal dism'd,

With similar result, the common
agrarian conception of property limited owners to "natural" uses of
their land prior to and during much
of the 18th century. See id., at 32.
Thus, for example, the owner could

24. For this reason, the retroactive application of the regulation to formerly lawful uses
was not a controlling distinction in the past.
"Nor can it make any difference that the
right is purchased previous to the passage of
the by-law," for "[ejvery right, from an absolute ownership in property, down to a mere
easement, is purchased and holden subject to
the restriction, that it shall be so exercised as

not to injure others. Though, at the time, it
be remote and inoffensive, the purchaser is
bound to know, at his peril, that it may
become otherwise." Coates v City of New
York, 7 Cow 585, 605 (NY 1827). See also
Brick Presbyterian Church v City of New
York, 5 Cow 538, 542 (NY 1826); Commonwealth v Tewksbury, 11 Mete 55 (Mass 1846);
State v Paui, 5 RI 185 (1858).
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build nothing on his land that would
alter the natural flow of water. See
id., at 44; see also, e.g., Merritt v
Parker, 1 Coxe 460. 463 (NJ 1795).
Some more recent state courts still
follow this reasoning. See, e.g., Just
v Marinette Countv. 56 Wis 2d 7,
201 N W 2 d 7 6 1 , 768'1972).
Nor does history indicate any common-law limit on the State's power
to regulate harmful uses even to the
point of destroying all economic
value. Nothing in the discussions in
Congress concerning the TakingClause indicates that the Clause was
limited by the common-law nuisance
doctrine. Common law courts themselves rejected such an understanding. They regularly recognized that
it is "for the legislature to interpose,
and by positive enactment to prohibit a use of property which would
be injurious to the public." Tewksbury, 11 Mete, at S7.25 Chief Justice
Shaw explained in upholding a regulation prohibiting construction of
wharves, the existence of a taking
did not depend on "whether a certain erection in tide water is a nuisance at common law or not." Alger,
7 Cush, at 104; see also State v Paul,
5 RI 185, 193 (1858); Commonwealth
v Parks, 155 Mass 531, 532, 30 NE
174 '1892) (Holmes, J.i i"[T]he legislature may change the common law
as to nuisances, and may move the
iine either way, so as to make things
nuisances which were not so, or to
make things lawful which were nuisances").
25. Mure recent state court decisions agree.
See e g . L^ne v Mr Vernon. 38 NY2d 344,
342 NEid 571, 573 <1976>: Commonwealth v
Baker 160 Pa Super 640. 53 A2d 829. 830
1947)
26. The Court asserts that ail early American experience, prior to and after passage of
:ne Bill of Rights, and any case law prior to
1897 are "entirely irrelevant" in determining
vnat is ' the historical compact recorded in
"ie Takings Clause " Ante, at
. n 15. 120

In short, I find no clear and accepted "historical compact" or "understanding of our citizens'* justify
ing the Court's new taking doctrine.
Instead, the Court seems to treat
history as a grab-bag of principles, to
be adopted where they support the
Court's theory, and ignored where
they do not. If the Court decided
t h a t the early common law provides
the background principles tor interpreting the Taking Clause, then regulation, as opposed to physical confiscation, would not be compensable.
If the Court decided that the law of
a later period provides the background principles, then regulation
might be compensable, but the Court
would have to confront the fact that
legislatures regularly determined
which uses were prohibited, independent of the common law, and independent of whether the uses were
lawful when the owner purchased.
What makes the Court's analysis
unworkable is its attempt to package
the law of two incompatible eras and
peddle it as historical fact.26
V
The Court makes sweeping and, in
my view, misguided and unsupported changes in our taking doctrine. While it limits these changes
to the most narrow subset of govern-

L Ed 2d, at 820 Nor apparently are we to find
this compact in the early federal taking cases,
which clearly permitted prohibition of harmful uses despite the alleged loss of all value,
whether or not the prohibition was a common-law nuisance, and whether or not the
prohibition occurred subsequent to the purchase. See supra, at
,
,
120 L Ed 2d, at 833-834, 836-837, and n 16. I
cannot imagine where the Court finds its
"historical compact." \f not in history
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ment regulation—those that eliminate all economic value from land—
these changes go far beyond what is
necessary to secure petitioner Lucas'
private benefit. One hopes they do
not go beyond the narrow confines
the Court assigns them to today.
I dissent.

Justice Stevens, dissenting.
Today the Court restricts one
judge-made rule and expands another. In my opinion it errs on both
counts. Proper application of the
doctrine of judicial restraint would
avoid the premature adjudication of
an important constitutional question. Proper respect for our precedents would avoid an illogical expansion of the concept of "regulatory
takings/'
I
As the Court notes, ante, at
,
120 L Ed 2d, at 809, South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act
has been amended to permit some
construction of residences seaward
of the line that frustrated petitioner's proposed use of his property.
Until he exhausts his right to apply
for a special permit under that
amendment, petitioner is not entitled to an adjudication by this Court
of the merits of his permanent takings claim. MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v County of Yolo, 477 US 340,
351, 91 L Ed 2d 285, 106 S Ct 2561
(1986).
It is also not clear that he has a
viable "temporary takings" claim. If
1. In this regard, it is noteworthy that
petitioner acquired the lot about 18 months
before the statute was passed; there is no
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we assume that petitioner is now
able to build on the lot, the only
injury that he may have suffered is
the delay caused by the temporary
existence of the absolute statutory
ban on construction. We cannot be
sure, however, that that delay
caused petitioner any harm because
the record does not tell us whether
his building plans were even temporarily frustrated by the enactment
of the statute. 1 Thus, on the present
record it is entirely possible that
petitioner has suffered no injury-infact even if the state statute was
unconstitutional when he filed this
lawsuit.
It is true, as the Court notes, that
the argument against deciding the
constitutional issue in this case rests
on prudential considerations rather
than a want of jurisdiction. I think
it equally clear, however, that a
Court less eager to decide the merits
would follow the wise counsel of
Justice Brandeis in his deservedly
famous concurring opinion in Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 341, 80 L Ed 688, 56
S Ct 466 (1936). As he explained, the
Court has developed "for its own
governance in the cases confessedly
within its jurisdiction, a series of
rules under which it has avoided
passing upon a large part of all the
constitutional questions pressed
upon it for decision." Id. at 346, 80 L
Ed 688, 56 S Ct 466. The second of
those rules applies directly to this
case.
"2. The Court will not 'anticipate
a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it/ Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co.
v Emigration Commissioners, 113
evidence that he ever sought a building permit from the local authorities.
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US 33, 39 '28 L Ed 899, 5 S Ct
352]; [citing rive additional cases].
It is not the habit of the Court to
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the
case.' Burton v United States 196
US 283, 295 149 L Ed 482, 25 S Ct
243]." Id., at 346-347, 91 L Ed 2d
285, 106 S Ct 2561.
Cavalierly dismissing the doctrine
of judicial restraint, the Court today
tersely announces that "we do not
think it prudent to apply that prudential requirement here." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 811. I respectfully disagree and would save consideration of the merits for another
day. Since, however, the Court has
reached the merits, I shall do so as
well.
II
In its analysis of the merits, the
Court starts from the premise that
this Court has adopted a "categorical rule that total regulatory takings
must be compensated," ante, at
,
120 L Ed 2d, at 819, and then sets
itself to the task of identifying the
exceptional cases in which a State
may be relieved of this categorical
obligation. Ante, at
, 120
L Ed 2d, at 820. The test the Court
announces is that the regulation
must do no more than duplicate the
result that could have been achieved
under a State's nuisance law. Ante,
at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 821. Under
this test the categorical rule will
apply unless the regulation merely
makes explicit what was otherwise
an implicit limitation on the owner's
property rights.
In my opinion, the Court is doubly
in error. The categorical rule the
Court establishes is an unsound and
unwise addition to the law and the

Court's formulation of the exception
to that rule is too rigid and too
narrow.
The Categorical

Rule

As the Court recognizes, ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 812, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US 393,
67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28 ALR
1321 (1922), provides no support for
its—or, indeed, a n y — c a t e g o r i c a l
rule. To the contrary. Justice
Holmes recognized that such absolute rules ill tit the inquiry into
"regulatory takings." Thus, in the
paragraph that contains his famous
observation that a regulation may go
"too far" and thereby constitute a
taking, the Justice wrote: "As we
already have said, this is a question
of degree—and therefore cannot be
disposed of by general propositions."
Id. at 416, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158,
28 ALR 1321. What he had
"already. . .said" made
perfectly
clear that Justice Holmes regarded
economic injury to be merely one
factor to be weighed: "One fact for
consideration in determining such
limits is the extent of the diminution [of value.] So the question depends upon the particular facts/' Id.
at 413, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158. 28
ALR 1321.
Nor does the Court's new categorical rule find support in decisions
following Mahon. Although in dicta
we have sometimes recited that a
law "effects a taking if [it] . . . denies an owner economically viable
use of his land," Agins v Tiburon,
447 US 255, 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100
S Ct 2138 «1980), our rulings have
rejected such an absolute position.
We have frequently—and recently—
held that, in some circumstances, a
law that renders property valueless
may nonetheless not constitute a
taking. See, e.g., First English Evan843
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gelicai Lutheran Church of Glendale
v County of Los Angeles, 482 US
304, 313, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct
2378 (1987); Goldblatt v Hempstead,
369 US 590, 596, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S
a 987 '1962j; United States v Caltex, 344 US 149. 155, 97 L Ed 157,
73 S Ct 200 (1952); Miller v Schoene,
276 US 272, 72 L Ed 568, 48 S Ct
246 U928); Hadachek v Sebastian,
239 US 394, 405, 60 L Ed 348, 36 S
Ct 143 (1915); Mugier v Kansas, 123
US 623, 657, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273
(1887); cf. Ruckelshaus v Monsanto
Co., 467 US 986, 1011, 81 L Ed 2d
815, 104 S Ct 2862 (1984); Connolly v
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 US 211, 225, 89 L Ed 2d
166, 106 S Ct 1018 (1986). In short,
as we stated in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 US
470, 490, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct
1232 (1987), " f Although a comparison of values before and after' a
regulatory action 'is relevant, . . . it
is by no means conclusive/ "
In addition to lacking support in
past decisions, the Court's new rule
is wholly arbitrary. A landowner
whose property is diminished in
value 95% recovers nothing, while
an owner whose property is diminished 100% recovers the land's full
value. The case at hand illustrates
this arbitrariness well. The Beachfront Management Act not only prohibited the building of new dwellings
in certain areas, it also prohibited
2. This aspect of the Act was amended in
1990. See SC Code § 4S-39-290(B) (Supp 1990).
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the rebuilding of houses that were
"destroyed beyond repair by natural
causes or by fire." 1988 SC Acts 634,
§ 3; see also Esposito v South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F2d 165,
167 (CA4 1991 ).2 Thus, if the homes
adjacent to Lucas' lot were destroyed
by a hurricane one day after the Act
took effect, the owners would not be
able to rebuild, nor would they be
assured recovery. Under the Court's
categorical approach, Lucas (who
has lost the opportunity to build)
recovers, while his neighbors (who
have lost both the opportunity to
build and their homes) do not recover. The arbitrariness of such a
rule is palpable.
Moreover, because of the elastic
nature of property rights, the
Court's new rule will also prove unsound in practice. In response to the
rule, courts may define "property"
broadly and only rarely find regulations to effect total takings. This is
the approach the Court itself adopts
in its revisionist reading of venerable precedents. We are told that—
notwithstanding the Court's findings
to the contrary in each case—the
brewery in Mugler, the brickyard in
Hadacheck, and the gravel pit in
Goldblatt all could be put to "other
uses" and that, therefore, those
cases did not involve total regulatory
takings.3 Ante, at
, n 13, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 819-820.

cial or productive use,'' ante, at
, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 813 (emphasis added), of property is
relevant in takings analysis. I should think
3. Of course, the same could easily be said that a regulation arbitrarily prohibiting an
in this case: Lucas may put his land to "other owner from continuing to use her property for
uses"—fishing or camping, for example—or bird-watching or sunbathing might constitute
may sell his land to his neighbors as a buffer. a taking under some circumstances; and, conIn either event, his land is far from "value- versely, that such uses are of value to the
less."
owner. Yet the Court offers no basis for its
This highlights a fundamental weakness in assumption that the only uses of property
the Court's analysis: its failure to explain why cognizable under the Constitution are develonly the impairment of "economically benefi- opmental uses.
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On the other hand, developers and
investors may market specialized estates to take advantage of the
Court's new rule. The smaller the
estate, the more likely that a regulatory change will effect a total taking.
Thus, an investor may, for example,
purchase the right to build a multifamily home on a specific lot, with
the result that a zoning regulation
that allows only single-family homes
wouid render the investor's property
interest "valueless." 4 In short, the
categorical rule will likely have one
of two effects: Either courts will alter the definition of the ''denominator" in the takings "fraction," rendering the Court's categorical rule
meaningless, or investors will manipulate the relevant property interests, giving the Court's rule sweeping effect. To my mind, neither of
these results is desirable or appropriate, and both are distortions of
our takings jurisprudence.

lished that a 50% diminution in
value does not by itseif constitute a
taking. See Euclid v Ambler Realty
Co., 272 US 365, 384, 71 L Ed 303,
47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016 (1926)
(75% diminution in value). Thus, the
landowner's perception of the regulation cannot justify the Court's new
rule.

Finally, the Court's justification
for its new categorical rule is remarkably thin. The Court mentions
in passing three arguments in support of its rule; none is convincing.
First, the Court suggests that "total
deprivation of feasible use is, from
the landowner's point of view, the
equivalent of a physical appropriation." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
814. This argument proves too much.
From the "landowner's point of
view," a regulation that diminishes
a lot's value by 50% is as well "the
equivalent" of the condemnation of
half of the lot. Yet, it is well estab-

Finally, the Court suggests that
"regulations that leave the owner
. . . without economically beneficial
. . . use . . . carry with them a
heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form
of public service." Ibid. As discussed
more fully below, see infra, Part III,
I agree that the risks of such singling out are of central concern in
takings law. However, such risks do
not justify a per se rule for total
regulatory takings. There is no necessary correlation between "singling
out" and total takings: a regulation
may single out a property owner

4. This unfortunate possibility is created by
the Court's subtle revision of the "total regulatory takings" dicta. In past decisions, we
have stated that a regulation effects a taking
if it "denies an owner economically viable use
of his land," Agins v Tiburon. 447 US, 255,
260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138 (1980)

(emphasis added), indicating that this "total
takings" test did not apply to other estates.
Today, however, the Court suggests that a
regulation may effect a total taking of tiny
real property interest. See ante, at
, n 7,
120 L Kd 2d, at 813-814.

Second, the Court emphasizes that
because total takings are "relatively
rare" its new rule will not adversely
affect the government's ability to "go
on." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
814. This argument proves too little.
Certainly it is true that defining a
small class of regulations that are
per se takings will not greatly hinder important governmental functions—but this is true of any small
class of regulations. The Court's suggestion only begs the question of
why regulations of this particular
class should always be found to effect takings.
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without depriving him of all of his
property, see e.g., Nollan v California Coastal Comm'n, 483 US 825,
837, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141
(1987); J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v Atkinson, 121 NH 581, 432 A2d 12
(1981); and it may deprive him of all
of his property without singling him
out, see e.g., Mugler v Kansas, 123
US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S a 273
(1887); Hadachek v Sebastian, 239
US 394, 60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143
(1915). What matters in such cases is
not the degree of diminution of
value, but rather the specificity of
the expropriating act. For this reason, the Court's third justification
for its new rule also fails.
In. short, the Court's new rule is
unsupported by prior decisions, arbitrary and unsound in practice, and
theoretically unjustified. In my opinion, a categorical rule as important
as the one established by the Court
today should be supported by more
history or more reason than has yet
been provided.
The Nuisance Exception
Like many bright-line rules, the
categorical rule established in this
case is only "categorical" for a page
or two in the U. S. Reports. No
sooner does the Court state that "total regulatory takings must be compensated," ante, at
, 120 L Ed
2d, at 819, than it quickly establishes an exception to that rule.
The exception provides that a regulation that renders property valueless is not a taking if it prohibits
uses of property that were not "previously permissible under relevant
property and nuisance principles."
Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 821.
The Court thus rejects the basic
holding in Mugler v Kansas, 123 US
846

120 L Ed 2d

623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887).
There we held that a state-wide statute that prohibited the owner of a
brewery from making alcoholic beverages did not effect a taking, even
though the use of the property had
been perfectly lawful and caused no
public harm before the statute was
enacted. We squarely rejected the
rule the Court adopts today:
"It is true, that, when the defendants . . . erected their breweries,
the laws of the State did not forbid the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. But the State did not
thereby give any assurance, or
come under an obligation, that its
legislation upon that subject
would remain unchanged. [T]he
supervision of the public health
and the public morals is a governmental power, 'continuing in its
nature/ and 'to be dealt with as
the special exigencies of the moment may require;' . . . 'for this
purpose, the largest legislative discretion is allowed, and the discretion cannot be parted with any
more than the power itself.'" Id.,
at 669, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273.
Under our reasoning in Mugler, a
state's decision to prohibit or to regulate certain uses of property is not
a compensable taking just because
the particular uses were previously
lawful. Under the Court's opinion
today, however, if a state should
decide to prohibit the manufacture
of asbestos, cigarettes, or concealable
firearms, for example, it must be
prepared to pay for the adverse economic consequences of its decision.
One must wonder if Government
will be able to "go on" effectively if
it must risk compensation "for every
such change in the general law."
Mahon, 260 US, at 413, 67 L Ed 322,
43 S Ct 158, 28 ALR 1321.
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The Court's holding today effectively freezes the State's common
law, denying the legislature much of
its traditional power to revise the
law governing the rights and uses of
property. Until today, I had thought
that we had long abandoned this
approach to constitutional law. More
than a century ago we recognized
that "the great office of statutes is to
remedy defects in the common law
as they are developed, and to adapt
it to the changes of time and circumstances." Munn v Illinois, 94 US 113,
134, 24 L Ed 77 (1877). As Justice
Marshall observed about a position
similar to that adopted by the Court
today:
"If accepted, that claim would represent a return to the era of Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 [49
L Ed 937, 25 S Ct 539] (1905),
when common-law rights were
also found immune from revision
by State or Federal Government.
Such an approach would freeze
the common law as it has been
constructed by the courts, perhaps
at its 19th-century state of development. It would allow no room
for change in response to changes
in circumstance. The Due Process
Clause does not require such a
result." PruneYard Shopping Center v Robins, 447 US 74, 93, 64 L
Ed 2d 741, 100 S Ct 2035 (1980)
(concurring opinion).
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and evolution—both moral and practical. Legislatures implement that
new learning; in doing so they must
often revise the definition of property and the rights of property owners. Thus, wh». n the Nation came to
understand that slavery was morally
wrong and mandated the emancipation of all slaves, it, in eifect, redefined "property." On a lesser scale,
our ongoing self-education produces
similar changes in the rights of
property owners: New appreciation
of the significance of endangered
species, see, e.g., Andrus v Allard,
444 US 51, 62 L Ed 2d 210, 100 S Ct
318 (1979); the importance of wetlands, see, e.g., 16 USC § 3801 et seq.
[16 USCS §§3801 et seq.]; and the
vulnerability of coastal lands, see,
e.g., 16 USC § 1451 et seq. [16 USCS
§§ 1451 et seq.J, shapes our evolving
understandings of property rights.

Arresting the development of the
common law is not only a departure
from our prior decisions; it is also
profoundly unwise. The human condition is one of constant learning

Of course, some legislative redefinitions of property will effect a taking
and must be compensated—but it
certainly cannot be the case that
every movement away from common
law does so. There is no reason, and
less sense, in such an absolute rule.
We live in a world in which changes
in the economy and the environment
occur with increasing frequency and
importance. If it was wise a century
ago to allow Government " 'the largest legislative discretion'" to deal
with " 'the special exigencies of the
moment,' " Mugler, 123 US, at 669,
31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273, it is imperative to do so today. The rule that
should govern a decision in a case of
this kind should focus on the future,
not the past. 5

5. Even measured in terms of efficiency, the
Court's rule is unsound. The Court today
effectively establishes a form of insurance
against certain changes in landuse regulations. Like other forms of insurance, the

Court's rule creates a ''moral hazard" and
inefficiencies: In the face of uncertainty about
changes in the law, developers will ovennvest,
safe in the knowledge that if the law changes
adversely, they will be entitled to compensa-
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The Court's categorical approach
rule will, I fear, greatly hamper the
efforts of local officials and planners
who must deal with increasingly
complex problems in land-use and
environmental regulation. As this
case—in which the claims of an individual property owner exceed $1
million—well demonstrates, these officials face both substantial uncertainty because of the ad hoc nature
of takings law and unacceptable penalties if they guess incorrectly about
that law.6

120 L Ed 2d

The rigid rules fixed by the Court
today clash with this enterprise:
"fairness and justice" are often disserved by categorical rules.
Ill
It is well established that a takings case "entails inquiry into [several factors:] the character of the
governmental action, its economic
impact, and its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations." Prune Yard, 447 US, at 83,
64 L Ed 2d 741, 100 S Ct 2035. The
Court's analysis today focuses on the
last two of these three factors: the
categorical rule addresses a regulation's "economic impact," while the
nuisance exception recognizes that
ownership brings with it only certain "expectations." Neglected by
the Court today is the first, and in
some ways, the most important factor in takings analysis: the character
of the regulatory action.

Viewed more broadly, the Court's
new rule and exception conflict with
the very character of our takings
jurisprudence. We have frequently
and consistently recognized that the
definition of a taking cannot be reduced to a "set formula" and that
determining whether a regulation is
a taking is "essentially [an] ad hoc,
factual inquir[y]." Penn Central
Transportation Co. v New York City,
438 US 104, 124, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98
The Just Compensation Clause
S Q 2646 (1978) (quoting Goldblatt v "was designed to bar Government
Hempstead, 369 US 590, 594, 8 L Ed from forcing some people alone to
2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962)). This is bear public burdens which, in all
unavoidable, for the determination fairness and justice, should be borne
whether a law effects a taking is by the public as a whole." Armultimately a matter of "fairness and strong, 364 US, at 49, 4 L Ed 2d
justice," Armstrong v United States, 1554, 80 S Ct 1563. Accordingly, one
364 US 40, 49, 4 L Ed 2d 1554, 80 S of the central concerns of our takCt 1563 (1960), and "necessarily re- ings jurisprudence is "preventing]
quires a weighing of private and the public from loading upon one
public interests." Agins, 447 US, at individual more than his just share
261, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138. of the burdens of government." Motion. See generally Farber, Economic Analysis
and Just Compensation, 12 Int'l Rev of Law &
Econ 125(1992)
6. As the Court correctly notes, in regulatory takings, unlike physical takings, courts
have a choice of remedies. See ante, at
,n
17, 120 L Ed 2d, at 822. They may "invalidate the] excessive regulation" or they may
"allofw] the regulation to stand and orde{r]
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the government to afford compensation for
the permanent taking." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v Countv of Los
Angeles, 482 US 304, 335, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107
S Ct 2378 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also id., at 319-321, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct
2378. In either event, however, the costs to
the government are likely to be substantial
and are therefore likely to impede the development of sound land-use policy.
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companies, the Subsidence Act affected all surface owners—including
the coal companies—equally. See
Keystone, 480 US, at 486, 94 L Ed
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. Perhaps the
most familiar application of this
principle of generality arises in zonFor example, in the case of so- ing cases. A diminution in value
iled
'developmental exactions," caused by a zoning regulation is far
ve have paid special attention to the less likely to constitute a taking if it
risk that particular landowners is part of a general and comprehennight "b[e] singled out to bear the sive land-use plan, see Euclid v AmDurden" of a broader problem not of ber Realty Co., 272 US 365, 71 L Ed
lis own making. Nollan, 483 US, at 303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016
*35, n 4, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct (1926); conversely, "spot zoning" is
1141; see also Pennell v San Jose, far more likely to constitute a tak185 US 1, 23, 99 L Ed 2d 1, 108 S Ct ing, see Penn Central. 438 US, at
A9 (1988). Similarly, in distinguish- 132, and n 28, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S
ag between the Kohler Act (at issue Ct 2646.
i Mahon) and the Subsidence Act
The presumption that a permait issue in Keystone), we found sigificant that the regulatory function nent physical occupation, no matter
i rhe latter was substantially how slight, effects a taking is wholly
roader. Unlike the Kohler Act, consistent with this principle. A
hich simply transferred back to the physical taking entails a certain
8
irtace owners certain rights that amount of "singling out." Consisiey had earlier sold to the coal tent with this principle, physical ocnongahela Navigation Co. v United
States, 148 US 312, 325, 37 L Ed
463, 13 S a 622 (1893). We have,
therefore, in our takings law frequently looked to the generality of a
regulation of property.7

7. This principle of generality is well-rooted
our broader understandings of the Consti;ion as designed in part to control the "mis:efs of faction." See The Federalist No. 10, p
:G. Wills ed 1982) (J. Madison).
\ n analogous concern arises in First
lendment law. There we have recognized
.t an individual's rights are not violated
en his religious practices are prohibited
ier a neutral law of general applicability.
- example, in Employment Division, Detment of Human Resources of Oregon v
;th, 494 US 872, 879-880, 108 L Ed 2d 876,
S Ct 1595 (1990), we observed:
Our) decisions have consistently held that
right of free exercise does not relieve an
vidua! of the obligation to comply with a
A and neutral law of general applicability
the ground that the law proscribes (or
cnbes) conduct that his religion pre^es tor proscribes).' United States v Lee,
US 252. 263, n 3 [71 L Ed 2d 127, 102 S
1051] (1982) (Stevens. J., concurring in
menu
. In Prince v Massachusetts,
US 158 [88 L Ed 645, 64 S Ct 438] U944),
leid that a mother could be prosecuted

under the child labor laws for using her children to dispense literature in the streets, her
religious motivation notwithstanding. We
found no constitutional infirmity in excluding
[these children) from doing there what no
other children may do.' id., at 171 [88 L Ed
645, 64 S Ct 438]. In Braunfeld v Brown, 366
US 599 [6 L Ed 2d 563, 81 S Ct 1144] (1961)
(plurality opinion), we upheld Sunday-closing
laws against the claim that they burdened the
religious practices of persons whose religions
compelled them to refrain from work on other
days. In Gillette v United States, 401 US 437,
461 [28 L Ed 2d 168. 91 S Ct 828] (1971), we
sustained the military Selective Service System against the claim that it violated free
exercise by conscripting persons who opposed
a particular war on religious grounds."
If such a neutral law of general applicability may severely burden constitutionally protected interests in liberty, a comparable burden on property owners should not be considered unreasonably onerous.
8. See Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special
Interests, 77 Va L Rev 1333, 1352-1354 (1991).
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cupations by third parties are more
likely to effect takings than other
physical occupations. Thus, a regulation requiring the installation of a
junction box owned by a third party,
Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 US 419, 73 L Ed 2d
868, 102 S Q 3164 (1982), is more
troubling than a regulation requiring the installation of sprinklers or
smoke detectors; just as an order
granting third parties access to a
marina, Kaiser Aetna v United
States, 444 US 164, 62 L Ed 2d 332,
100 S Ct 383 (1979), is more troubling than an order requiring the
placement of safety buoys in the
marina.
In analyzing takings claims, courts
have long recognized the difference
between a regulation that targets
one or two parcels of land and a
regulation that enforces a state-wide
policy. See, e.g., A.A. Profiles, Inc. v
Ft. Lauderdale, 850 F2d 1483, 1488
(CA11 1988); Wheeler v Pleasant
Grove, 664 F2d 99, 100 (CA5 1981);
Trustees Under Will of Pomeroy v
Westlake, 357 So 2d 1299, 1304 (La
App 1978); see also Burrows v
Keene, 121 NH 590, 432 A2d 15, 21
(1981); Herman Click Realty Co. v
St. Louis County, 545 SW2d 320,
324-325 (Mo App 1976); Huttig v
Richmond Heights, 372 SW2d 833,
842-843 (Mo 1963). As one early
court stated with regard to a waterfront regulation, "If such restraint
were in fact imposed upon the estate
of one proprietor only, out of several
estates on the same line of shore,
9. See Zalkin. Shifting Sands and Shifting
Doctrines: The Supreme Court's Changing
Takings Doctrine and South Carolina's
Coastal Zone Statute, 79 Cal L Rev 205, 216217, nn 46-47 (1991) (collecting statutes).
10. This provision was amended in 1990.
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the objection would be much more
formidable." Commonwealth v Alger, 61 Mass 53, 102 (1851).
In considering Lucas' claim, the
generality of the Beachfront Management Act is significant. The Act
does not target particular landowners, but rather regulates the use of
the coastline of the entire State. See
SC Code § 48-39-10 (Supp 1990). Indeed, South Carolina's Act is best
understood as part of a national effort to protect the coastline, one initiated by the Federal Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972. Pub L 92583, 86 Stat 1280, codified as
amended at 16 USC §1451 et seq.
[16 USCS §§ 1451 et seq.]. Pursuant
to the Federal Act, every coastal
State has implemented coastline regulations.9 Moreover, the Act did not
single out owners of undeveloped
land. The Act also prohibited owners
of developed land from rebuilding if
their structures were destroyed, see
1988 SC Acts 634 § 3,10 and what is
equally significant, from repairing
erosion control devices, such as seawalls, see SC Code § 48-39-29CKBK2)
(Supp 1990). In addition, in some
situations, owners of developed land
were required to "renourisfh] the
beach . . . on a yearly basis with an
amount . . . of sand . . . not . . .
less than one and one-half times the
yearly volume of sand lost due to
erosion." 1988 SC Acts 634 § 3, p
5140.11 In short, the South Carolina
Act imposed substantial burdens on
owners of developed and undevelSee SC Code § 48-39-29(XB) (Supp 1990).
11. This provision was amended in 1990;
authority for renourishment was shifted to
local governments. See SC Code § 48-39-350(A)
(Supp 1990).
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oped land alike This generality
indicates that the Act is not an effort to expropriate owners of undeveloped land
Admittedly, the economic impact
of this regulation is dramatic and
petitioner's investment-backed expectations are substantial Yet, if
anything, the costs to and expectations of the owners of developed land
are even greater I doubt, however,
that the cost to owners of developed
land of renounshing the beach and
allowing their seawalls to deteriorate effects a taking The costs imposed on the owners of undeveloped
land, such as petitioner, differ from
these costs only in degree, not in
kind
The impact of the ban on developmental uses must also be viewed in
light of the purposes of the Act The
legislature stated the purposes of the
Act as "protecting], preserving], restoring] and enhancing] the beach/
dune system ' of the State not only
for recreational and ecological pur
poses but also to <fprotec[t] life and
property" SC Code § 48-39-260U)(a)
(Supp 1990) The State, with much
science on its side, believes that the
"beach/dune system [acts] as a
buffer from high tides, storm surge,
[and] hurricanes" Ibid This is a
traditional and important exercise of
the State's police power, as demonstrated by Hurricane Hugo, which in
1989, caused 29 deaths and more
than $6 billion in property damage
m South Carolina alone 13
In view of all ot these factors, even
12. In this regard the Act more closely
resembles the Subsidence Act in Kevstone
than the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coai Co
v Mahon 260 US 393 67 L Ed 322 43 S Ct
158 28 ALR 1321 (1922) and more closely
resembles the general zoning scheme in Eu
did v Amber Realty Co 272 US 365 71 L Ed

Ed 2d 798

assuming that petitioner's property
was rendered valueless, the risk inherent in investments of the sort
made by petitioner, the generality of
the Act, and the compelling purpose
motivating the South Carolina Legislature persuade me that the Act did
not effect a taking of petitioner's
property
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent

Statement ot Justice Souter.
I would dismiss the writ of certiorari in this case as having been
granted
improvidently
After
briefing and argument it is abun
dantly clear that an unreviewable
assumption on which this case comes
to us is both questionable as a conclusion of Fifth Amendment law and
sufficient to frustrate the Court's
ability to render certain the legal
premises on which its holding rests
The petition for review was
granted on the assumption that the
state by regulation had deprived the
owner of his entire economic interest in the subject propeity Such was
the state trial court's conclusion,
which the state supreme court did
not leview It lb apparent now that
in light of our prior cases, see e g,
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn v
DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 493 502,
94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (1987),
\ndrus v Allard, 444 US 51, 65-66,
62 L Ed 2d 210, 100 S Ct 318 (1979),
Penn Central Transportation Corp v
New York City, 438 US 104, 130-131,
303 47 S Ct 114 54 ALR 1016 (1926) than the
specific landmark designation in Penn Central
Transportation Co v New York City 438 US
104 57 L Ed 2d 631 98 S Ct 2646 (1978)
13 7alkin 79 Cal L Rev at 212 213
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57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978),
the trial court's conclusion is highly
questionable. While the respondent
now wishes to contest the point, see
Brief for Respondent 45-50, the
Court is certainly right to refuse to
take up the issue, which is not fairly
included within the question presented, and has received only the
most superficial and one-sided treatment before us.
Because the questionable conclusion of total deprivation cannot be
reviewed, the Court is precluded
from attempting to clarify the concept of total (and, in the Court's
view, categorically compensable) taking on which it rests, a concept
which the Court describes, see ante,
at
n 6, 120 L Ed 2d, at 813, as
so uncertain under existing law as to
have fostered inconsistent pronouncements by the Court itself. Because that concept is left uncertain,
so is the significance of the exceptions to the compensation requirement that the Court proceeds to recognize. Thi3 alone is enough to show
that there is little utility in attempting to deal with this case on the
merits.
The imprudence of proceeding to
the merits in spite of these unpromising circumstances is underscored
by the fact that, in doing so, the
Court cannot help but assume something about the scope of the uncertain concept of total deprivation,
even when it is barred from explicating total deprivation directly. Thus,
when the Court concludes that the
application of nuisance law provides
an exception to the general rule that
complete denial of economically beneficial use of property amounts to a
compensable taking, the Court will
be understood to suggest (if it does
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not assume) that there are in fact
circumstances in which state-law
nuisance abatement may amount to
a denial of all beneficial land use as
that concept is to be employed in
our takings jurisprudence under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The nature of nuisance law, however, indicates that application of a
regulation defensible on grounds of
nuisance prevention or abatement
will quite probably not amount to a
complete deprivation in fact. The
nuisance enquiry focuses on conduct,
not on the character of the property
on which that conduct is performed,
see 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts
§821B (1979) (public nuisance); id.,
§822 (private nuisance), and the
remedies for such conduct usually
leave the property owner with other
reasonable uses of his property, see
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, &
D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on
Law of Torts § 90 (5th ed 1984) (public nuisances usually remedied by
criminal prosecution or abatement),
id., § 89 (private nuisances usually
remedied by damages, injunction or
abatement); see also, e.g., Mugler v
Kansas, 123 US 623, 668-669, 31 L
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887) (prohibition on use of property to manufacture intoxicating beverages "does
not disturb the owner in the control
or use of his property for lawful
purposes, nor restrict his right to
dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use . . . for
certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests"); Hadacheck v Sebastian, 239 US 394, 412,
60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143 (1915)
(prohibition on operation of brickyard did not prohibit extraction of
clay from which bricks were produced). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine property that can be used only to
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REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Earl D. TANNER and Mary Louise Tanner, his wife, David V. Trask, Grant S.
Kesler, and Larry Y. Lunt, Defendants,
Cross-Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant
and Cross-Defendant.
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Earl D. TANNER and Mary Louise Tanner, his wife; David V. Trask; Grant S.
Kesler; and Larry V. Lunt, Defendants
and Appellants.
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
TRASK & BRITT, a professional corporation; Grant S. Kesler; Larry V. Lunt;
and Capitol Life Insurance Co., a corporation, Defendants and Appellants.
Nos. 17692, 19348 and 19684.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 19, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 17, 1987.
City redevelopment agency brought actions to acquire properties within blighted
area. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, David B. Dee and Peter F. Leary,
JJ., found that agency did not misrepresent
or mislead condemnees into waiving claims
and abandoning litigation challenging agency's jurisdiction to condemn their properties, and awarded compensation. Cases
were consolidated on appeal. The Supreme
Court, Hall, CJ., held that: (1) agency was
not required to present proof of conditions
precedent to condemnation, where con-

demnee signed stipulations waiving
claims and defenses to authority of agen
to condemn their properties and withdr*
condemnation funds which had been depc
ited in court; (2) juror's cursory inspects
of subject premises did not mandate reve
sal of jury verdict, where numerous phot
graphs of building were received into e\
dence at trial; and (3) refusal to alio
condemnees to call agency's consultant t
testify as expert witness regarding valu
of property was not prejudicial error, an
where consultant's testimony would no
have substantially affected outcome.
Affirmed.
1. Stipulations <s=»14(4)
City redevelopment agency was not required to present proof of conditions precedent to condemnation in condemnation compensation trial where condemnees signed
stipulations waiving all claims and defenses
to authority of agency to condemn their
property, and withdrew condemnation
funds agency had deposited with court.
U.C.A.1953, 11-19-23.9. 78-34-9.
2. Estoppel <3=>92(4)
Once property owner chooses to withdraw money deposited by state in obtaining
condemnation order, owner waives all objections and defenses to action and to taking of his property, except any claim to
greater compensation. U.C.A.1953, 78-349.
3. Appeal and Error <3=>931(1)
Where there is dispute and disagreement in evidence, reviewing court will assume that trial judge believed those
aspects and fairly drew inferences to be
derived therefrom which gave his decision
support.
4. Trial «=>344
Affidavits filed by third persons are
not competent to impeach jury verdict.
5. Eminent Domain «=»262(5)
Juror's cursory view of premises which
formed basis of eminent domain proceedings did not warrant reversal of jury verdict, where numerous photographs of both
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inside and outside of building were received
into evidence at trial, condemnees were still
using building as of time compensation proceeding was brought, and jury's verdict
was fully supported by evidence.
6. Eminent Domain <3= 262(5)
Refusal to allow condemnees to call
consultant for city redevelopment agency
to testify as expert witness regarding value of condemned property was harmless
error, if any, where consultant did not have
independent opinion as to value of property, at least two other appraisors who actually appraised property testified as to its
value, and other appraisors were available.
7. Appeal and Error $=*1056.1(1)
Exclusion of evidence is harmless unless excluded evidence would probably
have had substantial influence in bringing
about different verdict or finding.
Harold A. Hintze, Provo, and William D.
Oswald, Salt Lake City, for Redevelopment
Agency.
Robert S. Campbell and E. Barney Gesas, Salt Lake City, for defendants Tanner,
Trask, Kesler, and Lunt.
Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Trask
& Britt.
HALL, Chief Justice:
These cases, consolidated for purposes of
appeal, emanate from action of the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City (the
RDA) to acquire appellants' properties.
The Tanner group in case No. 19348 and
the Trask group in case No. 19684 appeal
separate trial court determinations that the
RDA did not misrepresent or mislead appellants into waiving claims and abandoning
litigation challenging the RDA's jurisdiction to condemn their properties. Case No.
17692 involves a condemnation compensation trial and raises claims of jury misconduct and trial court error in denying appel1. Utah Neighborhood Development Act, 1st
Spec. Sess., ch. 5, 1969 Utah Laws 1134 (codified
as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-19-1 to
-35 (1986)). While amendments were made to
this act in 1983, they do not affect the resolution
of these appeals.

lants' request to call the RDA's consultant
to testify as an "expert witness." For
reasons enumerated below, we affirm the
trial court's determination in each of the
three appeals.
I
In 1969, the Utah legislature enacted the
"Utah Neighborhood Development Act" l
Under the provisions of this act, municipal
redevelopment agencies are created and
empowered in part to undertake "redevelopment projects" within areas determined
to be "blighted."2 Acquisition and redevelopment of "blighted" property contributes to the health of the community and
may be accomplished by various means,
including eminent domain.3
Pursuant to this act, Salt Lake City's
Board of Commissioners (the Commission)
was designated to act as the City's RDA.
In June 1977, the Commission enacted an
ordinance specifying 18V2 blocks of downtown Salt Lake City, Utah, as a "blighted"
area. Appellants' real properties are situated on Block 53 (between Third and
Fourth South and State Street and Second
East) and are included within the project
area. In early 1979, the RDA began the
statutory process necessary for the acquisition of Block 53. A "redevelopment plan"
for Block 53 was finally published and put
into effect by the Commission in June 1979.
In July 1979, the Tanner group and the
Trask group filed separate actions in Third
District Court challenging the authority of
the RDA to condemn their properties.
Shortly thereafter, the RDA commissioned a private architectural firm to develop a "master plan" report for Block 53.
Apparently, the purpose of this report was
to provide recommendations and guidelines
to private developers choosing to bid on the
acquisition and redevelopment of the block.
In October 1979, the RDA met with appellants at the architect's office to review
2. Id
3. Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9(2) (1986).
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drawings and a scale model of the "master
plan." Representations made by the RDA
at and subsequent to that meeting are at
issue herein.
In November 1979, the RDA offered the
Trask group $277,400 and the Tanner
group $394,000 for their respective properties. Both groups declined, and further
negotiation continued for approximately
two months. In January 1980, the RDA
commenced condemnation
proceedings
against appellants' properties. Thereafter,
the parties entered into stipulations wherein the RDA agreed to deposit with the
court 100 percent of a higher estimate of
the market value of the properties for appellants' immediate withdrawal and use.
In exchange, appellants stipulated to the
RDA's immediate possession of the properties and agreed to dismiss their lawsuits
and waive all claims and challenges (except
the issue of just compensation) to the
RDA's authority to condemn. Pursuant to
these stipulations, both trial courts entered
orders of immediate occupancy for the
RDA, and appellants withdrew the monies
the RDA deposited with the courts. The
parties thereafter proceeded to trial on the
issue of "just compensation."
In August 1980, a jury awarded the Tanner group $357,000 as just compensation
for their property. This sum was less than
the $417,640 appellants originally received
and resulted in a $60,640 refund to the
RDA. Subsequently, the Trask group stipulated that the $294,044 offered by the
RDA was in fact just compensation for
their property.
Thereafter, the Tanner group filed appeal No. 17692, claiming jury misconduct
and error by the court in refusing appellants' request to call the RDA's consultant
to testify as an expert witness. While that
appeal was pending, both the Trask group
and the Tanner group alleged that the
RDA misrepresented and abandoned its
original plans for the use of their properties. Accordingly, appellants filed several
motions below, including motions to vacate
4. 649 P.2d 5 (Utah 1982).

the orders of immediate occupancy and to
dismiss the condemnation proceedings.
Therein, appellants sought to withdraw
their stipulations to the RDA's occupancy
and right to condemn their properties.
Upon motions to this Court, we stayed the
parties' pending appeals and remanded the
cases to the trial courts for evidentiary
proceedings on the issues of misrepresentation and mistake. We also issued an order
of mandamus in Tanner v. District Judges
of Third Judicial District Court* Thereafter, both trial courts conducted evidentiary hearings and subsequently denied appellants' requests for relief, thereby sustaining the condemnation awards and the binding effect of the stipulations. Appeals in
cases No. 19348 and No. 19684 followed.5

II
Cases No. 19348 and No. 19684
Both the Tanner group and the Trask
group argue on appeal that since the RDA
failed to follow statutory prerequisites to
condemning their properties, the trial
courts had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the lawsuits and dismissal of the
condemnation actions was required. However, as discussed below, the dispositive
issue presented by these appeals is whether appellants were induced by mistake or
misrepresentation into signing stipulations
waiving all claims and defenses to the
RDA's authority. The conclusions of the
trial courts in favor of the RDA are not
clearly erroneous and preclude this Court
from substituting its judgment for that of
the trial courts.
[1] Each "Order of Immediate Occupancy" based upon the parties' stipulations
provided in pertinent part:
[T]he Court having carefully examined
the pleadings and the written Stipulation
pertaining thereto referred to above,
and, having determined that plaintiff has
5. Due to their similarity, we deal with the issues
raised in cases No. 19348 and No. 19684 simultaneously.
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the right of eminent domain W and that
the purpose for which the property of
defendants sought by plaintiff herein to
be condemned is for a public purpose ^
and that the property is located within a
redevelopment project area which is
blighted, and that the project area is
detrimental or inimical to the public
health, safety or welfare, and that the
immediate occupancy thereof is necessary and proper; and, the parties having
expressly reserved for future adjudication only the issue of the amount of just
compensation to be paid Defendants^ in
accordance with the provisions of Section 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended:

and $417,640 for the Tanner group] being
100% of the amount of just compensation
based upon two independent appraisals
which Plaintiff has caused to be made of
the premises, adjusted to the date of
taking.

5. Defendants may withdraw the [total sums indicated above] deposited with
the Clerk of the Court for the use and
benefit of Defendants without prejudice
to any claim they may wish to assert for
additional just compensation in the trial
of the matter
(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to these orders, the RDA deposited with the courts
100 percent of the agreed sums. AppelNOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBYlants subsequently withdrew these monies
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9
1. Subject to and in accordance with (1977), which provides in pertinent part:
the "Stipulation for Order of Immediate
Upon the application of the parties in
Occupancy/* a copy of which is attached
interest, the court shall order that the
hereto and by reference made a part
money deposited in the court be paid
hereof, Plaintiff be and is hereby authoforthwith for or on account of the just
rized to occupy the property belonging to
compensation to be awarded in the proDefendants above-named described in the
ceeding. A payment to a defendant as
Complaint on file herein . . . [descriptions
aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonof particular property] which said properment by such defendant of all defenses
ties are sought for uses by the public in
excepting his claim for greater compenconnection with and as part of the C.B.D.
sation.M
Neighborhood Development Project au- (Emphasis added.) ^ h e explicit effect of
thorized and approved by the Salt Lake the parties' stipulations (££&}withdrawal of
funds ^pursuant to section 78-34-9 was to
City Commission on June 21, 1979.
2. Plaintiff is hereby permitted to relieve the RDA of presenting proof that
take immediate possession of said prop- the conditions precedent to condemnation
erties and continue in possession of the under section 11-19-23.9 had been met
same pending further hearing and trial Indeed, the plain language of both stipulaon the issue of just compensation which tions reflects the acknowledgment of all
is the only issue which may be raised in parties that the RDA was entitled to immediate occupancy. Because the stipulations
this action
3. Plaintiff has tendered into court do not recite the existence of controversy
and deposits with the Clerk of the Court as to either the RDA's authority to take
herewith for the benefit of Defendants the properties or the RDA's compliance
the sum of [$294,044 for the Trask group with statutory prerequisites to condemning
6. Under the provisions of the Utah Neighbor- 7. Redeveloping areas to terminate urban blight
is a public purpose. See Tribe v. Salt Lake City
hood Development Act, the RDA may condemn
Corp., 540 P.2d 499, 503-04 (Utah 1975); see
property through the procedures of eminent doalso Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34, 75
main. Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9(1986); see
also Redevelopment Agency v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d S.Ct. 98, 102-103, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954).
47, 48 (Utah 1974); Redevelopment Agency v. 8. This Court has heretofore indicated the appliMitsui Inv., Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1371 n. 2 (Utah cability of section 78-34-9 to redevelopment
1974).
law. See, e.g., Mitsui Inv., Inc., 522 P.2d at 1372
& n. 3.
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the same, appellants did not preserve any
such issues for future determination. Consequently, in the appropriate exercise of
discretion, the trial courts accepted the
stipulations and entered the appropriate orders of occupancy. For all intents and
purposes, the taking was then complete.
The fact that the stipulations only preserved the issue of just compensation for
trial is not surprising. Whenever issues
pertaining to authority or jurisdiction „ to
condemn exist at the time an order of immediate occupancy is sought, the best interests of all concerned, including the
court, dictate that those issues be resolved
prior to issuance of the order. Otherwise,
the condemnor runs the risk of defeat and
the resultant loss of funds expended in
preparing the property for its new use.
Similarly, the condemnee runs the risk of
irreparable harm to the property if the
condemnor is permitted to occupy and alter
the property to accommodate the new use.
The specific facts of the instant case illustrate this conclusion. The RDA's planned
use for the properties apparently included
development and construction of new buildings and plazas. In view of the magnitude
of this project and the resultant significant
change in the nature of the existing properties, it is incomprehensible that the parties
would stipulate and agree to orders of immediate occupancy if legitimate issues of
authority and compliance with statutory
procedures remained to be resolved.9
[2] In Utah State Road Commission v.
Friberg,10 the parties entered into a stipulation that was incorporated into an order
establishing the state's right to condemn
and reserving for later determination the
amount of compensation to be awarded and
the date for assessing valuation.11 Therein, this Court noted, "A defendant may be
9. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d
821, 840 (Utah 1984) (Hall, CJ., dissenting).
10. 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984) (plurality opinion).
11. Id. at 827.
12. Id. at 833 n. 10 (citing Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-34-9)."
13. See 6 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 24.11[l][c], at 24-177 (3d ed. 1986)

barred from litigating the merits of t
State's authority after an order of immec
ate occupancy has been granted if 1
waives his right to litigate those issues <
he withdraws the money deposited by tl
State in obtaining the order." 12 This la
guage correctly states the established ar
applicable rule that once a property own*
chooses to withdraw the money deposite
by the State in obtaining the order, h
waives all objections and defenses to th
action and to the taking of his property
except any claim to greater compensation.1
Appellants would have us ignore thi
rule by recognizing that the "term 'defens
es' [in section 78-34-9] cannot include th<
failure of the lower courtfs] to acquire sub
ject matter jurisdiction but rather is limitet
to personal defenses of the landowner." Ii
other words, appellants contend that ever
though they waived all claims and defenses
regarding the RDA's compliance with statutory procedures and authority to condemn, they can now raise those same
claims and defenses to show the trial
courts' lack of jurisdiction in these cases.
We disagree. Appellants apparently misunderstand both the language of and principles behind section 78-34-9 and the nature and result of their stipulations. The
stipulations are proof of the state's power
to expel appellants from their properties.
By entering into the stipulations and withdrawing the monies, appellants acknowledged that the jurisdictional conditions
precedent to the RDA's exercising the power to condemn were properly satisfied.
Therefore, the lower courts' jurisdiction in
that regard was not at issue.
To adopt appellants' arguments would be
to sanction abuse in settlement proceedings
by allowing parties (once they determine
that additional money is available) to invali(based upon the Uniform Eminent Domain
Code); 6 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 26.31 (3d ed. 1986); 6A J. Sackman,
Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 28.321(2) (3d ed.
1985); 1A J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 4.6, at 4-37 (3d ed. 1985) (waiver and
estoppel); see also City of Durham v. Bates, 273
N.C. 336, 160 S.E.2d 60 (1968); State v. Jackson,
388 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1965).
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date stipulations by simply claiming that
issues they stipulated to can forever be
raised.14 Indeed, departing from the rule
in section 78-34-9 invites controversy in
every condemnation case and affords a
means for parties to manipulate the measure of the compensation, which the statutory provision attempts to prevent.
Therefore, upon accepting the benefits
under section 78-34-9, appellants in the
instant cases, absent_ misrepresentation.
are precluded fromattacking the Utah
Neighborhood Development Act, the jurisdiction of the courts to enter the order
granting the RDA possession of the properties, and the failure of the RDA to strictly comply with statutory prerequisites to
condemnation. Accordingly, we now turn
to the issue of misrepresentation and the
factual circumstances underlying the stipulations.
Ill
Appellants claim that the trial courts
erred by denying their motions in these
cases. Without marshalling all of the evidence in support of the trial courts' determinations,15 appellants summarily contend
that they were improperly induced to withdraw their challenges to the condemnation
proceedings by the RDA's own representations that their properties would be used
for a municipal office building and plaza
complex. These representations in turn allegedly persuaded appellants that the properties were being condemned for a public
use. Therefore, they contend that they
were led to believe that since the City could
condemn their properties if the RDA failed
in its attempt, they had no valid defense to
the RDA's condemnation action or possibility of success in their related lawsuits.
Consequently, they stipulated to the RDA's
authority to condemn. Appellants now
claim that the RDA's representations were
either false when made or have become
false because the RDA has abandoned the
14. In their briefs, appellants express a willingness to return the monies they withdrew if they
could be allowed to challenge the jurisdiction
and authority of the RDA to condemn their
properties. Such willingness is irrelevant here.

existence of an uncontroverted public use.
Accordingly, appellants argue that the stipulations should be dismissed and they
should be allowed to challenge the authority of and procedures followed by the RDA.
Also, appellants claim that the trial
courts erred by ignoring this Court's mandate in Tanner and by not finding clear
and convincing evidence of unilateral mistake or material misrepresentation requiring rescission of the stipulations. In short,
appellants would have us believe that the
lower courts arbitrarily disregarded and
failed to fairly examine evidence on remand
that plainly showed material misrepresentation and justifiable mistake that culminated in the stipulations to waive jurisdictional defenses. We are not persuaded.
First, the orders and opinion of this
Court on remand did not mandate a particular result. Rather, we instructed the trial
courts to take additional evidence and give
due consideration to that evidence before
reaching a conclusion.16 At the evidentiary
hearings, both trial courts heard extensive
evidence regarding appellants' contentions.
Appellants were given ample opportunity
to present their evidence and arguments
regarding mistake and misrepresentation.
That the trial courts below declined to
adopt appellants' contentions does not
prove that they failed to give due consideration to appellants' evidence. Upon our
review of the records, we conclude that the
trial courts did not fail to comply with our
orders and previous decision.
[3] Second, appellants' claims are predicated on our acceptance of their version of
the events which occurred and how the
trial courts should have perceived the circumstances as they existed. However, the
facts appellants advance in support of their
arguments are carefully chosen to the exclusion of other evidence in the records
supporting the lower courts' decisions.
Due to the trial court's advantaged posi15. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah
1987) (citing Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)).
16. See Tanner, 649 P.2d at 5-6.
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tion, the presumptions favor its judgment.17 Where there is dispute and disagreement in the evidence, we assume that
the trial judge believed those aspects and
fairly drew the inferences to be derived
therefrom which gave his decision support.18 To this end, neither trial judge
found credible the evidence appellants marshalled. Instead, the courts viewed the
evidence as supporting the determination
that there were no material misrepresentations or mistakes underlying the stipulations. These conclusions are not clearly
erroneous. Accordingly, the decisions of
the trial courts are affirmed.
We have also examined appellants' other
objections to the trial courts' determinations and find them to be without merit.
IV
Case No. 17692
In this case, the Tanner group attacks
the Third District Court's denial of their
motion for a new trial based upon alleged
jury misconduct and failure to allow the
RDA's consultant to testify as an expert
witness. In April 1981, appellants presented affidavits alleging that several jurors
had viewed the subject property during the
trial on just compensation. Appellants
claim that these unauthorized views were
prejudicial grounds for a new trial. In
denying appellants' motion for a new trial
on the grounds of juror misconduct, the
court observed:
[Wjhatever cursory visit was made to the
condemned property was at most harmless error, and did not prejudice this jury
which took considerable amount of time
in reviewing all of the photographs and
17. McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah
1978).
18. See Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 739
(Utah 1982).
19. Apparently, most jurors refused to sign affidavits admitting any unauthorized view.
20. 75 Wash. 430, 134 P. 1097 (1913).
21. Id. at 437, 134 P. at 1099-1100. See also
State v. Marvin, 124 Ariz. 555, 559, 606 P.2d 406,

testimony of experts before arriving at
its verdict.
Upon review of the record, the trial judge's
determination is not clearly erroneous.
[4] First, a majority of the affidavits
offered by appellants should not have been
considered. Specifically, appellants provided several affidavits of affiants who
"polled" the individual jurors. These affidavits purported to restate what jurors told
the affiants after being contacted sometime subsequent to the trial.19 As early as
1913, courts held that affidavits filed by
third persons were not competent to impeach jury verdicts. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Seattle Electric Co.,20 that court
held that "affidavits of third persons as to
unsworn statements of jurors tending to
show either the fact of misconduct or its
effects upon the verdict cannot be received
for any purpose because they are of a
purely hearsay character." 21 Because appellants' affidavits are primarily of this
character, the trial judge could properly
refuse to consider them.
Second, appellants offered the affidavit
of Don K. Green ("Juror Green") and contended that his view was manifestly prejudicial because of the changed conditions of
the condemned property and the surrounding premises. In the past, this Court has
ruled that in eminent domain proceedings,
the jury is precluded from basing its verdict on self-obtained evidence not presented
at trial.22 However, many courts have held
that an unauthorized visit by a juror will be
regarded as harmless where the visit did
not disclose any evidence not already admitted at trial.23 Jury misconduct, there410 (1980) (en banc); Rowley v. Group Health
Coop., 16 Wash.App. 373, 379, 556 P.2d 250, 254
(1976).
22. State ex rel Road Comm'n v. White, 22 Utah
2d 102, 103, 449 P.2d 114 (1969).
23. See, e.g., Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 154
Mont. 414, 432-33, 465 P.2d 314, 324 (1970);
Winters v. Hassenbusch, 89 S.W.2d 546, 552-53
(Mo.CtApp.1936); Reed v. L Hammel Dry
Goods Co., 21S Ala. 494, 497, 111 So. 237, 239-40
(1927).
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fore, must be judged on the individual facts
and circumstances of the case.24
In the instant case, review of Juror
Green's affidavit indicates that he experienced no more than a cursory view of the
subject premises. Indeed, "[he merely]
went inside the building along the hall of
the first floor and then went out of the
building. He then looked down the alley
and looked at the side of the building/' In
contrast, numerous photographs of both
the inside and outside of the building were
received into evidence at trial, after the
court determined that they adequately depicted the property on the day of its taking.
Appellants, however, cite this Court's decision in State ex rel Road Commission v.
White25 as determinative of this issue. In
White, individuals had "razed the frame
house and extensively had demolished the
interiors of the other buildings/'26 Therefore, because of one juror's unauthorized
view of the property, "the jury well may
have been influenced adversely with respect to an objective valuation of the property as of the time of taking." v White is
distinguishable because that property had
been vandalized and burned after the owner had vacated and before the compensation hearing. In contrast, appellants herein were still using the building in question
as of the time of this just compensation
proceeding.28 Apparently, then, it had not
significantly deteriorated and was not suffering from nonuse. Moreover, appellant
Kesler himself testified at trial that the
pictures admitted into evidence accurately
reflected the property at the time of its
taking, as well as at the time of trial. So,
contrary to the assertion of appellants, the
condition of the property had not changed
significantly from the date of its taking
until the date of trial.
[5] Accordingly, the jury's verdict in
this caae was fully supported by the evidence, and the observations made by the
offending juror did not add to the evidence
24. See White, 22 Utah 2d at 103, 449 P.2d at 115.
25. 22 Utah 2d 102, 449 P.2d 114.
26. 22 Utah 2d at 103, 449 P.2d at 114.
27. Id.

properly received and considered by the
jury. Therefore, any error was harmless,
and this reason for a new trial must fail.
Finally, appellants contend that the trial
court erred in not allowing them to call the
RDA's consultant to testify as an expert
witness regarding the value of the property. By means of a motion in limine, the
RDA excluded consultant Raymond Fletcher from giving subpoenaed testimony on
the basis of the attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine. Apparently, Fletcher had not actually appraised appellants' property and did not have an independent opinion as to its value. Rather, he
had been retained as a confidential adviser
to review the independent appraisals and
consult with the RDA in preparation for
the condemnation suit.
[6,7] Appellants argue that because
Fletcher's opinion as to the value of the
property was higher than that of the appraiser who actually testified for the RDA,
the value of the property was "low-balled"
and appellants had no way to effectively
contradict that evidence. In short, appellants claim that Fletcher's testimony could
have been used to show that the value of
appellants' land was greater than the
amount the RDA was offering. The court
granted the RDA's motion in limine to exclude Fletcher's testimony, apparently on
the grounds that he had not actually appraised the property and was not an expert
witness in that sense, but rather had
worked as a consultant and confidential
advisor to the RDA and its attorney. We
pass over the potential attorney-client and
work product problems that the RDA contends might have arisen had Fletcher testified, because we are satisfied that even if
exclusion of the evidence was erroneous,
the judgment still could not be reversed.
The exclusion of evidence is harmless unless the excluded evidence would probably
have had a substantial influence in bring28. Respondent notes in its brief that after the
order of immediate occupancy was entered, the
subject property was leased back to defendants.
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ing about a different verdict or finding.29
Upon viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict,80 there
is no reasonable likelihood that a different
result would have followed from permitting
the jury to consider the testimony of
Fletcher as to the appraised value of the
property; at least two other appraisers
who actually appraised the property testified as to its value.31 Nor have appellants
shown that other appraisers were unavailable. Indeed, the record indicates that at
least one other individual who actually appraised the property was not called by appellants to testify.
Appellants have not shown, and we do
not believe, that Fletcher's testimony
would have substantially affected the outcome. Therefore, exclusion of his testimony was not prejudicial error.
V
Conclusion
In sum, the determinations of the trial
courts are not clearly erroneous, and there
is no basis for reversing the judgments.
Accordingly, the orders are in all respects
affirmed.
STEWART, Associate CJ., HOWE
and DURHAM, JJ., and GEORGE E.
BALLIF, District Judge, concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., having disqualified
himself, does not participate herein;
Ballif, District Judge, sat

Chad A. SPOR, Ray Spor, Paul C. Spor,
Spor Brothers Motor Company, a Utah
corporation, Spors, Inc., a Utah corporation, and Gold-Spor Mining Company, a Wyoming corporation, Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
v.
CRESTED BUTTE SILVER MINING,
INC., a Colorado corporation, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, and Appellant,
v.
CANDELARIA METALS, INC., a Nevada
corporation, Third-Party Defendant.
No. 19403.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 25, 1987.
In action which sought declaration of
rescission or termination of preincorporation contract, the Fourth District Court,
Millard County, David Sam, J., granted
summary judgment in favor of first contracting party and second party appealed.
The Supreme Court, Stewart, Associate
CJ., held that genuine issues of material
fact regarding whether prepayment of loan
between parties was intended to satisfy all
obligations of both parties under agreement, thus constituting either rescission or
accord and satisfaction of entire agreement, precluded grant of summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Contracts «=»252, 253
Mutual rescission is like contract to
undo prior contract and must include at
least offer and acceptance and evidence
mutual meeting of minds to rescind; this
may take form of simple offer and acceptance or demand followed by agreement or

29. Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah
1983); Gillmor, 657 P.2d at 743.
30. Hill, 658 P.2d at 1209.

31. The fact that appellants' own appraiser testified that the property was worth $850,000 refutes appellants' argument that without Fletcher's testimony, they had no way to contradict
the estimate of the RDA's appraiser.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
David Franklin YOUNG, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890424.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 17, 1993.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy
R. Hanson, J., of first-degree murder and
theft and was sentenced to death, and he
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J-,
held that: (1) death statute is constitutional; (2) court acted within discretion in ordering defendant to be shackled during
portions of penalty phase; (3) prosecutor
was entitled to introduce additional aggravating circumstances at penalty phase that
were not charged or proven in the guilt
phase; (4) defendant's pro se answer to
civil complaint filed by victim's sister was
properly admitted; (5) court properly allowed prosecutor to present rebuttal argument at penalty phase; (6) court properly
rejected proffered instruction that jury
could consider sympathy at penalty phase;
(7) court should have upheld defendant's
challenge for cause to juror who stated
that death penalty was always appropriate;
(8) jury should have been permitted to consider possible verdict of guilty and mentally ill; and (9) defendant was entitled to
present allocution by way of statement to
jurors prior to deliberation at penalty
phase.
Reversed and remanded.
Zimmerman, Durham and Stewart, JJ-,
concurred in part and dissented in part and
filed opinions.
Hall, C.J. and Howe, Acting, C.J., dissented in part.
1. Homicide <e=>357(9)
Aggravating circumstance of death
penalty statute that the homicide was committed for personal or pecuniary gain gave
adequate notice to defendant that it applied

to the killing of the victim and taking of
her purse, money, credit cards, and truck.
(Per Chief Justice Hall, with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring in
the result.) U.C.A.1953, 76-5-202(l)(f).
2. Homicide <$=>343
In view of fact that jury found firstdegree murder with aggravating circumstances that the murder occurred during
attempt to commit rape and for pecuniary
gain, any error in applying to defendant
aggravating circumstance that defendant
had previous felony conviction was harmless with respect to determination that defendant was eligible for death penalty.
(Per Chief Justice Hall, with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring in
the result.) U.C.A.1953, 76-5-202(l)(d, f, h).
3. Constitutional Law <s=>55
Doctrine of separation of powers prohibits state of Utah from requiring federal
courts to review Utah conviction. (Per
Chief Justice Hall, with one Justice concurring and one Justice concurring in the result.)
4. Criminal Law <s=>1206.1(2)
Death penalty under Utah statutory
scheme is constitutional. (Per Chief Justice Hall, with one Justice concurring and
one Justice concurring in the result.)
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-202.
5. Jury e»33(l.l, 2.10)
Defendant has right to impartial jury
drawn from fair cross section of community.
*. Jury *=>33a.U
To establish prima facie violation of
right to jury that represents fair cross section of community, defendant must show
that excluded group represented distinctive
group in community, that group was not
fairly and reasonably represented in jury
venires, and that underrepresentation is
due to systematic exclusion of group during jury selection process.
7. Jury <3=>33(1.10)
Geographical distribution and socioeconomic status are not distinctive classifications or groups for Sixth Amendment fair
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XIX. MERGING OF THEFT
(h) (prior felony), and (f) (pecuniary or othCONVICTION
er personal gain). Evidence at trial was
[68] Defendant claims that his convic- sufficient to prove aggravating factors (d)
tion for theft should merge with his mur- and (h) and also sufficient to prove that in
der conviction because theft is a lesser addition to the victim's motor vehicle, deincluded offense of first degree murder fendant took her credit cards, her purse,
226
This additional evidence
under the aggravating circumstance that and her money.
the murder was committed for personal or independently supports a finding of murder
pecuniary gain. A defendant cannot be for gain under subsection (f). The crime of
convicted of both first degree murder and a murder in the first degree under subsection
lesser included offense of that crime.221 (f) could have been proved absent the theft
We have determined that one crime is a conviction. The trial court correctly deterlesser included offense of another "where mined that the theft conviction should not
the two crimes are 'such that the greater merge with the first degree murder conviccannot be committed without necessarily tion.
having committed the lesser.'" 222 This
court examined the relationship between
XX. CUMULATIVE ERROR
lesser included offenses and the aggravating circumstances under the first degree
Defendant claims that the cumulative efmurder statute in the case of State v. Shaf- • fect of errors during the guilt and penalty
fer.m Although we held in Shaffer that phases of his trial require a new penalty
the defendant's conviction of robbery hearing. The doctrine of cumulative error
merged with his conviction of murder un- allows for a new trial when standing alone,
der aggravating circumstance (h) in Utah no error is severe enough to warrant a new
Code Ann. § 76-5-202, we stated that a trial, but when considered together, the
defendant could be convicted of a crime errors denied the defendant a fair trial.227
that might also serve as the basis for an This court ascribes to the doctrine of cumuaggravating circumstance if the prosecu- lative error, but we do not believe that the
tion did not rely on that crime for proof of doctrine warrants a new trial or penalty
the aggravating circumstance.224
hearing in this case. Although defendant
[69] In determining whether the State has claimed many errors on appeal, we
relied on proof of the theft for its proof of have determined that the majority of his
the aggravating circumstance, it becomes claims do not constitute error; the remainnecessary to examine what was actually der are merely harmless error. We have
proved at trial.225 The jury convicted de- examined the effect of the harmless errors
fendant of theft of a motor vehicle. The and determine that the cumulation of these
jury also convicted him under the aggrava- errors did not result in a fundamentally
ting circumstances in subsections (d) (rape), unfair trial.228 Therefore, the doctrine of
22!. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3).
222. State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)
(quoting State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah
1983)).
223. 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986).

in leaving the state. This evidence could be
used to support a finding of "other personal
gain" under subsection (f). While we have not
defined "other personal gain," it seems clear
that the purposes of escape and prevention of
identification would fit within the plain meaning of those terms.

225. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97.

227. State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987);
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah
1986).

226. The evidence, including defendant's own
statements in his confession and in the pro se
answer introduced in the penalty phase, also
indicated that he killed the victim in order to
prevent her from identifying him and to aid him

228. See generally State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
499-500 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (discussing harmlessness of several errors
in light of confession and other evidence of guilt
and gruesomeness of crime).

224. Id. at 1314 n. 3.
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cumulative error does not afford defendant
relief.22*
We have duly reviewed defendant's other
claims of error raised in the context of the
points above and find them to be without
merit. 230
Associate Chief Justice Howe concurs in
this opinion, and we would affirm the conviction and sentence. However, a majority
of the court, in the opinions that follow,
reverse and remand for a new trial.
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs.
DURHAM, Justice:
I dissent from parts II, IV, X, XII, XV,
and XVII.A of the lead opinion. I dissent
in part from part VI of the lead opinion. I
concur in the result reached in part VIII of
the lead opinion but dissent from its rationale. The first three parts of this opinion
address issues arising from the penalty
phase of Young's trial. The next two parts
address issues arising from the guilt phase
of the trial. The ensuing two parts discuss
jury selection issues. The final part analyzes the constitutionality of Utah's statutory scheme for narrowing the class of
defendants eligible for the death penalty.
I. SHACKLING OF DEFENDANT
DURING PENALTY PHASE
(lead opinion part XII)
Young argues that the trial court violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when it required him
to remain in shackles in the presence of the
jury during the penalty phase. I concur
with the lead opinion that "it is within the
sound discretion of the trial court to determine the safety measures necessary to insure the security of the courtroom and its
occupants. These safety measures may in229. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 288
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110
S.Ct. 1837, 108 L.Ed.2d 965 (1990); Bishop, 753
P.2d at 489; Rammel, 721 P.2d at 498, 501-02.
230. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah
1989).
I.

Even Duckett v. State, 104 Nev. 6, 752 P.2d
752, 755 (1988), upon which the lead opinion
relies, admits that physical restraints at sentenc-

clude shackling a defendant in appropriate circumstances"
(Emphasis added.)
The problem in this case is the manifest
lack of the requisite necessity. Young's
unwarranted shackling amounted to an impermissible comment on the evidence and
violated his due process rights by creating
unacceptable prejudice.
Because of the inherently prejudicial impact of appearing shackled before the jury,
courtroom shackling is permitted only "as
a last resort." See Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25
L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). In all the cases I have
examined, reviewing courts have required a
showing of necessity before tolerating a
trial court's decision to shackle. See, e.g.,
Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 728 (9th
Cir.1989), cert, denied, 495 U.S. 910, 110
S.Ct. 1937, 109 L.Ed.2d 300 (1990); Elledge
v. Bugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1452 (11th Cir.
1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 1014, 108 S.Ct.
1487, 99 L.Ed.2d 715 (1988); Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1983);
People v. Duran, 16 Cal.3d 282, 290, 127
Cal.Rptr. 618, 623, 545 P.2d 1322, 1327
(1976); Bello v. State, 547 So.2d 914, 918
(Fla.1989).1 Thus, I agree with the Ninth
Circuit that "a trial judge may . . . impose
restraints only when 'confronted with disruptive, contumacious, [and] stubbornly defiant defendants.' . . . Shackling . . . must
be limited to cases urgently demanding
that action." Tyars, 709 F.2d at 1284
(quoting Allen, 397 U.S. at 343, 90 S.Ct. at
1060-61).
Furthermore, before a court may shackle
a disruptive defendant, it must first "pursue less restrictive alternatives." Spain,
883 F.2d at 721; see also Tyars, 709 F.2d
at 1284. Lesser restraints could include
increasing courtroom security personnel,
ing may not be imposed absent necessity. Furthermore, although Duckett upheld a sentencing-stage shackling order, it did not, as the lead
opinion suggests, hold that the constitutional
right to be free of shackles did not exist at
sentencing; it held only that the constitutional
right to be free of prison garb, established in
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691,
48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). did not exist at sentencing.

27-12-160

HIGHWAYS

27-12-160.' 1-15 designated as Veterans' Memorial Highway.
(1) There is established the Veterans' Memorial
Highway composed of the existing Interstate Highway 15 from the Utah-Idaho border to the Utah-Arizona border.
(2) The department shall designate Interstate 15
as the "Veterans' Memorial Highway" on all future
state highway maps.
1991
27-12-161. Legacy Loop Highway.
(1) There is established Legacy Loop Highway
comprising the existing highway from Route 15 south
of St George, northerly on Route 18 to Route 56 at
Beryl Junction, then easterly on Route 56 to Interstate Highway 15 in Cedar City.
(2) The Department of Transportation shall designate the portions of the highways identified in Subsection (1) as the Legacy Loop Highway on all future
state highway maps.
1991
CHAPTER 13

COLLECTOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION ACT
(Repealed by Laws 1975, ch. 76, § 47; 1982,
ch. 30, § 5.)
27-13-1 to 27-13-10.

1186

cities pursuant to rules and regulations of the state
Department of Transportation developed in cooperation with the counties and participating cities It u
the further intention of the legislature that the fundj
permitted to be expended pursuant to this act be
deemed add.cional to funds normally used by countiee
and participating cities for sidewalk construction and
shall not be used in substitution for local sidewalk
construction funds.
1*75 (lit &JJ
27-14-3. Definitions.
As used in this act
(1) "Construction" means the function of constructing or reconstructing a sidewalk with or
without curb and gutter and shall include land
acquisition, engineering or inspection and may
be more fully defined by the rules and regulations of the Department of Transportation
(2) "Participating city" means any city having
at least third class status
(3) "Curb and gutter" means the area between
the roadway and sidewalk designed for water
runoff and safety of pedestrian and vehicular
traffic
(4) "Pedestrian safety devices" means any device or method designed to foster the safety of
pedestrian traffic.
1975 a* SJJ

Repealed.
27-14-4.

CHAPTER 14
SIDEWALK CONSTRUCTION
Section
27-14-1
27-14-2
27-14-3.
27-14-4.
27-14-5.
27-14-6.
27-14-7.
27-14-8.

Citation.
Purpose.
Definitions.
Designated county and city sidewalks —
Construction on easements granted by
transportation department.
Funding priorities by county and city officials — Factors.
Pedestrian safety to be considered in
highway planning.
Rules and regulations — Transportation
department — Cooperation with the
county legislative body.
County or city granting exemption from
construction — Not eligible to utilize
funds under act.

27-14-L Citation.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Utah Sidewalk Construction Act"
1975 (1st s s.>
27-14-2. Purpose.
The legislature recognizes that adequate sidewalks
and pedestrian safety devices are essential to the general welfare of the citizens of the state It is the opinion of the legislature that existing sidewalks within
the state, especially in the most populated areas, are
not adequate to service the walking public with a
result of creating unnecessary hazards to pedestrian
and vehicular traffic. It is the intent of this act to
provide a means whereby a portion of the funds received by the counties and participating cities as B
and C road funds may be used for the construction of
curbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this act
The legislature deems it to be in the best interest of
the state if pedestrian safety construction t» to be
performed on state highways that it be performed under the direction of the counties and participating

Designated county and city sidewalka
— Construction on easements granted
by transportation department
(1) All sidewalks, including curbs and gutters
within the unincorporated areas of a county and
within nonparticipating cities or towns situated
within the county, shall be designated county sidewalks. All sidewalks within participating cities shall
be designated city sidewalks
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law
counties and participating cities may construct and
maintain curbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian
safety devices adjacent to the traveled portion of state
highways upon easements that may be granted by
the state Department of Transportation. The state
Department of Transportation shall cooperate with
counties and participating cities to accomplish pedestrian safety construction and maintenance.
1975 (1st a&)

27-14-5. Funding priorities by county and city
officials — Factors.
(1) The county legislative body of the counties and
the governing officials of participating cities may establish funding priorities relating to construction of
curbs, gutters, sidewalks or other pedestrian safety
construction, with funds permitted to be expended by
this act, based on factors including, but not limited to.
(a) existing useable rights-of-way;
(b) auto-pedestrian accident experience;
(c) average daily automobile traffic;
(d) average daily pedestrian traffic;
(e) average daily school age pedestrian traffic;
and
(f) speed of automobile traffic.
(2) All construction performed pursuant to this act
shall be barrier free to wheelchairs at crosswalks and
intersections.
^^j
27-14-e.

Pedestrian safety to be considered in
highway planning.
Pedestrian safety consideration* shall be included
in all state highway engineering and planning where
pedestrian traffic would be a significant factor on all

27-12-96. Acquisition of rights-of-way and other
real property.
The department may acquire any real property or
interests in real property necessary for temporary,
present, or reasonable future state highway purposes
by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise. Highway purposes as used in this
chapter includes:
(1) rights-of-way, including those necessary
for state highways within cities and towns;
(2) the construction, reconstruction, relocation, improvement, and maintenance of the state
highways and other highways, roads, and streets
under the control of the department;
(3) limited access facilities, including rights of
access, air, light, and view and frontage and service roads to highways;
(4) adequate drainage in connection with any
highway, cut, fill, or channel change and the
maintenance of any highway, cut, fill, or channel
change;
(5) weighing stations, shops, offices, storage
buildings and yards, and road maintenance or
construction sites;
(6) road material sites, sites for the manufacture of road materials, and, access roads to the
sites;
(7) the maintenance of an unobstructed view
of any portion of a highway to promote the safety
of the traveling public;
(8) the placement of traffic signals, directional
signs, and other signs, fences, curbs, barriers,
and obstructions for the convenience of the traveling public;
(9) the construction and maintenance of storm
sewers, sidewalks, and highway illumination;
(10) the construction and maintenance of livestock highways; and
(11) the construction and maintenance of roadside rest areas adjacent to or near any highway.
1991

78-34-7

JUDICIAL CODE

(2) the names of all owners and claimants of
the property, if known, or a statement that they
are unknown, who must be styled defendants
(3) a statement of the right of the plaintiff
(4) if a right of way is sought, the complaint
must show its location, general route and termini, and must be accompanied by a map thereof,
so far as the same is involved in the action or
proceeding.
(5) a description of each piece of land sought to
be taken, and whether the same includes the
whole or only part of an entire parcel or tract All
parcels lying in the county and required for the
same public use may be included in the same or
separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the court may consolidate or separate
them to suit the convenience of parties
1953
78-34-7. Who may appear and defend.
All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming
an interest in, any of the property described in the
complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof,
though not named, may appear, plead and defend,
each in respect to his own property or interest, or that
claimed by him, in the same manner as if named in
the complaint.
1953
78-34-8. P o w e r s of court or judge.
The court or judge thereof shall have power
(1) to hear and determine all adverse or conflicting claims to the property sought to be condemned, and to the damages therefor, and
(2) to determine the respective rights of different parties seeking condemnation of the same
property.
/
1981
78-34-9.

Occupancy of premises pending action
— Deposit paid into court — Procedure for payment of compensation.
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof,
at any time after the commencement of suit, on notice
to the defendant, if he is a resident of the state, or has
appeared by attorney in the action, otherwise by serving a notice directed to him on the clerk of the court,
tor an order permitting the plaintiff to occupy the
premises sought to be condemned pending the action,
including appeal, and to do such work thereon as may
be required The court or a judge thereof shall take
proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the
premises sought to be condemned and of the damages
which will accrue from the condemnation, and of the
reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall
grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of
the case and the relative damages which may accrue
to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court or
judge shall enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a
condition precedent to occupancy to file with the clerk
of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75% of the
condemning authority's appraised valuation of the
property sought to be condemned. The amount thus
fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, and
shall not be admissible in evidence on final hearing
The rights of the just compensation for the land so
taken or damaged shall vest in the parties entitled
thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained
and awarded as provided in Section 78-34-10 and established by judgment therein, and the said judgment
shall include, a* part of the just compensation
awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the
amount finally awarded as the value of the property
and damages, from the date of taking actual possession thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy,
whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment, but in-

346

terest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall
have been paid into court Upon the application of the
parties in interest, the court shall order the money
deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on account of the just compensation to be awarded in the
proceeding A payment to a defendant as aforeaaid
shall be held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses excepting his claim for greater
compensation If the compensation finally awarded ii
respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall eiceed the amount of the money so received the court
shall ent-r judgment against the plaintiff for tot
amount of the deficiency If the amount of money at
received by the defendant is greater than the araoue*
finally awarded, the court shall enter judgment
against the defendant for the amount of the excee*
Upon the filing of the petition for immediate occupancy the court shall fix the time within which, ana*
the terms upon which, the parties in possebsion *oafl
be required to surrender possession to the plainutf
The court shall make such orders in respect to encua>
brances, hens, rents, assessments, insurance at*
other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable.
78-34-10.

Compensation and damages — He*
assessed.
The court, jury or referee must hear such leg*! evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to int
proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and m
sess.
(1) the value of the property sought to be ow>
demned and all improvements thereon *w*
taming to the realty, and of each and every iterate estate or interest therein, and if it conawuef
different parcels, the value of each parcel and ef
each estate or interest therein shall be sepafalefr
assessed
(2) if the property sought to be condemned o*>
stitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the <
ages which will accrue to the portion not *>
to be condemned by reason of its severance 1
the portion sought to be condemned and the o»>
struction of the improvement in the manner an*
posed by the plaintiff.
(3) if the property, though no part thereof •
taken, will be damaged by the construcuoo 4 Jae
proposed improvement, the amount of such daw
ages.
(4) separately, how much the portion •**
sought to be condemned, and each estate or inter
est therein, will be benefited, if at all by «•»
construction of the improvement propoaed if enf
plaintiff If the benefit shall be equal to the «**>
ages assessed under Subdivision (2) 0/ lh» m
tion, the owner of the parcel shall be allow* m
compensation except the value of the perta*
taken, but if the benefit shall be lese the* m
damages so assessed, the former shall be *>
ducted from the latter, and the remainder a**
be the only damages allowed in addition at • *
value of the portion taken.
(5) As far as practicable compensation Mall*
assessed for each source of damages separately
78-34-11.

When right to damages
have accrued.
For the purpose of assessing compenanUea
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed le *
accrued at the date of the service of summon* a*
actual value at that date shall be the measure**
pensation for all property to be actually Unea\ i

70-34-11. When right to damages deemed *
have accrued.
For the purpose of assessing compensation •*•
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to h*w
accrued at the date of the service of summons, and IU
actual value at that date shall be the measure of co»
penaation for all property to be actually taken, ud
\totbasis of damages to property not actually taken,
I tot injuriously affected, in all cases where such dam[ ges are allowed, as provided in the next preceding
I gction (Section 78-34-10). No improvements put
I fon the property subsequent to the date of service of
I «mmons shall be included in the assessment of comI jmsauon or damages.
less

23.
24.
25.
26.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Article

27. (Fundamental rights.]

I. Declaration of Rights
II. State Boundaries
III.

IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

IX.
X.
XI.
XII.

xm.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.

XX.
XXI
XXII.
XXIII.
XXIV.

28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] [Proposed.)

Ordinance
Elections and Right of Suffrage
Distribution of Powers
Legislative Department
Executive Department
Judicial Department
Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
Education
Counties, Cities and Towns
Corporations
Revenue and Taxation
Public Debt
Militia
Labor
Water Rights
Forestry
Public Buildings and State Institutions
Public Lands
Salaries
Miscellaneous
Amendment and Revision
Schedule

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.)
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.

All political power is inherent in the people; and all
free governments are founded on their authority for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may require.
1896
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United
States is the supreme law of the land.
1896
Sec. 4.

Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we,
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate
the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section

1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.!
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to
vote or hold office. 1
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.J
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. [Rights of accused persons.]
[Rights of accused persons.] [Proposed.]

13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
17. [Elections to be free •— Soldiers voting.]

18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
[Treason defined — Proof.]
[Military subordinate to the civil power.]
[Slavery forbidden.]
(Private property for public use.]

1896

Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.]

PREAMBLE

19.
20.
21.
22.

[Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
[Uniform operation of laws.]
(Rights retained by people.]
[Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]

[Religious liberty — N o property qualifi-

cation to vote or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed.
The State shall make no law respecting a n establishment of religion or prohibiting t h e free exercise
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or t h e
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for t h e support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property
qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896

Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it.
1896
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear
arms for security and defense of self, family, others,
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; b u t nothing herein shall
prevent t h e legislature from defining t h e lawful use
of arms.
1984 (2nd S.S.)
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
1896

Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except:

411

413

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in
levving war against it, or in adhering to its enemies
or in giving them aid and comfort No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act
1896
Sec. 20.

[Military

subordinate

to

the

civil

power. 1
The military shall be in strict subordination to the
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be
quartered in any house without the consent of the
owner, nor in time of war except in a manner to be
prescribed by law
1896
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.!
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this
State
1896
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.l
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation
1896
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any
franchise, privilege or immunity
1896
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation
1896
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed
to impair or deny others retained by the people
1896
Sec. 26.

[Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise
1896
Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.]
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is
essential to the security of individual rights and the
perpetuity of free government
1896
Sec. 28.

[Declaration of the rights of crime vic-

tims.] [Proposed.]
(1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process, victims of crimes have these
rights, as defined by law
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and
dignity, and to be free from harassment and
abuse throughout the criminal justice process,
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present
at, and to be heard at important criminal justice
hearings related to the victim, either in person or
through a lawful representative, once a criminal
information or indictment charging a crime has
been publicly filed in court, and
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose
of imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and
consider, without evidentiary limitation, reliable
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a peioon convicted of an offense except that this subsection does not apply
to capital cases or situations involving privileges
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as
creating a cause of action tor money damages, costs,
or attorney's fees, or for dismissing any criminal
charge, or relief from any criminal judgment

Art. Ill

(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all
felony crimes and such other crimes or acts, including
juvenile offenses, as the Legislature may provide
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce
and define this section by statute
(19941
ARTICLE II
STATE BOUNDARIES
Section
1 [State boundaries ]
Section 1. [State boundaries.]
The boundaries of t h e State of U t a h shall be a s
follows
Beginning a t a point formed by t h e intersection of
the thirty-second degree of longitude west from
Washington, with t h e thirty-seventh degree of north
latitude, thence due west along said thirty-seventh
degree of north latitude to t h e intersection of t h e
same with the thirty-seventh degree of longitude
west from Washington, thence due north along said
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to t h e intersection of t h e same with t h e forty-second degree of
north latitude, thence d u e east along said forty-second degree of north latitude to t h e intersection of the
same with t h e thirty-fourth degree of longitude west
from Washington, thence due south along said thirtyfourth degree of west longitude to t h e intersection of
the same with the forty-first degree of north latitude,
thence due east along said forty-first degree of north
latitude to t h e intersection of t h e same with t h e
thirty-second degree of longitude west from Washington, thence due south along said thirty-second degree
of west longitude to the place of beginning
1896
ARTICLE III
ORDINANCE
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden ]
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of
lands — Exemption ]
[Territorial debts assumed ]
[Free nonsectanan schools ]
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of
this State
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.]
First — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is
guaranteed No inhabitant of this State shall ever be
molested m person or property on account of his or
her mode of religious worship, but polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited
1896
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation
of lands — Exemption.]
Second — The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that they forever disclaim all right
and title to the unappropriated public lands lying
within the boundaries hereof, and to ail lands lying
within said limits owned or held by any Indian or
Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall
have been extinguished by the United States, the
same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of
the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the
Congress of the United States The lands belonging to
citizens of the United States, residing without this
State shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the
lands belonging to residents of this State, but nothing

Amend. I

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
CHARLES COTES WORTH
PINCKNEY,
CHARLES PINCKNEY,
PIERCE BUTLER.

Georgia

WILLIAM FEW,
ABR BALDWIN.
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AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

In Convention Monday September 17th 1787.

AMENDMENT III

Present The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr.
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved,

[Quartering soldiers.!
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

That the preceding Constitution be laid before the
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof
to the United States in Congress assembled.

AMENDMENT IV

Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention,
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States which shall
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and
Representatives elected: That the Electors should
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place assigned;
that the Senators should appoint a President of the
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and
counting the Votes for President; and, that after he
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
Constitution.
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention.
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary.

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII
AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.)
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
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W. D. H u r l e y ,

October 24, 1975

The Honorable Stanley Green, Mayor
City of Centervllle
470 North 400 West
Centervllle, Utah
84014
Dear Mayor Green:
This office has received two letters from Mr. L. Val Roberts,
Attorney at Law, pertaining to the desire of residents to install
curb and gutter on the west side of Main Street, north of Parrish
Lane. It is our understanding that Centervllle has an ordinance
requiring installation of sidewalk where curb and gutter has been
placed.
Inasmuch as the standard state right-of-way of 66 feet was in
question, Mr. BJorn Wang, District R/W Design Engineer, was asked to help
resolve the problem. It appears the state does not have a 33 foot
righc-of-way west of the monument line through the area in question,
but that placement of the curb and gutter with the back of curb
25.5 feet from the monument line (standard for 66' right-of-way)
would be well within the state right-of-way.
Mr, Edward D. Julio, District Traffic Engineer, and I, made an
on-the-site inspection to determine the possibility of shifting the
curb and gutter easterly to provide room for the parking strip and
sidewalk on existing right-of-way. It is our opinion that shift
should not be made due to the width of the present, roadway and the
set-back of the existing curb and gutter north of the area.
We regret that we could not be more helpfull in providing a
solution, however, the department does not have funds for obtaining
additional right-of-way in that area at the present time. We do
appreciate your concern for upgrading and providing a safe traffic
condition on state highways.
Yours truly,

// ,
cc:

W.
L.
B.
E.

AJS:tb

D, Hurley
y
Val Roberts^
Wang
D. Julio

//£

/fasti. ^y~/%yft> »
Andrew J . y o o p k o /
Cotitract Xlaima & U t i l i t y Officer

FARMINGTON, UTAH, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1994
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THE COURT:

We are in chambers in the matter in

Utah Department of Transportation vs. Joseph Val Rav Roberts
and Verle Roberts, his wife.

Case number 920700170.

Mr. Ward is here on behalf of the Department of
Transportation.
his wife.

Mr. Roberts is here representing himself and

Mr. Roberts is a member of the bar.

Counsel has

asked to visit with the Court in chambers.
What can I help you with, gentlemen?
MR. WARD:
concerns.

Your Honor, I have a couple of

Number one, after the taking of the depositions,

it appears to me as though Mr. Jackman is $1,000 or less on
his appraisal unless he's changed.
appraisal.

We are 2,000 on our

I am not getting to the penny, and I am not

representing that, I am just talking in generalities.

I

would like to know where we are going with this.
Mr. Roberts has —

when his deposition was taken,

he's testified to 275,000.
THE COURT:

Well, let me just say at this point,

first of all, I think I will say right now, and this is where
we are going, and I think I've equivocated about it on this.
The only issue before the Court is the value of the property
and any severance damage.

Those are the only issues we will

hear, period.

5

spent a good deal of time researching.
THE COURT:

I have indicated before, the only

issues before this Court at this time, Mr. Roberts, are value
of the take before and after, and severance damage.

It has

nothing to do with the title to the property as far as where
the line was located.

That has been resolved by stipulation,

and it's over and done.
MR. ROBERTS:

As to the value of the severance

damages, that figure that I gave of 103,000 versus 275,000
won't necessarily encompass the value associated with the
loss of the use of the land on the south boundary of the
driveway, because it's so narrow you can't do anything with
it but grow weeds, and it would also include the loss of
the land taken by the backfill and the berm along the west
edge of the property, and it would also include the loss of
the benefits from the nine-foot-high private hedge or
eight-foot-high private hedge and the loss of the large
willow tree,
THE COURT:

So you've included in your change of

value all of your severance damages?
MR. ROBERTS:

That's what I've tried to do, your

Honor, to the best of my ability.

I am not otherwise

competent to, except as a property owner, to testify as to
what the individual value of any particular severance damage
may be.

I couldn't even tell you

—
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MR. WARD:

Okay.

MR. ROBERTS:

For that limited purpose, we don't

object.
Q.

(BY MR. WARD)

So your original appraisal was

based upon what, Mr. Hoi brook?
A.

The fact that the property necessary for

construction of this project was already in the State
right-of-way.
Q.

How much was that appraisal?

A.

$900.

Q.

What was that based upon?

A.

Well, it was based on a minimum value for the

taking and the easement.

Under the State acquisition

schedules, there is a minimum value that is paid no matter
how much property we take or whether we take any.

If we need

to get a deed and an instrument, there is a $250 minimum paid
to the property owner, and for the temporary easement it
would have been $100.

And then I did give him some credit,

even though it was in the right-of-way, for landscaping trees
at the time, and it came to a total of $900 at that time.
MR. ROBERTS:

Your Honor, I am going to object to

his testimony that the improvements were in the right-of-way
since your Honor has —

it's been offered only to explain

that the testimony is a fact that it was that way and it is
objectionable.
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be considered as property taken.
So the fact that there is a berm behind that wall
only is relevant insofar as it may constitute a diminution in
the value of the remainder.

In this case, there is no such

testimony that the construction of the berm behind the wall,
the wall, the elevation of the driveway or any of those items
which may have altered somewhat the access to defendant's
property in any way diminished the value of the remainder.
There is absolutely no evidence to support that argument.
There has been evidence offered by Mr. Roberts of
a value of the property at the time of the take to be
$275,000.

I assume he bases that on some commercial value,

but the Court finds that the best evidence is that that was
not the highest and best use.

Even assuming it was, there is

no basis to support that value in the property.
As to his testimony as to the value remaining
after the take, the Court would find that the $103,000
estimate presented by Mr. Roberts is without support or
foundation, and although as a property owner he has
competency to testify relative to value, the question of the
weight to be accorded to that testimony is for the Court, and
the Court finds that based upon his experience, his basis for
his estimates and general knowledge in that area, that his
estimate in that regard is basically not competent.
The Court further notes that there has been

75

evidence relative to a grade behind the retaining wall not
being provided in the plans, and possibly not in conformity
with the guidelines of the building code and even department
standards.

The Court makes no finding as to why it ended up

in that manner.

However, there has been some evidence in

that regard, but I have heard absolutely no evidence to the
effect that it in any way affected the value of the remainder
so as to constitute severance damage.
The Court will, however, order that the fill be
placed to bring the grade up to as it's required by the
plans.

The Court will allow that either to be done by

Mr. Roberts and reimburse him a reasonable amount or require
that the city complete that.
Mr. Roberts, how do you want it?

Do you want, to

do it or do you want them to do it?
MR. ROBERTS:
Honor, they can do it.
THE COURT:
have.

If those are the choices, your
I would prefer a different choice.
That is the only alternative you

The Court will order that the city is to bring the

grade up to and equal to that provided by the plans.
are to slope the berm back over a three-foot area.

They

They are

to provide the fill sufficient to do that and sod sufficient
to sod that from the west side of the retaining wall to a
point three feet back from the wall.

I calculate that that

is 394 square feet of sod, and I estimate 28 cents a square
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6
7
8

Plaintiff
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9
10
11
12
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14

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled matter came on
for hearing before the Hon. RODNEY PAGE, Judge of the above
entitled Court on November 17, 1992.
WHEREUPON the following proceedings were had and the
following testimony was adduced, to wit:
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16
17

A p p e a r a n c e s :

18
STEVE LEWIS, ESQ.

19
Attorney for Plaintiff;
20
21
22
23
24
25

J. VAL ROBERTS, ESQ.,
Attorney for Defendant.

1
2

THE COURT:

Transportation vs. Val Roberts.

3
4

MR. ROBERTS:

I believe that's stipulated, your

Honor.

5
6

What about number 12, Utah Department of

MR. LEWIS;

We have a resolution, if we can

THE COURT:

You may.

approach.

7

This is a question as far as

8

the disposition of proceeds that are being held in the Clerk's

9

office?

10

MR. LEWIS:

11

Steve Ward is the moving party.

12
13

THE COURT:

MR. WARD:

15

MR. LEWIS:

18

20
21
22
23
24
25

My name is Steve Lewis.

I wouldn't want to be getting mixed up

I can take it.
I don't work in the same division.

used to work in the same division.

17

19

On the calendar it reflects

with his name either.

14

16

Right.

I

He is an honorable fellow.

THE COURT:

Just in jest, Mr. Ward.

MR. LEWIS:

The Motion, your Honor, is one by the

Utah State Tax Commission for distribution of proceeds.
Notice was given to Mr. and Mrs. Roberts and to counsel for
UDOT.

The Record should reflect that there was an affidavit

filed reflecting amounts that were owed.
Originally in our motion we asked for—we asked that
monies be distributed based on liens that had been filed in
Davis County.

Currently there is $900.00 being held by the
1

1
2

Clerk of the Court here.

And Mr. Roberts today is stipulating

that monies reflected in this affidavit, which total $782.46,

3
would be distributed.

He has initialed it.

4
MR. ROBERTS:
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

to lose my voice.

owed.

Because of the way at least I interpret the Utah

statute on what happens if you remove proceeds in a
condemnation action, I am not prepared to stipulate to the
removal of the proceeds, except t h a t — a s far as myself is
concerned, or my wife.

What I am basically saying is that

their accounting is correct and their liens are valid.

I have

no defense to them taking the amount of money that they have
set out.

And I have initialed the amounts as being correct.

So as far as agreeing to the distribution per se, that's
not what I am doing.

17
18

If I may, what I am stipulating to is that

their accounting is correct, and that the money is in fact

15
16

If I may, your H o n o r — p a r d o n me, about

MR. LEWIS:

Your Honor, there is an affidavit that

sets forth the amounts.

19

THE COURT:

I have seen the affidavit.

MR. LEWIS:

Okay.

20
Out in the hall we went through

21
that.

I told Mr. Roberts if the distribution is made today,

22
it will clear off all those balances.
23
MR. ROBERTS:

And I don't dispute the accounting.

24
MR. LEWIS:

That it would be in his interest.

THE COURT:

Well, the Court will order that the

25
2

1
2
3

funds be distributed pursuant to the accounting set forth in
the affidavit that was filed by Jan Penney.
those funds I suppose you would like?

4

MR. ROBERTS:

5

THE COURT:

6

THE COURT:

THE COURT:
such an Order.

15

20
21

24

If I can reflect on the record that a

today.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. LEWIS:

One other small thing, on the affidavit

it shows that the '91 return and the '91 return haven't been
filed.

Mr. Roberts reflects his '91 return has been filed

with nothing owing.

If there is something further owing, we

may have a further motion before the Court.

22
23

The Court will sign that order.

copy of that Order will be handed to Mr. Roberts and Mr. Ward

17

19

With that understanding you may submit

MR. LEWIS:

16

18

That's correct, your Honor.

Thank you all for appearing.

13
14

So you don't give up that question as

MR. ROBERTS:

10

12

Yes, your Honor.

far as that is concerned.

9

11

Oh, no, they stay here.

You want to remain there.

MR. ROBERTS:

7
8

The balance of

THE COURT:

Well, that's between you and Mr.

Roberts.
MR. LEWIS: Thank you very much, your Honor.

25
MR. ROBERTS;

May we take the Order and get
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THE COURT:

One that requires it certain as to

the sidewalk if federal funds are involved, and if you can
show me the law, I'll take a look at that time and then we
will look at whether federal funds are involved.
MR. ROBERTS:

All right.

That again is Title 29

of the federal code.
THE COURT:

Submit it in the proper form and I

will take a look at it.
MR. WARD:

You have 10 days to do it.
Your Honor, it's our position that the

order of occupancy has been granted.

He drew down on the

money, the 7824.
THE COURT:

Hasn't the money been drawn down?

MR. ROBERTS:
MR. WARD:
or something.

No.

That is another issue.

The money has been drawn down, 7824.12

The only issue left is how much.

I mean if he

had a question, he should have raised that at the time of the
order of occupancy.

We are not going to relitigate the

design of the highway because that is not what the statute
provides.

When he draws down on the money, your Honor, and

there is a Supreme Court case on this, Qgden vs. UDOT when he
draws down on the money and doesn't reserve anything, the
only issue left is how much do we owe him.
THE COURT:

Mr. Roberts, that would be correct,

MR. ROBERTS:
money.

Except we didn't draw down on the

In fact, both the letter and the statute which

6

1

requires the state to pay

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. ROBERTS:

4j

MR. WARD:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. ROBERTS:

—

Did you withdraw the money?
No, your Honor.

That is wrong, your Honor.
It's still in the file.
No.

Let me tell you how it came

7

together.

We were in two hearings together.

In fact, Ted

8

Lewis, attorney for the State Tax Commission, knew about

9

money being paid into this account three or four days before

10

I did, and he called me and said they are going to pay

11

another $500.

12

"I don't want anything done with it.

13

because of the very statute."

14
15
16
17

What do you want to do with it?

THE COURT:

MR. ROBERTS:

Did the State come in and take the

The State came in and took it.

We

don't have the 75 percent that is required.
THE COURT:

19

MR. ROBERTS:

20

offense to it.

21

not stipulate.

Did you stipulate that they could?
No, sir.

I said I don't have an

There is nothing I can do about it.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. ROBERTS:

25

It stays this way

money?

18

24

And I said,

I did

Did you appear?
I did appear at two hearings, your

Honor, before yourself.
THE COURT:

Did you consent to their withdrawal?

MR. ROBERTS:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

I see.

We will need to look at what

the minute entry says in those.
MR. ROBERTS:
MR. WARD:

Absolutely no consent at all.

We take the position, your Honor, some

of what he says is true.

We had a tax lien against him and

they picked up the money, and if he had wanted to make
reservations, he should have made them at that time reserving
certain issues, and I'm unaware of that he did any of that.
THE COURT:

We will look at that.

MR. ROBERTS:

They were reserved too.

If we need

to, we will ask the court reporter to do a transcript.
THE COURT:

Find those dates and I will have her

look at those.
MR. ROBERTS:

Now, that is another issue.

As far

as we are concerned, both our rights to parol process, equal
protection of the law, and our sewer lines have been rich,
because we have not received the money.

It's just been

passed from one State agency to the other.

That's where we

are at on that.
THE COURT:
MR. ROBERTS:

Okay.
Now, the other major problem is the

18 foot of the construction easement.

No one has been

willing to take the foot-and-a-half-high mound of earth that
they left behind away and put the sod back the way it was.

8

in value?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Are you aware, Mr. Jones, that the parties have

entered into a stipulation to pay compensation?
MR. ROBERTS:

Objection, relevance as to the

survey.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

I think that has already

been stipulated to, Counsel.
MR. WARD:

I was asking if he knew that, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

It's irrelevant whether he knows that

or not.
MR. WARD:

All right.

No further questions, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Redirect, Mr. Roberts?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR, ROBERTS:
Q.

Mr. Jones, at your deposition, I believe you

testified that there were, in addition to I think what you
referred to as the east boundary by description, there were
two other lines establishing the east boundary of the
defendant's property.
A.

Is that not so?

In my deposition, I believe I indicated that

there were two possibilities of the west line of the
right-of-way.

If, in fact, you assume some things, one of
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1

which was that if you assume that the old existing wells that

2

were drilled many years ago along the west side of this

3

street were contained with private property, then that west

4

line would be approximately six feet east of* where it's

5

indicated on the Centerville plats now.

6

Q.

Does that show on this survey?

7

A.

Not on this one.

8

the other plat.

9

Q.

This plat here?

10

A.

Yes.

11

THE COURT:

It shows on the other survey,

I think we are going now where I am

12

not going to allow to us go, Mr. Roberts.

13

to go litigate where your east boundary line is, period.

14

That has been stipulated and decided, and I am not hearing

15

any evidence in that regard other than what I've

16

inadvertently let in at this point.

17

That is not an issue.

18

else, but we will hear no more about that.

19

We are not going

So we are finished.

Go on if you want to go to something

MR. ROBERTS:

It's the inadvertence that I

20

believe prejudices the defendants* case in making a record on

21

what the overall circumstances are surrounding the

22

right-of-way from date of beginning to present taking.

23

THE COURT:

Mr. Roberts, you entered into a

24

stipulation and agreed where that boundary line was, and you

25

are bound by .that stipulation, and therefore, it's not a

46

question of litigation-

Now, I won't tell you again.

Let's

go from there.
MR. ROBERTS:

I appreciate the Court's

utilization of inadvertence.

No other questions for this

witness.
MR. WARD:

No further questions, your Honor.

MR. ROBERTS:
THE COURT:

Now, the issue then becomes
Wait a minute.

—

Are you through with

this witness?
MR. ROBERTS:
THE COURT:

No further.

He has no questions.

You may step down.

May this witness be excused?
MR. ROBERTS:

This depends on what Mr. Campbell

is going to testify to.
THE COURT:

That is your problem.

May this

witness be excused?
MR. ROBERTS:
THE COURT:

Subject to re-call.

All right.

You may be excused.

(Witness excused.)
MR. ROBERTS:

May I speak with the witness

privately, your Honor?
THE COURT:

You may.

(Whereupon a discussion was held off the record.)
MR. ROBERTS:
other commitments.

Yes, your Honor, this witness has

He will, however, be available on the

47

MR. ROBERTS:
THE COURT:

I have no other witnesses.
You rest subject to calling

Mr. Aposhian?
MR. ROBERTS:

And subject to, depending on what

is testified to.
THE COURT:

Well, you have a right to rebuttal.

MR. ROBERTS:

Yes, rebuttal witnesses, that's

fine.
THE COURT:
MR. WARD:

We will call Mr. Dean Hoi brook.

THE COURT:
please.

You may proceed.

Mr. Hoi brook, would you step up,

If you would raise your right hand and face the

clerk.
DEAN W. HOLBROOK
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff, being
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

PIR5CT EXAMINATION
BY MR. WARD:
Q.

State your name and your address and occupation

if you would, Mr. Holbrook.
A.

Dean W. Holbrook.

Bountiful, Utah.

360 North 700 East,

Right now, I'm retired.

I was at the

time of this acquisition the chief of right-of-way of the
Utah Department of Transportation, and as such, I'm
representing them here today.
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appraisal of the subject property?
A.

Yes.

In fact, they are defined in the report

itself.
Q.

When were you first retained to make an appraisal

of the subject property?
A.

Well, I got involved with this acquisition back

in 1990 and came out and took a look at it, and it went on
for a period of time.

The initial appraisal, per se, was

done in 1992, and I made it at that time.
Q.

Did you have occasion to talk with the landowner?

A.

Oh, yes, many times.

Q.

Did you explain to him what you were doing there?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ultimately make an initial appraisal?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was that based on?

A.

My initial appraisal was —

My initial appraisal was based —
1992.

just a moment here.

was made in April of

It was made based on the fact that the property that

was needed for this acquisition was jalxaady in the State

MR. WARD:

Your Honor, I'm only offering this to

explain the difference in the two appraisals.
trying to go into

I am not

—

THE COURT:

I understand.
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1

MR. WARD:

2

MR. ROBERTS:

Okay.
For that limited purpose, we don't

3| object.

4

Q.

(BY MR. WARD)

So your original appraisal was

51 based upon what, Mr. Hoi brook?
6

7

A

*

The

f

^ct that the property necessary for

construction of this project was already in the State

81 right-of-way.
91

Q.

How much was that appraisal?

10

A.

$900.

11

Q.

What was that based upon?

12

A.

Well, it was based on a minimum value for the

13

taking and the easement.

14

schedules, there is a minimum value that is paid no matter

15

how much property we take or whether we take any.

16

to get a deed and an instrument, there is a $250 minimum paid

17

to the property owner, and for the temporary easement it

18

would have been $100.

19

even though it was in the right-of-way, for landscaping trees

20

at the time, and it came to a total of $900 at that time,

21

Under the State acquisition

If we need

And then I did give him some credit,

MR. ROBERTS:

Your Honor, I am going to object to

22

his testimony that the improvements were in the right-of-way

23

since your Honor has —

24

that the testimony is a fact that it was that way and it is

25

objectionable.

it's been offered only to explain
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1

THE COURT:

I am not receiving it for the truth

2

of the matter asserted in here as to the location of the

3

right-of-way, only to explain the reasons for his valuation.

4

MR. WARD:

5

MR. ROBERTS:

6

used, truth of the matter asserted.

7

MR. WARD:

8

THE COURT:

9

I just didn't want it,
That is the term I should have

There has been a change, your Honor.
I understand.

Q.

(BY MR. WARD)

11

A.

The condemnation case was filed.

12

Q.

Then you were made aware of the stipulation of

10

13

Then the condemnation case was

filed?

the parties?

14

A.

That's right.

15

Q.

That stipulation necessitated a revision of your

16

appraisal?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

In that the parties stipulated that six feet

19

would be taken and paid for?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Did you make a new appraisal, Mr. Holbrook?

22

A.

Yes, I did.

23

Q.

Tell us about that appraisal.

24

A.

Well, of course, the difference being that we

25

were now going to pay for the property as defined in the
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